US judge blocks Trump's veto on union bargaining for transport security officers
A federal judge on Monday said the administration of US President Donald Trump probably broke the law by stripping 50,000 transport security officers of the ability to unionise and bargain over their working conditions.
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US District Judge Marsha Pechman in Seattle, Washington blocked the US Department of Homeland Security from cancelling a union contract covering TSA (Transportation Security Administration) officers pending the outcome of a lawsuit by four unions challenging the move.
The lawsuit claims the
Trump administration ended collective bargaining for TSA officers, who staff checkpoints at US airports and other transport hubs, as retaliation against the unions for suing over administration policies.
Trump, a Republican, has moved to curb union bargaining for wide swathes of the federal workforce. A US appeal court in May allowed those efforts to proceed, pausing a lower-court ruling that had blocked seven agencies from cancelling union contracts while it considers an appeal.
Because of the sensitive nature of their jobs, TSA officers are not governed by the civil service system and do not have the same rights to unionise and collectively bargain over working conditions as most other federal employees.
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During former president Barack Obama's administration, the TSA granted officers the ability to bargain over certain subjects. Former president
Joe Biden's administration expanded the scope of bargaining in 2021.
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