Katarzyna Nowak Archives
Yesterday's (un)forgotten co-existence Subscribe to NEE
The consequences of Russia's invasion are visible not only in Ukraine. The Kremlin has set off or exploited a series of crises that face most European countries. Subscribe to NEE
New thinking is needed in policies towards Russia, in whatever form it will take after the war. Subscribe to NEE
Ukraine's suffering goes well beyond the front line. Subscribe to NEE
With Russia's invasion of Ukraine we now see our western values under siege, whether we consciously recognise it or not. Subscribe to NEE
The invasion by Russian forces of Ukraine from the north, south and east – with the initial aim to take the capital Kyiv – has changed our region, and indeed our world, forever. Subscribe to NEE
The situation with Russian threats towards Ukraine once again illustrates the high level of instability in our region. Subscribe to NEE
Only a year ago we witnessed the second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It took at least 5,000 lives and significantly shifted the geopolitics in the South Caucuses. Subscribe to NEE
This special issue aims to honour the plight of Belarusians whose democratic choice made in August 2020 was shamelessly snubbed by Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Subscribe to NEE
From the social, economic and political points of view, a lot of work still remains for this country. And this is why Ukraine's story is incomplete. Subscribe to NEE
30 years after the fall of the Soviet Union Subscribe to NEE
And what lies ahead for our region... Subscribe to NEE
Our societies are more polarised than ever before, which makes them more susceptible to disinformation, untruth and conspiracy theories. Subscribe to NEE
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed limitations and weaknesses in nearly all countries around the world. Subscribe to NEE
The case of Georgia Subscribe to NEE
Its costs, challenges and the commitment to peace. Subscribe to NEE
Uncertainty, volatility and the relationship between Russia and the West. Subscribe to NEE
A true makeover or cosmetic change? Subscribe to NEE
The Black Sea region is quickly becoming a geopolitical battleground which is gaining the interest of major powers, regional players and smaller countries – and the stakes are only getting higher. Subscribe to NEE
This issue is dedicated to the 10 year anniversary of the European Union's Eastern Partnership as well as the 30 years since the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe. Subscribe to NEE
The consequences of the emerging multipolar world. Subscribe to NEE
This issue takes a special look at the role and responsibility of the public intellectual in Central and Eastern Europe today. Subscribe to NEE
In the eastern parts of the European continent, 1918 is remembered not only as the end of the First World War, but also saw the emergence of newly-independent states and the rise of geopolitical struggles which are felt until this day. Subscribe to NEE
It often seems, at least from the outside, that Belarus remains isolated from the West and very static in its transformation. Yet, despite its relative isolation, Belarus is indeed changing. Subscribe to NEE
The Summer 2018 issue of New Eastern Europe tackles the complexity of para-states in the post-Soviet space. Subscribe to NEE
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Balkan Insight
7 hours ago
- Balkan Insight
Will Russia attack beyond Ukraine?
July 24, 2025 - Valerii Pekar - Articles and Commentary Damaged buildings after Russian shelling and rocket attacks in Bakhmut. Photo: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock The answer to the question posed in the title of this article depends on how you assess the current international situation. Do you consider Russian aggression in Ukraine a local war or the first act of a global war? Do you have full confidence that the United States will immediately come to the rescue? Do you consider NATO's level of deterrence against Russia to be sufficient? Are you sure you understand Russia's goals and strategies? Are there vulnerabilities in the current system that invite an aggressor? Lately, we have been hearing that Russia will be ready to attack Europe around 2030, and by then the continent needs to be fully prepared and rearmed. But is Russia obliged to wait for such a moment of European readiness? After all, it is appropriate to strike at the moment of least readiness. Why not now? To understand this, we need to answer three questions: What is Russia's strategic goal? How has war changed? And how can Russia use the new nature of the war to achieve its goal? As I wrote in a previous article, in the new world of the 'right of force', American, Russian and Chinese interests coincide. They would all like to see Europe divided and weak, incapable of making strong joint decisions. They want a Europe that is not an independent centre of power but only a set of markets in which they can trade profitably. This leads to steps that can even be seen as a certain American-Russian rapprochement. Thus, the Russian strategic goal is not to seize a part of European territory as was expected during the Cold War. It would be enough now to sow panic and chaos; create a humanitarian crisis; generate refugee flows; and collapse and overthrow governments. This could create a domino effect that could bring radical Eurosceptics to power, destroy European unity and (last but not least) cut support to Ukraine. To understand how this could happen, we need to look at the face of modern war. The new face(s) of war The nature of modern warfare has changed radically over the past three years. While the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 looked like the Second World War, radical innovations since then (some of the most important were mentioned here) have changed the battlefield every few months. This has influenced not only tactics but also strategies. And generals (in a phrase attributed to Churchill) are always preparing for the last war. One of the typical delusions is that the war in Ukraine is a 'poor country's war' that is forced to use a large army, while NATO can wage a 'rich country's war' with a small professional army and high-precision weapons. This concept from the days of Operation Desert Storm is outdated. As one of the leading Ukrainian military experts, Taras Chmut, says, 'You don't need to have the best equipment. You need to have sufficient equipment in enough quantities.' At the same time, war is not only high-tech, but also multi-domain. More than ever before, it includes other types of confrontation, in addition to kinetic engagement. It now covers the economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, political, demographic, cyber, information, psychological and cognitive (semantic) spheres alongside other domains. The third important feature of war is the significant expansion of the amplitude of operations. In addition to clearly hostile actions, modern war includes (and Russian military doctrine emphasizes) so-called liminal operations. These involve activities that are not obviously (at least initially) hostile until they achieve their goals, or those that, in the opinion of the other side, do not cross the threshold of reaction. Examples include the appearance of militants in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 who initially seemed unserious. Following this, recently we have seen the repeated infringement of the Polish border by missiles and drones (seemingly by accident); the inexplicable death of American soldiers in Lithuania; the recent fires involving military equipment in Germany and Belgium; a fire affecting telecommunications networks in Poland; and the dangerous use of electronic warfare in the Baltics. Finally, the fourth important feature of war is that it is taking place for the first time in the postmodern world, which affects all other dimensions. I will only list the most important theses here: The emergence of cognitive (semantic) warfare to the fore, with the main battlefield becoming consciousness itself and what people think. A full-fledged reflection of war in the media and social networks in real time, which completely changes the perception of war within societies. The active use of fakes aimed at the creation of an alternative reality for the opponent and third parties: it does not matter what has happened, what is important is what is said about events. Post-heroic societies that do not approve of mass mobilization, despite the fact that war still requires huge armies. From the point of view of European security, the question arises whether the continent's countries are ready for such a war — high-tech, multi-domain, liminal, postmodern. This means that there must be readiness of not only armies, but societies. Russian strike Most likely, we should not expect a Russian strike as a ground operation, featuring powerful tanks and motorized columns aimed at Baltic countries or the Polish-Lithuanian Suwałki corridor. Instead of this, just imagine an attack on Poland that combines: massive missile and drone attacks on energy, infrastructure and logistics facilities (by the way, drones can be marked as Ukrainian); cyber-attacks on government and infrastructure facilities; a navigation collapse due to the large-scale use of electronic warfare; sabotage and terrorist groups creating sudden 'ecological' and man-made disasters; the destabilization of society (already heated) through social networks; the use of a 'fifth column' and 'useful idiots'; crowds of thousands of Middle Eastern refugees released across the Belarusian border. I am not saying that everything will necessarily be like this. I just want to emphasize that the war could be completely different from the one Europe is preparing for. And such a war requires significantly fewer resources than a Second World War-style one, resources which are available in Russia today. In such a situation, the key issue is not the quantity and quality of weapons, but the readiness of the political and military leadership to react quickly. It is also important to assess the readiness of society to take balanced, mature and responsible actions. Dear reader, ask yourself: what would the political leadership of your country do in such a case? Will governments be at a loss, not knowing how to respond? And what would you and your family do personally? Conclusion The increasingly frequent statements by Russian representatives that Russia is not going to attack Europe sounds like a wake-up call for European politicians. Russia will neither wait for European readiness nor attack where it has long been expected. It will also not use the strategic approaches of the Second World War. This raises a number of questions that go beyond the military dimension. Relevant issues now include the unity and cohesion of societies; control of the domestic information space; the ability of NGOs to support governments and societies in moments of extraordinary challenges; and the preparedness of political leaders to make decisions in a pre-threshold liminal war. Learning the lessons of Ukraine, for which Ukrainians paid with their own blood, is recommended here. Purchasing tanks and armoured vehicles is not enough to oppose a Russian strike. They will not even leave the hangars. Superbly trained and brave soldiers will have no targets to acquire with this equipment. There will be no more wars like February 2022. Europe has all the necessary resources to defend itself. The problem is that governments and societies do not see that war is already on their doorstep. They do not understand that Russia should not be deterred or stopped but defeated. Some will say I am causing panic. I already heard this in early February 2022. Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of the Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. geopolitics, Russian invasion of Ukraine
Novaya Gazeta Europe
a day ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Russian Supreme Court bans ‘international Satanist movement' — Novaya Gazeta Europe
Russian soldiers attend a service at Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces outside Moscow, on 23 June 2020. EPA/SERGEI ILNITSKY A Russian Supreme Court judge has designated 'Satanism' and the 'International Satanist movement' as 'extremist', and legally banned their operations in Russia, independent news outlet Mediazona reported on Wednesday. The decision means that, among other things, 'the general principles of Satanism' and the performance of 'occult rituals' will now be outlawed in Russia, according to the Prosecutor General's office, which hailed the designation as a triumph for 'legal forces' in the 'eternal struggle between good and evil'. Presiding judge Oleg Nefedov, who previously applied the same designation to the non-existent 'international LGBT movement' in November 2023 and oversaw the April decision to decriminalise the Taliban, conducted the hearing in a closed-door session, with no media or other officials permitted to attend. The designation follows over a year of discussions by top officials and prominent pro-Kremlin voices regarding the fight against Satanism in Russia, which began with a special State Duma session in July 2024, featuring deputies, priests, and several state media propagandists. During the initial discussion, participants broadly classified a variety of groups, including LGBT individuals, 'childfree' advocates, women's abortion rights proponents, Ukraine's Azov battalion members, furry and therian subcultures as 'Satanist' or destructive influences in society. In January, Patriarch Kirill, primate of the Russian Orthodox Church and a close ally of Vladimir Putin, renewed discussion of the topic, demanding that Satanism be legally banned in Russia, and endorsed a proposed law banning the advertisement of 'occult magic services', such as astrology or tarot card readings. 'It is unacceptable that various Satanic sects forming part of the international Satanist movement are still freely conducting their rituals in our country, recruiting young people, and openly registering their groups and communities on social media,' Patriarch Kirill said at the time, adding that Russian soldiers in Ukraine were 'ready to give their lives for values that are clearly trampled upon by Satanists'. Though the legislation endorsed by Kirill was rejected on 11 July by the government of Prime Minister Mikhail Mushustin on the grounds that its definitions were overly nebulous, in early July the Prosecutor General's Office and Justice Ministry jointly filed a lawsuit with the Russian Supreme Court requesting that the 'international Satanist movement' be recognised as extremist. In November 2023, Putin pardoned a member of a Satanist gang that killed four teenagers who was serving a 20-year prison sentence in recognition of his military service in Ukraine.
Novaya Gazeta Europe
2 days ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
First wartime protests in Ukraine as Zelensky signs law weakening anti-corruption bodies — Novaya Gazeta Europe
Thousands of people gathered in cities across Ukraine on Tuesday to protest a controversial law signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky that weakens the independence of the country's two key anti-corruption agencies. In Kyiv, crowds of demonstrators assembled near the Ivan Franko Drama Theatre, close to the presidential office, following the passing of the bill by Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. Ukrainian news outlets reported that many demonstrators came with flags and handmade signs, and chanted slogans including 'Veto the law' and 'No corruption in government'. Estimates of the crowd ranged from several hundred to around 3,000, with Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko also reportedly in attendance. Hundreds more gathered in the cities of Lviv, Dnipro and Odesa, marking the largest anti-government protests in Ukraine — which is still under martial law — since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. As the protests continued on Tuesday evening, Zelensky signed the bill, which strips the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) of their autonomy and grants Ukraine's prosecutor general sweeping powers over both bodies, including the authority to reassign and close ongoing corruption cases. As the prosecutor general is appointed by the president, critics say the new law centralises power in Zelensky's hands and gives him unprecedented control over which cases are pursued or dropped. The swift passing of the bill on Tuesday drew condemnation not only from civil society groups and opposition figures within Ukraine, but also from Western officials, with EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos calling it a 'serious step back'. In his nightly address to Ukrainians, Zelensky made no direct mention of the protests, but said Tuesday had been a 'long, emotional day'. He defended the legislation, saying it would ensure Ukraine's anti-corruption infrastructure was 'cleared of … Russian influence' and allow Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko to guarantee the 'inevitability of punishment' for those who broke the law. 'Cases that have been lying dormant must be investigated', Zelensky said. 'There is no rational explanation for why criminal proceedings worth billions have been 'hanging' for years', he added, stressing that the new law would bring 'more justice'. Established in the wake of Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity at the insistence of Kyiv's Western partners to tackle high-level corruption, the NABU and SAPO have both operated independently of the Ukrainian government since 2015. Both agencies expressed their gratitude for the protests in statements on Tuesday evening, with NABU calling them a 'sign of trust' in the institutions and SAPO pledging both bodies would 'continue to fight for justice, integrity, and dignity'.
