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Yesterday's (un)forgotten co-existence Subscribe to NEE
The consequences of Russia's invasion are visible not only in Ukraine. The Kremlin has set off or exploited a series of crises that face most European countries. Subscribe to NEE
New thinking is needed in policies towards Russia, in whatever form it will take after the war. Subscribe to NEE
Ukraine's suffering goes well beyond the front line. Subscribe to NEE
With Russia's invasion of Ukraine we now see our western values under siege, whether we consciously recognise it or not. Subscribe to NEE
The invasion by Russian forces of Ukraine from the north, south and east – with the initial aim to take the capital Kyiv – has changed our region, and indeed our world, forever. Subscribe to NEE
The situation with Russian threats towards Ukraine once again illustrates the high level of instability in our region. Subscribe to NEE
Only a year ago we witnessed the second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It took at least 5,000 lives and significantly shifted the geopolitics in the South Caucuses. Subscribe to NEE
This special issue aims to honour the plight of Belarusians whose democratic choice made in August 2020 was shamelessly snubbed by Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Subscribe to NEE
From the social, economic and political points of view, a lot of work still remains for this country. And this is why Ukraine's story is incomplete. Subscribe to NEE
30 years after the fall of the Soviet Union Subscribe to NEE
And what lies ahead for our region... Subscribe to NEE
Our societies are more polarised than ever before, which makes them more susceptible to disinformation, untruth and conspiracy theories. Subscribe to NEE
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed limitations and weaknesses in nearly all countries around the world. Subscribe to NEE
The case of Georgia Subscribe to NEE
Its costs, challenges and the commitment to peace. Subscribe to NEE
Uncertainty, volatility and the relationship between Russia and the West. Subscribe to NEE
A true makeover or cosmetic change? Subscribe to NEE
The Black Sea region is quickly becoming a geopolitical battleground which is gaining the interest of major powers, regional players and smaller countries – and the stakes are only getting higher. Subscribe to NEE
This issue is dedicated to the 10 year anniversary of the European Union's Eastern Partnership as well as the 30 years since the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe. Subscribe to NEE
The consequences of the emerging multipolar world. Subscribe to NEE
This issue takes a special look at the role and responsibility of the public intellectual in Central and Eastern Europe today. Subscribe to NEE
In the eastern parts of the European continent, 1918 is remembered not only as the end of the First World War, but also saw the emergence of newly-independent states and the rise of geopolitical struggles which are felt until this day. Subscribe to NEE
It often seems, at least from the outside, that Belarus remains isolated from the West and very static in its transformation. Yet, despite its relative isolation, Belarus is indeed changing. Subscribe to NEE
The Summer 2018 issue of New Eastern Europe tackles the complexity of para-states in the post-Soviet space. Subscribe to NEE
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Novaya Gazeta Europe
2 hours ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
In the Army now. After moving his family from Texas to Russia in search of ‘traditional values', Derek Huffman now finds himself at war — Novaya Gazeta Europe
In March, 46-year-old Derek Huffman and his family left their home in Texas and moved to Russia, in search of 'traditional values' they felt were lacking in the US. Initially, they were overwhelmingly positive about their new life in videos they posted to their YouTube channel, but that all changed in late May, when the Huffmans became embroiled in a war they had only seen on TV. The last time Derek Huffman posted a video of himself, he addressed his family from a Russian military training camp: 'You can see my face, see I'm doing well, probably see I've lost a few pounds … I miss you all more than you can imagine and I can't wait to see you. Hopefully I get a vacation at some point and I get to come home and spend a couple of weeks with you.' Big Water is the first of multiple planned communities in rural Russia for foreigners fleeing the 'woke mind virus'. Earlier this year, the Huffman family — Derek, DeAnna, and their three daughters — settled in Big Water, a remote, purpose-built village near the Moscow region town of Istra that's about an hour's journey from the Russian capital. The so-called American Village project was launched two years ago by the American-born pro-Kremlin propagandist Tim Kirby for Americans keen to live with 'like-minded individuals', and Big Water is the first of multiple planned communities in rural Russia for foreigners fleeing the 'woke mind virus'. Speaking about the project to state-affiliated tabloid Argumenty i Fakty, Kirby cited escaping 'LGBT propaganda' as the main reason Americans chose to move to Russia. 'In the West, it's everywhere: advertising, computer games, even in schools. Children are being forced to believe that this is the norm.' Last year, Vladimir Putin made the process of relocation to Russia a whole lot easier when he issued a decree granting foreigners who share 'traditional Russian spiritual and moral values' temporary residency permits, removing a legal requirement for them to have passed a Russian language test. The Huffman family's ID cards issued by the Russian Interior Ministry. Source: YouTube / Huffman Time The Huffmans are reportedly one of two families who call Big Water home. Their elderly neighbours, the Barretts, who left their relatives behind in the US to start a new life in Russia, are reportedly finding it challenging to form connections with Russians due to the language barrier. The houses in Big Water are small, white modular structures — humble lodgings given that the Americans sold almost all their assets to buy them. Despite having three children, the Huffmans now live in a two-bedroom house, and much of the surrounding area still looks like a construction site. 'They want us to be fat and dumb' Back in the US, Derek Huffman had been outraged by what he saw as 'the LGBT indoctrination of kids', where, in his words, even 'cartoons are about sex and gender'. His concern extended to other aspects of life in the US: 'The food in America is so unhealthy. They want us to be fat and dumb, controllable,' resolving to create a better life for his daughters. The family's first move was from Arizona to Texas, where they hoped to find a more conservative environment. But they were disappointed by the 'propaganda' they felt had infiltrated the Texas school system. After that, the couple began homeschooling their daughters, but found even that insufficient. It was at that point that Derek stumbled across an article about Kirby and his American Villages project. In videos made before his deployment, Derek frequently mused on the 'decline of the West', fretted about what he said were 'pornographic books' in US libraries, and bemoaned the indoctrination of children in schools. 'Russia is a different matter,' he says in one. In another he says, 'I'm just thankful we were able to find this and get an opportunity to raise our children the way we want,' before calling Russia a 'great country' and Putin an 'amazing leader.' The Huffman daughters in Russia. Source: YouTube / Huffman Time The struggle is real On 26 May, DeAnna announced that her husband had enlisted to serve in the Russian army, and even recorded herself giving the news to her daughters: 'Daddy just sent me a picture. He has signed the contract. It's official. He signed his army contract.' The girls didn't react. In an effort to get fast-tracked Russian citizenship for himself and his family, Derek signed up to serve in the military, a quid pro quo used by many foreign citizens hoping to become naturalised in Russia. Speaking about how so many of the migrants who had come to the US had no respect for the local culture and didn't attempt to integrate, Derek said that he didn't want to be seen by Russians in the same light and that he was determined to earn 'the right to live in Russia'. In the video, he seems to be sold on the Kremlin's false narrative of the war: 'I know enough to know that Russia is just in their cause and they are doing the right thing. And this Nazi regime and Ukraine needs to be stopped.' DeAnna's tone changed noticeably in a new video she posted on 8 June, in which she admitted that Derek had found his basic military training to be tough. 'It's hard of course because it's the military in Russia, so it is definitely a struggle. He is eating every day but not a lot because between his stomach not feeling the best and the food being a little bit dry.' DeAnna added that many people had asked her why they couldn't afford a car. She explains that as a 'migrant worker' in Russia, Derek receives a far smaller salary than the one used to promote migration to the country from abroad. She goes on to say that the equipment the military issued to her husband was substandard — seemingly unaware that such public statements could lead to a criminal prosecution in Russia — but added that a 'gentleman who has been amazing' gave Derek boots, a bulletproof vest and a helmet. DeAnna Huffman at home in Istra. Source: YouTube / Huffman Time Thrown to the wolves In mid-June, DeAnna confessed to her followers that after three years in recovery from severe alcoholism, she had fallen off the wagon and started drinking again. Days after that, she again took to YouTube to say that she believed her husband had been duped. The family had expected him to be kept safe during his tour of duty, DeAnna said, adding that Derek had just been told that he would be deployed to the frontline. 'We thought because he had a welding certificate and really good background in construction and welding that he would be put in a spot that would be safe and or safer and utilise his experiences but unfortunately we're not sure that that's what is going to happen,' she said. DeAnna said Derek had even attempted to be given non-combat roles such as a military reporter or as part of a repair battalion, but neither option turned out to be possible. 'He feels like he's been thrown to the wolves right now, and he's kind of having to lean on faith, and that's what we're all kind of doing.' 'And the foreigners unit is still being taught in Russian and he doesn't understand Russian very well. So he's kind of struggling a bit with that, and not getting really any training,' DeAnna said. 'He feels like he's been thrown to the wolves right now, and he's kind of having to lean on faith, and that's what we're all kind of doing. So we are gathering together and asking everybody to just pray that something can be done. We are petitioning some public figures to hopefully help.' In a now-deleted video that remains available on Reddit, DeAnna said that above all else Derek now needs money, as he's been asked to help 'pay for supplies,' for his unit, and as his military salary had not yet been paid out, DeAnna says that she has been unable to send him money herself. DeAnna declined to respond to Novaya Gazeta Europe's question about Derek's current whereabouts. For about a month, DeAnna's videos barely mentioned Derek, and focused on her daughters instead, who seem to spend all their time at home with her. Russian state-run media, which initially did numerous segments on the family's relocation from the US, also appears to have lost interest in the story. On 26 July, DeAnna posted an audio recording of her speaking to her husband by phone, set to a montage of the family photographs taken in happier times. 'I have to go soon. I have a lot of work to do, but I wanted some parting words,' Derek says in the recording. 'For all the people saying I'm a Christian, yet I joined an army so I could kill Ukrainians, I don't relish the idea of taking life. You know, but I'm doing what I think is right… and of course I'm alive and well.'


Novaya Gazeta Europe
a day ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Wolf at the door. Europe must now show that it can follow through on its pledges to boost military spending and step up its support for Ukraine — Novaya Gazeta Europe
'Money makes the world go around,' sings the showgirl Sally Bowles in Cabaret, the iconic musical set against the backdrop of the Weimar Republic's decadence. Money will certainly shape Europe's future, as political leaders across the continent are forced to make painful decisions about how to allocate public funds in an increasingly unstable world. Carl Bildt Former Swedish prime minister and foreign minister Three urgent priorities are set to strain Europe's public finances over the next few years. The first — and most obvious — is defence. The push to boost military spending is primarily a response to Vladimir Putin's aggression, compounded by US President Donald Trump's relentless criticism of America's NATO allies. Together, these pressures have made strengthening Europe's defence posture a strategic necessity. The second, and arguably more urgent, priority is to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. If Ukraine's defences were to collapse, a revanchist Russia would likely go on a rampage. Ensuring that Ukraine can continue to defend itself will require European governments to go beyond their existing defence-spending commitments. And lastly, there is the lengthy process of producing the European Union's next multiyear budget, which will cover the period from 2028 to 2034. The European Commission has already presented its proposal, but the real challenge lies ahead, as member states and the European Parliament must go through internal negotiations before agreeing on the final numbers. Supporting Ukraine through the war and the country's eventual reconstruction will also require a substantial financial commitment. The commission's proposal includes increased funding for security, global commitments, and competitiveness, as well as additional support for Ukraine. Although these priorities have been widely supported, the reallocation of resources needed to fund them has been the subject of fierce debate. It is safe to say the commission is headed for a bruising political showdown before a consensus is reached. Despite the intensity of these budgetary battles, the commission's proposed budget amounts to just 1.26% of the combined gross national income (GNI) of the EU's 27 member states. While that is up from 1.13% today, the net increase is relatively modest once debt-servicing costs from the bloc's post-pandeemic borrowing spree are factored in. When it comes to defence, however, the numbers are far more significant. Across Europe, defence budgets have grown by roughly one third in recent years, with most of NATO's European members spending around 2% of their GDP or nearing that benchmark. But even that is no longer enough. At the June NATO summit in The Hague, members pledged to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035, with an additional 1.5% earmarked for loosely defined defence- and security-related investments. The extra 1.5% appears designed to appease Trump, who has repeatedly called for European allies to boost military spending to 5% of GDP. Much of this additional spending is expected to rely on creative accounting rather than actual new funding. Supporting Ukraine through the war and the country's eventual reconstruction will also require a substantial financial commitment. While estimates vary, $100 billion per year, for example, would amount to just over 0.4% of the combined GDP of the EU and the United Kingdom — significant but far from unmanageable. At some point within the 2028-35 budget window, the cost of rebuilding Ukraine will need to be addressed. Some studies have estimated the cost of reconstruction at around $500 billion, though this figure includes areas that may remain under Russian control for the foreseeable future. Much will also depend on whether security guarantees and the prospect of Ukraine's EU accession can foster an environment conducive to large-scale private investment. Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a glide bomb strike in Kharkiv, northern Ukraine, 25 July 2025. Photo: EPA/SERGEY KOZLOV Of course, new demands may emerge, placing additional strain on Europe's finances. Several European governments, for example, have already slashed development aid or diverted part of it to support Ukraine. While this may have been a necessary short-term response to Russia's invasion, its long-term consequences remain unclear. Currently, only Norway, Sweden, and Denmark meet the United Nations target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to development assistance. Following the Trump administration's dramatic foreign-aid cuts and the shutdown of the US Agency for International Development, there is a strong case for Europe to fill the void. A more desperate world will be more volatile and less secure, making development a strategic imperative as well as a moral one. Meeting all of these commitments will not be easy, especially for governments already grappling with high deficits and rising public debt. My guess is that northern European countries will reach NATO's 3.5%-of-GDP defence spending target well before 2035, while southern European countries — with the exception of Greece — will likely fail to meet it. With France, Italy, and Spain all heading for elections by 2027, the political appetite for the spending cuts needed to increase defence budgets will likely remain limited. There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts. This trend is already evident in the distribution of aid to Ukraine. In the first four months of 2025, the Nordic countries contributed $6.8 billion, the UK provided $5.3 billion, and Germany put up $760 million, while Spain and Italy gave only a fraction of those amounts. The irony is that the EU member states often labelled as 'frugal' are the ones actually willing to provide funding to advance the bloc's agreed-upon priorities. Meanwhile, the less frugal countries prefer to call for more borrowing, even though they have limited room to do so themselves. These tensions are now driving the intensifying battle over Europe's finances. There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts. Whatever the outcome, the coming fiscal fight will test how able and willing Europe's leaders are to confront the serious security challenges ahead. This article was first published by Project Syndicate. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe


Balkan Insight
4 days ago
- Balkan Insight
Will Russia attack beyond Ukraine?
July 24, 2025 - Valerii Pekar - Articles and Commentary Damaged buildings after Russian shelling and rocket attacks in Bakhmut. Photo: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock The answer to the question posed in the title of this article depends on how you assess the current international situation. Do you consider Russian aggression in Ukraine a local war or the first act of a global war? Do you have full confidence that the United States will immediately come to the rescue? Do you consider NATO's level of deterrence against Russia to be sufficient? Are you sure you understand Russia's goals and strategies? Are there vulnerabilities in the current system that invite an aggressor? Lately, we have been hearing that Russia will be ready to attack Europe around 2030, and by then the continent needs to be fully prepared and rearmed. But is Russia obliged to wait for such a moment of European readiness? After all, it is appropriate to strike at the moment of least readiness. Why not now? To understand this, we need to answer three questions: What is Russia's strategic goal? How has war changed? And how can Russia use the new nature of the war to achieve its goal? As I wrote in a previous article, in the new world of the 'right of force', American, Russian and Chinese interests coincide. They would all like to see Europe divided and weak, incapable of making strong joint decisions. They want a Europe that is not an independent centre of power but only a set of markets in which they can trade profitably. This leads to steps that can even be seen as a certain American-Russian rapprochement. Thus, the Russian strategic goal is not to seize a part of European territory as was expected during the Cold War. It would be enough now to sow panic and chaos; create a humanitarian crisis; generate refugee flows; and collapse and overthrow governments. This could create a domino effect that could bring radical Eurosceptics to power, destroy European unity and (last but not least) cut support to Ukraine. To understand how this could happen, we need to look at the face of modern war. The new face(s) of war The nature of modern warfare has changed radically over the past three years. While the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 looked like the Second World War, radical innovations since then (some of the most important were mentioned here) have changed the battlefield every few months. This has influenced not only tactics but also strategies. And generals (in a phrase attributed to Churchill) are always preparing for the last war. One of the typical delusions is that the war in Ukraine is a 'poor country's war' that is forced to use a large army, while NATO can wage a 'rich country's war' with a small professional army and high-precision weapons. This concept from the days of Operation Desert Storm is outdated. As one of the leading Ukrainian military experts, Taras Chmut, says, 'You don't need to have the best equipment. You need to have sufficient equipment in enough quantities.' At the same time, war is not only high-tech, but also multi-domain. More than ever before, it includes other types of confrontation, in addition to kinetic engagement. It now covers the economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, political, demographic, cyber, information, psychological and cognitive (semantic) spheres alongside other domains. The third important feature of war is the significant expansion of the amplitude of operations. In addition to clearly hostile actions, modern war includes (and Russian military doctrine emphasizes) so-called liminal operations. These involve activities that are not obviously (at least initially) hostile until they achieve their goals, or those that, in the opinion of the other side, do not cross the threshold of reaction. Examples include the appearance of militants in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 who initially seemed unserious. Following this, recently we have seen the repeated infringement of the Polish border by missiles and drones (seemingly by accident); the inexplicable death of American soldiers in Lithuania; the recent fires involving military equipment in Germany and Belgium; a fire affecting telecommunications networks in Poland; and the dangerous use of electronic warfare in the Baltics. Finally, the fourth important feature of war is that it is taking place for the first time in the postmodern world, which affects all other dimensions. I will only list the most important theses here: The emergence of cognitive (semantic) warfare to the fore, with the main battlefield becoming consciousness itself and what people think. A full-fledged reflection of war in the media and social networks in real time, which completely changes the perception of war within societies. The active use of fakes aimed at the creation of an alternative reality for the opponent and third parties: it does not matter what has happened, what is important is what is said about events. Post-heroic societies that do not approve of mass mobilization, despite the fact that war still requires huge armies. From the point of view of European security, the question arises whether the continent's countries are ready for such a war — high-tech, multi-domain, liminal, postmodern. This means that there must be readiness of not only armies, but societies. Russian strike Most likely, we should not expect a Russian strike as a ground operation, featuring powerful tanks and motorized columns aimed at Baltic countries or the Polish-Lithuanian Suwałki corridor. Instead of this, just imagine an attack on Poland that combines: massive missile and drone attacks on energy, infrastructure and logistics facilities (by the way, drones can be marked as Ukrainian); cyber-attacks on government and infrastructure facilities; a navigation collapse due to the large-scale use of electronic warfare; sabotage and terrorist groups creating sudden 'ecological' and man-made disasters; the destabilization of society (already heated) through social networks; the use of a 'fifth column' and 'useful idiots'; crowds of thousands of Middle Eastern refugees released across the Belarusian border. I am not saying that everything will necessarily be like this. I just want to emphasize that the war could be completely different from the one Europe is preparing for. And such a war requires significantly fewer resources than a Second World War-style one, resources which are available in Russia today. In such a situation, the key issue is not the quantity and quality of weapons, but the readiness of the political and military leadership to react quickly. It is also important to assess the readiness of society to take balanced, mature and responsible actions. Dear reader, ask yourself: what would the political leadership of your country do in such a case? Will governments be at a loss, not knowing how to respond? And what would you and your family do personally? Conclusion The increasingly frequent statements by Russian representatives that Russia is not going to attack Europe sounds like a wake-up call for European politicians. Russia will neither wait for European readiness nor attack where it has long been expected. It will also not use the strategic approaches of the Second World War. This raises a number of questions that go beyond the military dimension. Relevant issues now include the unity and cohesion of societies; control of the domestic information space; the ability of NGOs to support governments and societies in moments of extraordinary challenges; and the preparedness of political leaders to make decisions in a pre-threshold liminal war. Learning the lessons of Ukraine, for which Ukrainians paid with their own blood, is recommended here. Purchasing tanks and armoured vehicles is not enough to oppose a Russian strike. They will not even leave the hangars. Superbly trained and brave soldiers will have no targets to acquire with this equipment. There will be no more wars like February 2022. Europe has all the necessary resources to defend itself. The problem is that governments and societies do not see that war is already on their doorstep. They do not understand that Russia should not be deterred or stopped but defeated. Some will say I am causing panic. I already heard this in early February 2022. Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of the Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. geopolitics, Russian invasion of Ukraine