More than 3000 Aussies to be hit as financially challenged aged care, disability services company Annecto collapses
More than 3000 Australians will need new homes or new carers as an aged care and disability services company has collapsed.
Annecto is shuttering its doors from July after 70 years as financial challenges and shifts in the aged care and disability sectors have forced the company to close.
'As a result, it was identified that Annecto would be unable to continue providing services in the future,' the company states on its website.
Aussies at Annecto locations across Victoria, NSW, Queensland and the ACT will be helped by the company as they search for other care facilities.
'Our focus now is working together to transition the people we support and the services they receive to other trusted providers who can continue delivering the support they need and deserve,' Annecto said.
The company is working with various government agencies to transition its patients – including the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, the National Disability Insurance Agency and the Department of Veterans' Affairs.
Annecto said it remained committed to prioritising the welfare of its patients as they transition out of the company's homes.
'We are committed to the people we support and all Annecto staff during this time,' the company said.
'We are committed to compliance and ethical service delivery, ensuring our transition process aligns with customer, employee, and regulatory expectations.'
Annecto chair Colleen Furlanetto thanked the company's founders and community for their contributions to the company.
'As we approach this next chapter, we do so with the same spirit that inspired Annecto's beginnings—ensuring that every person has access to the support they need, delivered with dignity and respect,' Ms Furlanetto said.
The collapse comes after Labor passed its Aged Care Act which will change how different types of retirees in aged care are billed.
The major change is the lifetime cap will rise from about $82,000 to about $130,000.
Australia's aged care sector is not currently a profitable industry, but the changes in billing could lead to further investment into the growing sector as the ageing population grows.
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News.com.au
38 minutes ago
- News.com.au
‘A lot of money': Insane amount young Aussie can earn an hour through dog walking business
A university student has stunned Aussies after revealing the staggering amount of money he is earning through his dog walking business. Angus Healy was recently stopped on the streets of business by jobs app, GetAhead, and asked what he does for a living and how much he earns. The 19-year-old, who was walking four dogs at the time, revealed he owns a dog walking business. 'It is $50 an hour for each dog,' he said. 'I do three packs a day, keeps me busy, which is good.' Mr Healy said the most amount of dogs he will walk at one time is six, which sees him earn $300 for an hour of work. The young Aussie first got the idea for the business when he was in Year 8 and he wanted a dog but his parent's wouldn't allow him to get one. 'I thought, 'all right, well how can I spend time with dogs and earn money?'' he said. He started off slowly, walking one or two dogs at a time, but over the years his business, Happy Paws by Angus, grew and he now does sessions five days a week while also studying at university. Even if the teenager only walks one dog for each of his three sessions a day, that would see him earn $750 a week, which would add up to $36,000 a year. If he were to have the maximum number of dogs in each session, this would see him earn up to $4500 a week or 18,000 a month, which would result in a yearly income of $216,000. Mr Healy said the earnings are enough to pay his bills and also allowed him to buy a house. However, he said, like any business, there are 'expenses' to be considered. The teenager also offers pick up and drop off services, which is included in the $50 fee. 'We do go through a process in the application with all our clients to make sure all (the dogs) are friendly,' he said. The business also caters to reactive dogs, offering private walks for $60 for a one hour session. The video quickly gained a lot of attention, with commenters stunned by how much money the teenager was making through the side hustle. '50 bucks an hour. Wow really?' someone said. 'That's actually is a lot of money,' another said, with one person adding the business idea was 'so smart'. Another person claimed it was basically 'free money' and others branded it a 'dream job'. On the Happy Paws by Angus website, the 19-year-old states he understands the 'importance of providing exceptional care for your beloved dogs'. 'Founded out of a deep love for animals, we've built a trusted service that treats your pets as if they were our own,' the website reads. 'With every interaction, we strive to deliver not just pet care, but a community service that Clayfield residents can rely on.'
The Advertiser
2 hours ago
- The Advertiser
This deal was bad from the start. Now is our chance to get out
There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend.
Sky News AU
2 hours ago
- Sky News AU
Twelve million Aussie workers set to see their retirement savings surge in matter of weeks as new changes come into effect
Over 12 million Australian workers are weeks away from receiving a significant cash boost to their retirement savings. From July 1 major changes to superannuation will kick in, with employers required to pay super contributions of 12 per cent of a workers annual earnings. This is up from the current rate of 11.5 per cent required by law. The hike will serve as the fifth and final in a series of boosts that were first introduced in 2021 in order for Aussies to meet the basic needs for retirement. New research from the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia found that with the changes factored in, a 30-year-old with a super balance of $30,000 today who earns a median wage of $75,000 is forecast to accumulate a super balance of $610,000 upon reaching 67 years of age. This is due to due the fact that employees entering the workforce today will receive higher superannuation contributions for a longer amount of time than those who preceded them. The Super Members Council revealed that the vast majority of Australia's 12 million workers are not aware about the imminent changes, and that the government and superannuation funds needed to do a better of job of informing the public. SMC Chief executive Misha Schubert said, 'this increase to people's super is a powerful step forward for Australians' financial futures' and added 'too many people don't yet know it's happening." A person earning $60,000 will see their superannuation payments increase from $6,900 to $7,200, while those earning $150,000 will receive $18,000 up from $17,250. Those earning $200,000 a year will see $24,000 enter their super accounts up from $23,000. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics the average yearly salary of a full-time Australian worker is $100,000. The staggered increase to super payments was pursued to give businesses ample time to adjust to the changes. The current median super balance for 60 to 64-year-old men is $205,000, while women in the same age bracket hold only $154,000 in their accounts. However, the changes aren't all good news, with workers receiving super within their salary set to receive a reduction in their pay to compensate for the increase. Those who salary sacrifice into their super accounts will also be at a disadvantage, and will be slugged additional taxes and levies if they breach the $30,000 concessional contributions cap. ASFA states that for a someone to experience a comfortable retirement at least $595,000 in superannuation is needed, while a couple needs $690,000.
