Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) In 2025: Xi Jinping's Gunboat Diplomacy And Global Display Of Military Might In Four Maritime Drills Showcase Strength, Aim To Boost Domestic Confidence, Contain And Deter The U.S. And Its Allies, Target Taiwan, And Safeguard Xi's Overseas Expansion

Memri

26-03-2025

As 2025 unfolds, observations from the recently concluded Two Sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC) [1] and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) [2] reveal a grim domestic situation in China. The Chinese government is increasingly concerned about the risk of systemic re-impoverishment within the country.
With the domestic economy struggling to recover effectively, Chinese President Xi Jinping appears ever more enamored with flexing Beijing's military muscle, embarking on a bold display of force globally to assert dominance. In just over two months since the year began, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made frequent appearances across multiple regions worldwide.
This analysis compiles reports and commentary from Chinese social media on four large-scale military exercises recently conducted or launched without prior notice by the PLAN, offering readers a glimpse into the geopolitical chess game, guided by nationalism, that the CCP is playing. It analyzes the strategic considerations driving Xi Jinping's government's series of military maneuvers and proposes perspectives and approaches to address China's increasingly ambitious military challenges.
First, let us outline several key developments worth noting:
On March 7, 2025, during a meeting with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) delegation at the NPC, CCP leader Xi Jinping delivered a speech calling for the PLA to achieve "high-quality development and accelerate the development of new combat capabilities" to implement his newly proposed "three-step strategy" for modernizing China's national defense and armed forces: achieving the centennial goal of the PLA by 2027, largely realizing defense and military modernization by 2035, and building a world-class military by mid-century. Xi emphasized that military development must withstand the tests of history and real combat.
On March 7, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi took a hardline stance at a press conference during the NPC, asserting that Taiwan's sole designation at the United Nations is "Taiwan Province of China." He declared that Taiwan has never been a country in the past and will never be one in the future.
The CCP's annual Taiwan work conference, held in Beijing on February 25-26, omitted any mention of "peaceful" reunification this year. Instead, it introduced a new formulation: Resolutely combating "Taiwan independence" forces' provocations and shaping the inevitable trend of national reunification.
On March 17, the PLA conducted an unannounced military exercise near the Taiwan Strait, with China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson explicitly stating that the move was primarily aimed at the United States.
On February 21, 2025, at 2:47 pm local time, the Chinese Navy's Type 055 destroyer Zunyi fired live rounds from its main gun in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand, marking a historic first for the PLAN in the Southern Hemisphere. This sudden long-range deployment and live-fire exercise carried extraordinary significance: It was a warning and reprisal against Australia and New Zealand for supporting U.S. military action in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, as well as a test of the PLAN's long-range mobility, combat capability, and logistical support.
From March 10, Chinese naval warships participated in the annual "Maritime Security Belt 2025" joint naval exercise with Russia and Iran near Iran's Chabahar Port in the Gulf of Oman near the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
From February 7-11, the Chinese Navy joined the "AMAN-2025" naval exercise hosted by Pakistan. This multinational exercise, which included the U.S. among over ten participating navies, took place in a strategically vital region connecting the Indian Ocean, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia – an area of immense importance to Beijing.
Chinese social media has been abuzz with commentary on the PLAN's participation in these exercises. By collecting articles from various public accounts on platforms like WeChat – particularly regarding the Taiwan Strait, Tasman Sea, and "AMAN-2025" exercises – this article captures the exuberant nationalist sentiment and subtle details not openly disclosed by official channels. These insights help paint a fuller picture of Xi Jinping's strategic ambitions and adventurous impulses.
It should be noted that while these public account articles do not necessarily reflect Beijing's official stance, their publication under the CCP's stringent Internet censorship regime suggests at least tacit official approval.
Let us first examine Chinese social media posts in chronological order to understand Chinese domestic perspectives, focus areas, and strategic intentions regarding international relations and geopolitical competition. Some narratives in these articles may deviate from facts, data may be inaccurate or exaggerated, and no fact-checking is conducted here; they are presented as is:
1. PLA Taiwan Strait Exercise, March 17, 2025
This exercise was conducted without prior warning, with news disseminated through responses from Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Affairs Office spokespersons. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning directly singled out the United States, stating: "The U.S. has recently taken a series of wrong steps on the Taiwan question. In particular, the U.S. State Department removed important statements that show the U.S. is committed to the one-China policy and does not support 'Taiwan independence' in the fact sheet of its so-called relations with Taiwan on the website, which shows the U.S. gravely backpedaled on its position on Taiwan-related issues." She added, "China's relevant military operation is a firm response to external forces who are hellbent on abetting and aiding 'Taiwan independence,' and a warning to 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces' unconscionable acts." [3]
On the same day, the spokesperson of the Chinese government's Taiwan Affairs Office issued a warning aimed at Taiwan's Lai Ching-te administration: "Lai Ching-te's actions severely provoke the one-China principle, undermine cross-strait relations, and continuously push Taiwan toward a perilous brink of war, gravely threatening peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We will neither tolerate nor indulge this, and we will resolutely counter and punish it. We solemnly warn the Lai Ching-te authorities: daring to provoke and play with fire will only lead to self-destruction and utter ruin." [4]
The WeChat public account "Yangmen Zhuojian( 杨门灼见 )" commented on March 17: "Last year, our military's Eastern Theater Command conducted two consecutive 'Joint Sword' operations around Taiwan. This unannounced exercise can be seen as a continuation of those actions. Unlike previous instances, this exercise commenced without prior notice, aligning more closely with real combat scenarios and leaving no reaction time for the Taiwan island. This demonstrates both our military's firm resolve to safeguard national sovereignty and its formidable capability to achieve national reunification. As such drills become routine, they can, through repeated advancements, shape a posture of 'encircling Taiwan island and pressing closely,' breaking the psychological defenses of 'Taiwan independence' forces." [5]
The WeChat account "Moshang Huakai ( 陌上花开 )," in a March 17 article titled "Causes and Objectives of the PLA's Military Exercise Near the Taiwan Strait Today," suggested that the exercise aimed to "test real combat capabilities and reunification plans" and "probe international reactions." The article elaborated: "By showcasing military strength, this exercise sends a clear signal: through sea-air integrated blockade drills (e.g., the 'lock-the-door-and-beat-the-dog' tactic combining J-20 fighters and Type 055 destroyers), the PLA demonstrates its ability to swiftly isolate Taiwan, directly warning the DPP authorities against reckless moves. The deployment of 'carrier-killer' assets like the DF-21D missile during the exercise also serves to deter potential military intervention by external forces in the Taiwan Strait. The exercise tested joint operations across services, rapid response, and continuous day-night assaults, simulating 'blitzkrieg' scenarios. For instance, Taiwan media dubbed the 24-hour high-intensity drills an 'enhanced decapitation operation,' indicating the PLA's focus on real combat preparations and experience-building for potential reunification actions."
The author further noted: "This exercise allows us to gauge international reactions – especially from the U.S. and its allies – to sensitive actions like blockading the Taiwan Strait and live-fire drills, providing a basis for adjusting future Taiwan policies. This 'strategic test' helps China control the pace of the reunification process." [6]
The WeChat account "Zhanmeng Dashiye ( 展梦大 视野 )," in a March 17 article titled "Taiwan Strait Tensions Escalate! PLA's Around-Taiwan Exercise Sends a Powerful Signal: Taiwan Independence Will Face Severe Punishment," stated: "Military experts highlight three breakthroughs in this exercise: first, it marks the first "integrated operation of forces inside and outside the first island chain," with forces advancing to the waters off eastern Taiwan; second, establishing a multidimensional strike system with saturated sea-air coordinated attacks; and third, precisely targeting key 'Taiwan independence' assets, simulating precision strikes on energy routes and military facilities. This 'reverse salami-slicing' military pressure marks a new phase of normalized countermeasures against Taiwan." (Note: The term "reverse salami-slicing" used in the article has been frequently employed in MEMRI analyses of the Taiwan Strait since 2022.)
The article added: "The PLA's 'three-line blockade' capability – cutting off energy lifelines, escape routes for 'Taiwan independence' forces, and external support lines – has left separatists trapped in a 'cage with no escape.' From 'Joint Sword-2024A' to this around-Taiwan exercise, the PLA proves with actions that every escalation of separatist behavior will be met with an intensified countermeasure." [7] (Note: In my August 2022 analysis of Pelosi's Taiwan visit, I predicted that her trip would trigger Beijing's 'reverse salami-slicing' mode, with any U.S.-Taiwan actions against China prompting increasingly forceful retaliation.) [8]
Particularly noteworthy is a speech by General Lin Xiangyang ( 林向阳 ), Commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command and a close Xi confidant, delivered on March 14 at a symposium marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. Titled "Safeguarding National Reunification and Resolutely Thwarting All 'Taiwan Independence' Separatist Schemes," the speech was published in the CCP's top mouthpiece, People's Daily, on March 15. As the frontline commander facing Taiwan, his remarks carried unusual weight: "A range of major national weapons have been commissioned, significantly enhancing our ability to win informatized and intelligent warfare, sufficient to address all threats and challenges posed by 'Taiwan independence' separatism and external interference. Should 'Taiwan independence' separatists persist in their reckless course or take extreme risks, and should external forces insist on stoking tensions across the strait, the People's Army, alongside the nation – including the people of Taiwan – will take all necessary measures to forcefully suppress and punish them." [9]
PLA live-fire exercise footage (Source: Mp.weixin.qq.com)
2. China-Russia-Iran Gulf Of Oman Naval Exercise
On the morning of March 13, local time, Chinese and Russian warships departed Iran's Chabahar Port, concluding the two-day "Maritime Security Belt 2025" joint exercise with Iran, which began on March 10. Chinese state media reported: "The exercise reflected a high level of mutual trust and demonstrated a shared resolve to maintain maritime and regional security and stability." The Chinese contingent included the missile destroyer Baotou and the replenishment ship Gaoyouhu from the PLAN's 47th Aden Gulf escort task force, which had also participated in the "AMAN-2025" multinational exercise in Pakistan in early February.
Given the trilateral nature of this China-Russia-Iran exercise, Chinese social media commentary exuded a sense of superiority, asserting that the PLAN's technological advancement surpasses that of Russia and Iran, and even rivals the U.S.
The WeChat account "Daguo Boyi ( 大国博弈 )," in a March 16 article titled "Chinese Fleet Sails into the Persian Gulf, Massive Hulls Shock Middle Eastern Princes: Bigger Than U.S. Warships," brimmed with disdain for Gulf states. It stated: "The fleet, comprising the 7,000-ton Type 052DL destroyer Baotou and the 20,000-ton Gaoyouhu, arrived at Chabahar Port near the Persian Gulf's exit. Its imposing hulls, advanced active phased-array radar, dense vertical launch systems, and 130mm main gun left Middle Eastern princes in awe." Quoting Middle Eastern media, the article claimed that royals from Oman (an observer at the exercise) and nearby Saudi Arabia and UAE exclaimed that these warships were "bigger and more advanced than U.S. ones."
It boasted: "The exercise featured over ten warships from China, Russia, and Iran, but the two Chinese vessels stole the spotlight. The Baotou's combat capabilities surpass those of the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers stationed in the Persian Gulf, while the 23,000-ton Gaoyouhu serves as a mobile maritime support base, akin to the U.S. naval base in Bahrain."
The article cited Saudi media revisiting rumors of the kingdom eyeing Type 052DE destroyers, suggesting royals gained a firsthand impression of the PLA's version. It argued: "Western warships brought trouble and conflict to the Middle East, oppressing some nations, while China's fleet offers 'security cooperation' and advanced concepts like a 'community with a shared future,' which is why these princes are both stunned and admiring. Showing regional leaders a naval force 'more advanced than America's' is worth more than a hundred verbal assurances.
"With the Trump administration's lopsided support, Israel has nearly subdued regional resistance and consolidated its proxies. For Middle Eastern nations to truly control their security, they must break free from U.S. military reliance and build an independent regional security framework." [10]
The "Phoenix TV" WeChat account, in a March 14 article, noted that Chabahar Port, the exercise's venue, is vital to Iran's trade, boasts favorable hydrological and meteorological conditions, and lies near Pakistan's Gwadar Port – a key "Belt and Road" node – making it economically and strategically significant. Quoting Chinese military expert Wang Yunfei, it stated: "The Type 052D destroyer boasts strong combat capabilities, capable of launching anti-ship missiles with a 600km range and air-defense missiles with a 200km range. The Gaoyouhu, a comprehensive replenishment ship, supports diverse supplies and can deploy helicopters for vertical replenishment. No blue-water navy thrives without large replenishment ships, and China has mastered this capability." The article expressed displeasure at India's absence from the observer list, deeming it unreliable: "Despite its non-aligned stance, India is deeply tied to the U.S. strategically, participating in the U.S.-led Quad and expanding military cooperation, including arms purchases and joint exercises. As a linchpin in the U.S. 'Indo-Pacific Strategy,' India's opportunism shines through – likely keeping Iran at arm's length for speculative gain." [11]
(Source: Mp.weixin.qq.com)
The WeChat account "Caiwen Shezhang( 财闻社长 )," in a March 16 article titled "Oil for Warships? Iran's Commander Boards Type 052D – Two Models Available, China Emerges as Biggest Winner," reported: "On March 14, deputy foreign ministers of China, Russia, and Iran met in Beijing, jointly condemning sanctions, pressure, and military threats, implicitly criticizing the U.S. for its years of intense pressure on Iran. The 'Maritime Security Belt 2025' exercise is tangible support from China and Russia for Iran, with the name symbolizing their unbreakable bond." The article pitched Chinese warships to Iran: "The Type 052D, inspected by Iran's naval commander, is a highly capable destroyer. However, it may be too costly and complex for Iran, which lacks experience with large warships. The PLA's Type 054A frigate could be a better fit – equipped with a scaled-down active phased-array radar, it offers mid-range air defense at an affordable price of under 1.5 billion RMB per unit, a 'bargain' among warships. Iran could trade more oil to acquire a few." [12]
It is worth noting that Beijing also uses this routine exercise to tether Iran and Russia, preventing their rapprochement with the U.S. With Trump's second term underway and U.S.-Russia ties visibly warming, and Iran's President Pezeshkian signaling openness to U.S. dialogue on March 2 (despite Supreme Leader Khamenei's opposition), Chinese state and social media have reported these developments with evident concern. [13]
3. PLAN Tasman Sea Exercise
If Chinese social media displayed strength-based superiority regarding the China-Russia-Iran exercise, the PLAN's unprecedented live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea – right at Australia and New Zealand's doorstep – sparked an extraordinary wave of nationalist fervor. Commentators viewed it as revenge against two U.S. allies for opposing China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and a redemption of China's century-old humiliation when Western powers forced open its doors.
The WeChat account "Daguo Zhishiju ( 大国知 识局 )," posting on February 21 – the day the Tasman Sea exercise began – called it retaliation against Australia and New Zealand: "From February 10 to 13, Australian Air Force P-8A reconnaissance planes intruded into the South China Sea for four consecutive days, coming as close as 5.3 nautical miles from the Xisha (Paracel Islands) baseline. After China lawfully expelled them, the Type 055 task force dashed to the Tasman Sea within eight days – faster than a food delivery rider!" [14]
The WeChat account "Rongzhuang Jianwen ( 戎装 鉴闻 )," in a March 15 article, detailed the PLAN's over-10,000km journey and the exercise's specifics: "On February 21, 2025, at 15:47 local time, at coordinates 37°S, 157.02°E in the Tasman Sea, the Type 055 destroyer Zunyi's H/PJ-45 130mm main gun roared to life. In international waters 620km from Sydney, a New Zealand Navy Te Kaha frigate observer recorded this historic moment – the PLAN's first live-fire exercise in the Southern Hemisphere. Eighteen days earlier, on February 3, the task force – comprising Zunyi, Hengyang, and Weishanhu – departed the South China Sea, traversing the Mindoro and Basilan Straits, conducting initial firing in the Coral Sea off northeastern Australia, then proceeding south to establish a 40-nautical-mile no-sail zone in the sensitive waters between Australia and New Zealand." [15]
(Source: Mp.weixin.qq.com)
(Source: Mp.weixin.qq.com)
The WeChat account "Dushe Shijie ( 独舌 视界 )," in a February 25 article, hailed the PLAN's Southern Hemisphere thrust as "a manifesto of breaking through the First Island Chain's southern flank and targeting the Second Island Chain." It analyzed: "The 'First Island Chain' was a Cold War shackle on China, but this Type 055 task force's route tore apart that outdated geopolitical web: 1) Southern breakthrough: traversing the Torres Strait to the Tasman Sea, proving the PLAN can penetrate the chain multidirectionally without storming the Miyako Strait; 2) Force projection: two days of live-fire validated rapid combat capability in unfamiliar distant waters, with the Type 055's 112-cell VLS and dual-band radar extending its 'area denial' radius to the Second Island Chain; 3) Normalization signal: with a 37 percent annual increase in far-sea training, China's 'near-sea defense' era is over. The U.S. response was telling: forces in Okinawa pulled back, and the Seventh Fleet refrained from shadowing – a tacit admission of the 'island chain strategy's' obsolescence."
The article scrutinized America's muted stance: "Facing the PLAN's Second Island Chain incursion, Washington's silence reveals a triple bind: 1) Legal paradox: condemning China as 'provocative' would negate its decades-long 'freedom of navigation' mantra; 2) Strength anxiety: U.S. assessments peg victory odds against the PLA in the Western Pacific below 52 percent, forcing the Seventh Fleet to shrink its perimeter; 3) Alliance fissures: Australia and New Zealand's dismay at America's 'failure to back them up' is fraying Five Eyes trust. This silence reflects a stark power shift – the Type 055 costs 60 percent of a Burke III but outperforms it by 40 percent. When 'cost-effectiveness dominance' meets 'production speed dominance' (China launches three Type 055s annually vs. the U.S.'s six Burke IIIs planned over a decade), what can Washington do but stay quiet?" Quoting Xi Jinping, it smugly concluded: "The Tasman Sea's cannon fire heralds the end of unipolar maritime order. As Xi said, 'A great power must act like a great power' – an act China is forging with guns and wisdom." [16]
The WeChat account "Shengguan Tianxia( 盛 观天下 )," in a March 6 article titled "Tasman Sea Exercise Showcases China's Maritime Rangers' First Blade!!!" assessed the PLAN's strength and strategy: "Since the 21st century, China has pursued a blue-water fleet, now boasting three aircraft carriers, 28 Type 052D destroyers, eight Type 055 destroyers, and 15 large replenishment ships – solid foundations for its 'maritime rangers.' Through constant expeditions, platforms like carrier battle groups and Type 055/052D destroyers have been rigorously tested. In this Tasman Sea exercise, the task force traveled over 12,000 km from Sanya to Australia's east coast in 15 days, showcasing cross-theater mobility and support capabilities. The Tasman Sea, near Australia's economic core and a key South Pacific route, underscores China's intent to control far-sea strategic passages, honing its 'maritime rangers' and advancing its 'deep blue strategy.'" The article contrasted the PLAN with U.S. and Russian navies: "Unlike America's global-strike, carrier-backed 'maritime police' or Russia's post-Soviet submarine-and-missile 'regional deterrence,' China blends mobile task forces with area-denial systems for a 'dynamic presence.'" [17]
Notably, Beijing-based military account "Junwu Ciweimian ( 军武次位面 )," in a March 4 article titled "South Sea Fleet Patrols Australia, North Sea Fleet Eyes Alaska – Will the East Sea Fleet Go Bigger?," hinted at future Eastern Theater Navy moves against U.S.-Japan forces: "Today's Eastern Theater Navy mirrors the North Sea Fleet of a decade ago – quietly awaiting its breakout. If it receives four Type 055s and the 80,000-ton Fujian carrier as expected, its pent-up energy will erupt swiftly. Given the North Sea Fleet's feats within a year of Nanchang's commissioning, the Eastern Theater Navy – with Fujian and J-35s – could soon stun the world." [18]
4. PLAN Participation in "AMAN-2025" Exercise
The "AMAN-2025" exercise marked the PLAN's 2025 debut, commencing February 7 as Pakistani President Zardari visited China. The day prior, Zardari and Xi issued a joint statement in Beijing, proclaiming: "The unbreakable China-Pakistan ironclad friendship and partnership, tested by shifting international dynamics, transcends geopolitical interests and is a vital force for regional peace, stability, and development. China-Pakistan relations hold strategic value; any attempt to disrupt or undermine this cooperation will fail. China reaffirms its prioritization of this relationship in its diplomacy, where it holds special significance. Pakistan stresses that China-Pakistan ties are the cornerstone of its foreign policy." The statement vowed to "accelerate the building of a closer China-Pakistan community with a shared future in the new era."
Against this backdrop, the PLAN's participation in ally Pakistan's "AMAN-2025" exercise drew heightened attention on Chinese social media, with commentary focusing on three points: reinforcing China's Indian Ocean presence, a rare chance to compete with the U.S. Navy, and significant aid to Pakistan's naval buildup.
China Navy Ship (NS) Gaoyouhu take part during the multinational naval exercise AMAN-25 in the Arabian Sea near Pakistan's port city of Karachi on February 10, 2025. (Source: Global Times)
The WeChat account "Mingcha Ruijian( 明察 锐见 )," in a February 7 article titled "Chinese Navy's 'AMAN-2025' Sword Display," stated: "This military action marks a key step in China's global maritime strategy, injecting fresh momentum into its maritime voice in the new era. At Pakistan's initiative, warships from several nations will converge in these waters, drilling on maritime resupply, joint anti-piracy, search-and-rescue, and air defense – more than an exercise, it's a profound strategic game." It analyzed: "The success of 'AMAN-2025' not only highlights deep China-Pakistan maritime military cooperation but sends a strong signal: China is leveraging this partnership to bolster its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean – a critical region for its energy security, shipping, and global influence. To counter U.S. naval pressure worldwide, China must enhance its comprehensive maritime combat capabilities and influence through cooperation. 'AMAN-2025' is a strategic breakthrough in this global maritime contest, with the U.S. as the primary rival." [19]
The WeChat account "Ganyu Liangjian ( 敢于亮 剑 )," in a February 9 article, noted: "China deployed Baotou and Gaoyouhu – not our top-tier ships, yet still standout performers among the many nations present! The U.S. seeks to woo Pakistan, and this joint stage with Chinese warships offers both sides a chance to size each other up. Pakistan's navy and air force owe their current stature to China's aid, and Pakistan remains grateful – though shifting global dynamics and U.S. interference cast doubt on the longevity of this closeness." [20]
The WeChat account "Xiaoyingping ( 啸鹰评 )," in a January 25 preview of "AMAN-2025," quoted Pakistan Navy Chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf in a Global Times interview, detailing China-built S-26P submarines: "Once dubbed 'ocean black holes,' the Kilo-class pales beside China's Type 039, which outclasses rivals. The S-26P will be an undisputed 'Indian Ocean black hole,' boosting Pakistan's second-strike nuclear capability and deterring India's strategic nuclear gambles." [21]
Beijing's emphasis on "AMAN-2025" stems largely from the exercise's strategic location. The Arabian Sea near Karachi, a chokepoint for South Asia (notably China's rival India), the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, is critical to Beijing. Here, China is building a dual-use hub at Pakistan's Gwadar Port, complementing its Djibouti base to form a pincer stance. Once solidified, these east-west nodes will amplify China's deterrence and influence over Indian Ocean states, securing energy supply lines, bolstering the "Belt and Road," and adding leverage in its global rivalry with the U.S.
Thus, the February 6 China-Pakistan joint statement affirmed: "Both sides welcome the official opening of Gwadar New International Airport, pledging to advance Gwadar Port's comprehensive development and operation, enhancing its role as a land-sea-air logistics hub to drive economic growth with industrial support. Recognizing Gwadar's importance, they agree to unlock its potential as a key node for connectivity and trade."
It also stressed counterterrorism: "Both reaffirm a 'zero-tolerance' stance on all terrorism forms, agreeing to deepen bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Pakistan vows to expedite investigations into attacks involving Chinese nationals, bolster security forces, and tailor measures to protect Chinese personnel, projects, and institutions, ensuring a safe environment for cooperation. China praises Pakistan's relentless counterterrorism efforts and sacrifices, offering support for its capacity-building." [22]
The WeChat account "Renzhen Duida Meiyitian ( 认真对待每一天 )," in a February 9 article titled "China-Pakistan Deal Sealed, PLA Warships Head to Pakistan – Baloch Rebels' End Nears, Situation Is Complex," elaborated: "Baloch insurgents in southwest Pakistan have long disrupted the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), repeatedly targeting Chinese citizens. Beyond 'condemnations' or 'enhanced security,' China has proposed: 1) Pakistan authorizing Chinese security personnel to independently protect Chinese citizens and firms in Pakistan; 2) PLA Western Theater Command troops joining Pakistan's military in the 'Warrior-8' joint counterterrorism drill, teaching precise strikes on Baloch militants. These steps elevate China's security influence in Pakistan, shifting from passive reliance to proactive action."
It analyzed: "While targeting Baloch rebels, this cooperation implicates U.S. and Indian shadows. India, resentful of CPEC, has covertly backed Baloch separatists to sabotage it, while the U.S., aiming to curb China's South Asian sway, turns a blind eye – or tacitly supports – anti-government forces. India and the U.S. fear: 1) Stronger China-Pakistan maritime ties will reshape Indian Ocean dynamics – Pakistan's navy, once weak here, gains from China's boost, pressuring India; 'AMAN-2025' is both anti-piracy training and strategic deterrence. 2) Improved CPEC security will foil India's disruption tactics." [23]
Conclusion And Related Reflections
Reviewing Chinese media commentary on the PLAN's major 2025 exercises reveals a singular ultimate target: the United States. In Beijing's geopolitical lexicon, one keyword dominates – "America," the helmsman of the Western world. All of Beijing's external efforts pivot on countering the globe's preeminent power. Xi Jinping knows that neutralizing the U.S. could extend the CCP's reign by decades, with the ultimate goal of supplanting America as the world's new hegemon.
The question remains: Even if CCP-led China surpasses the U.S. in economic and military might, what globally accepted international political goods and ideological system can it offer? The CCP itself admits it upholds – and benefits from – the U.S.-built post-WWII order. Beijing must answer this.
As this draft neared completion, significant updates emerged: On March 17, President Trump announced at the Kennedy Center that Xi Jinping would visit the Washington in the "not too distant future." The much-anticipated "Trump-Xi Summit" has two rumored dates – The Wall Street Journal suggests a "birthday summit" in June, while the South China Morning Post claims Trump may visit China as early as April. Trump has repeatedly preemptively disclosed Xi-related news, while Xi remains reticent, with no official Chinese mention of contact since a January 18 pre-inauguration call.
Xi's passivity betrays his unease and uncertainty about Trump's intentions and temperament – a result of Xi and Beijing's shallow grasp of U.S. politics and Trump himself. Even if Beijing's think tanks or scholars understand America's shifting landscape and urge a break from rigid thinking to engage Trump directly, they lack the courage to advise the self-assured leader.
Xi's response to Trump's tariff hikes is notably subdued compared to Trump's first-term trade war. Beijing claims it will boost domestic consumption and reduce reliance on exports, especially to the U.S., but China's economy is far weaker than during Trump's first term. Transitioning the economy is no easy feat – domestic and foreign capital, battered by Xi's earlier trade war and pandemic mismanagement, have lost confidence. Trade and investment are now more vital to jobs and the economy than ever.
Trump, focused on domestic priorities, signaled cooperation with China to solve global issues in his December 16 post-election press conference. He has extended olive branches – unprecedentedly inviting Xi to his inauguration – but Xi has not reciprocated warmly.
I posit two reasons: 1) Xi, steeped in decades of CCP bureaucracy, clings to its rigid mindset and decision-making, struggling with Trump's streamlined, problem-focused style. He fears a Washington visit might expose him to awkward challenges, denting his "great" domestic image, thus missing chances to mend ties. 2) Xi's hubris – believing China's manufacturing and innovation rival America's, and that Trump needs China – leads him to snub Trump, hoping to force concessions.
With absolute power but limited knowledge, vision, and capability, Xi vacillates before the agile, unpredictable "friend" Trump. Unless Xi learns to deal and collaborate with Trump, U.S.-China relations will likely echo the first term's high-start, low-end arc.
In a March 18 Fox interview, Trump again mentioned Xi, believing Xi wants to get along with the U.S. but warning against a China-Russia rapprochement, noting their geopolitical rivalry. This aligns with my analysis: Xi is jittery about U.S.-Russia warming. After a February 24 call with Xi, Putin sent his Security Council Secretary and ex-Defense Minister Shoigu to Beijing on February 28 to reassure Xi. Xi, in both talks, stressed Russia as a "true friend," revealing his anxiety over potential shifts.
Unlike prior mentions, Trump's demeanor toward Xi in this interview was cool and subdued, hinting at dissatisfaction – suggesting strains in their rapport. Thus, the PLAN's global appearances reflect Beijing's inner unease, a bluff to intimidate the U.S., proving it can stir trouble worldwide to gain leverage with Trump. The U.S.'s low-key response to these exercises shows confidence, uninterested in dancing to Beijing's tune.
I have long argued that Xi and the CCP's grip on power – his paramount concern – hinges on the economy. To thwart Beijing's global ambitions, target its economic vulnerabilities. A sustained economic crisis would destabilize the CCP's rule, a reality even Xi's bravado cannot defy, as it ties directly to regime survival. President Trump sees this, wielding tariffs to force fair trade – a tactic that rattled Xi in the first term of Trump, leaving lingering dread.
Xi's clumsy, brutal handling of the trade war in Trump's first term and COVID-19 – etched in the memory of billions and the world – exposed his cognitive and leadership limits. His televised expulsion of predecessor Hu Jintao from the 20th Party Congress shocked the globe, baring him as a power-obsessed autocrat whose crude tactics and morals undermine trust from both Chinese citizens and the world.
This is corroborated by Xi's fury over Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing's sale of Panama Canal port assets to a U.S. firm, per a March 18 Wall Street Journal report. Xi was reportedly incensed that CK Hutchison's deal with a BlackRock-led consortium lacked Beijing's prior approval, foiling China's plan to use the port as a bargaining chip with Trump. Beijing had voiced displeasure days earlier, with Hong Kong's CCP-aligned Ta Kung Pao thrice condemning Li as an ungrateful, profit-driven "traitor." [24]
Li enjoyed good ties with Xi's predecessors – Deng, Jiang, and Hu – but has distanced himself from Xi, steadily divesting from China.
Under Trump's pressure, Beijing lost the Panama Canal leverage early, tasting U.S. strength. Doesn't this render the PLAN's 2025 exercises and social media bravado hollow and less intimidating?
I observe that Xi believes the U.S.-China gap is narrowing fast, with Trump retracting globally to focus domestically under a new Monroe Doctrine – perhaps an opportune moment for Xi to gamble on Taiwan and global rivalry. He thinks China's manufacturing can choke global supply chains, the U.S. lacks the might to stop a Taiwan assault, and wartime sacrifices of citizens' welfare are irrelevant – his pandemic actions were a savage test of total control and deprivation of freedoms.
If Trump keeps pressing Beijing economically and U.S.-Russia ties improve, a cornered Xi may again challenge Trump, with a military takeover of Taiwan a plausible move in Trump's second term – a view I have consistently held.
China has a saying: "A lean camel is still bigger than a horse." Though America's relative edge over China has waned, its comprehensive power and superpower status dwarf China's, despite China's manufacturing prowess.
The CCP's propaganda, stoking nationalism and pride, leans on grand narratives – China's rise, erasing historical shame, and calls to love the Party and nation. This clumsy rhetoric ignores citizens' personal needs and emotions, failing to resonate with millions. The Soviet Union, once a military equal to the U.S., crumbled swiftly – who foresaw that? A regime that oppresses its people, acts recklessly, and preys on the masses cannot win their support. No matter how "powerful" it claims to be, history and the people will ultimately reject it.
*Chris King is Senior Research Fellow for the MEMRI Chinese Media Studies Project. King was an active participant in the student protests in China in 1989.
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[2] Globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1329756.shtml, March 9, 2025.
[3] News.southcn.com/node_179d29f1ce/68c3c96597.shtml, March 17, 2025.
[4] News.cctv.com/2025/03/17/ARTIOUHVCpik2KdiAmjfeLux250317.shtml, March 17, 2025.
[5] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/zvLtgiq63m8SsELu8S_Oeg, March 17, 2025.
[6] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/47NkSgZPCdqmg8EESUvnPg, March 17, 2025.
[7] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4IlAuYSytVBQ-B495yDLSg, March 18, 2025.
[8] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 11375, All Eyes On Taiwan, June 4, 2024.
[9] News.sina.cn/gn/2025-03-15/detail-ineptsym8512734.d.html?vt=4&pos=108&his=0, march 15, 2025.
[10] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/whLZk7bav56ccchE7BXTBg
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[12] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/yAe-jnK5rdx5m5Y7WP4gog
[13] M.guancha.cn/internation/2025_03_03_766891.shtml, March 3, 2025.
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[15] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sI-FodwlDlnhS0RnVxx4jw, March 16, 2025.
[16] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/8aqgS9mrN8IQJOyDEVj7-w, February 26, 2025.
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[18] View.inews.qq.com/k/20250304A03C2K00?web_channel=wap&openApp=false, March 4, 2025.
[19] Mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4kqwhEgWmT5yIS1dHnXRiQ, February 7, 2025.
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[22] Gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202502/content_7002492.htm, February 6, 2025.
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[24] M.guancha.cn/zhouxian/2025_03_17_768689.shtml, March 17, 2025.