Turkey: PKK announces intention to disband
The announcement comes after four decades of armed conflict with the Turkish government over autonomy for ethnic Kurds in the country.
Why did PKK decide to disband?
'The 12th PKK Congress has decided to dissolve the PKK's organisational structure and end its method of armed struggle,' read a statement from the group carried by pro-Kurdish news agency ANF.
Their most recent summit has 'brought the Kurdish issue to the point of resolution through democratic politics, thus completing its historical mission', they added.
After holding its congress last week, it appeared that the group was responding to a call by PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan to lay down their arms. Ocalan has been imprisoned on an island near Istanbul since 1999.
Over the weekend, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had hinted the decision was close at hand, saying 'we are advancing with firm steps on the path to the goal of a terror-free Turkey'.
What is the PKK?
Kurds are an ethnic group of at least 30mn people who were split between Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran when Western allies redrew borders following the end of World War I.
The PKK was founded in 1978 with the stated goal of achieving an independent Kurdish state. However, in the 1990s they changed course, seeking only autonomy within Turkey.
Armed clashes with Turkish security over the decades, as well as attacks on civilians, led to the group being labelled a terrorist organisation by Ankara, as well as the United States and the European Union.
In turn, the Turkish government has been accused of destroying Kurdish villages and towns and forcing displacement of civilians in an effort to root out the group.
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