HMCS William Hall contributes to significant seizure of illegal narcotics on Operation CARIBBE
Canada News Centre
05 Jun 2025, 02:20 GMT+10
June 4, 2025 - Ottawa, Ontario - National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces
On May 29 and 31, while deployed in support of Operation CARIBBE, His Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) William Hall and an embarked United States Coast Guard (USCG) Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) successfully conducted seizures of more than 1300 kilograms of cocaine in the Caribbean Sea.
During two separate maritime patrols, multi-role rescue boats were deployed from HMCS William Hall to intercept vessels of interest in the Caribbean Sea, resulting in the seizures. These successful interdictions underscore the enduring collaboration and interoperability between the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and USCG and support- international efforts to prevent the flow of illicit substances into Canada and North America.
Canada's contribution to United States-led Enhanced Counternarcotics Operations under Joint Interagency Task Force South represents an important dimension of our relationship with our ally, the United States, and partners in the region. This collective effort enables us to achieve greater success in making the continent more secure from the threats posed by illicit trafficking and supports broader efforts to enhance regional and continental security.
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