Iran speeding up work on its nukes, two new reports say

Asia Times

05-02-2025

Two conflicting reports on Iran's nuclear weapons program were disclosed this week. Both reports offer important insight into just how Tehran is speeding up work on nuclear weapons.
The first report is from the New York Times which says US Intelligence has new findings on Iran's weapons program. It goes on to say that the new information was briefed to President Trump's national security team.
The second report comes from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The NCRI is an anti-regime organization that operates inside Iran.
The US Intelligence briefing says that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon 'faster' although the resulting weapon will be 'cruder.' US intelligence attaches a caveat to its new information, declaring that Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has not made a decision to develop a nuclear weapon.
The New York Times does not explain how Iran could have embarked on a 'cruder' weapon even though no decision has been made on going ahead by Iran's Supreme Leader.
The NCRI paints a different picture. It says that Iran has two important nuclear facilities, one located at Sharad, which doubles as a space launch site, and the other at Semnan, that also has space launch capabilities. Both towns are east of Tehran.
Sharad is kept as a top secret facility ostensibly for launching communications satellites. NCRI says it actually operates as a nuclear weapons development facility, with most of those activities underground. The Sharad launch facility features a new solid fuel Ghaem-100, a two-stage intermediate range ballistic missile. NCRI says that 3 Ghaem-100 missiles have already been launched, and a newer version, Ghaem 105 is being prepared for testing. Ballistic missiles on road-mobile launchers during a 2021 exercise. Photo: Farsnews
In October, 2024 Israel launched a retaliatory attack on Iran, knocking out important Iranian air defenses and the industrial site where Iran produces solid rocket fuel for weapons such as the Ghaem. This was a strategic move to deprive Iran of solid-fuel rockets to attack Israel.
Sharad is under the command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force. NCRI has identified the current commanders and the chief scientists involved at Sharad.
The second site at Semnan officially is the Khomeini Space Launch Terminal. The site has recently been significantly expanded. The site includes a special Geophysics Group run by the Organization for Advanced Defense Research (SPND). Allegedly the Geophysics Group is tied to Tehran University and its Earthquake Seismology department, providing a cover for bomb component testing.
The Semnan facility features the Simorgh liquid-fueled missile. Simorgh is similar to the North Korean UNHA-1, an intermediate range ballistic missile.
Solid-fuel missiles require far less set-up time to launch, replacing the lengthy fueling process needed for older-type ballistic missiles.
Both US Intelligence and the NCRI reports converge on one important aspect of weapons design and development.
The US Intelligence Report suggests that Iran has not progressed rapidly enough to develop a weapon that can be launched on an intermediate range ballistic missile. Reading between the lines, that means Iran's effort at miniaturizing a small enough warhead has not yet borne fruit.
A small size nuclear warhead would be fueled by plutonium (which Iranian nuclear reactors can manufacture). Plutonium bombs require a high level of engineering and special electronics to create the implosion around the plutonium core required for a successful bomb.
The 'cruder' approach would be to fall back on an uranium atomic bomb, like the one used at Hiroshima, that uses highly enriched uranium and a simpler gun-type mechanism to create a chain reaction and an atomic blast.
The uranium solution is likely the 'cruder' approach US intelligence is reporting. It is noteworthy that the Hiroshima bomb was never tested fully before it was used. Iran may also think it can field a uranium bomb and not have to demonstrate one by exploding it.
The Hiroshima bomb was quite large, weighing 4,400 kg (9,700 lbs.). To get it into a B-29, a four engine bomber, the aircraft had to be modified so the bomb could be lifted into the belly of the plane from a special lift in the ground under the aircraft. While a uranium bomb today might be lighter than that used at Hiroshima, it likely still would be too heavy and big for a missile. Special loading mechanism for Hiroshima 'Little Boy' bomb on B-29 Superfortress.
This means Iran would probably want to deploy a weapon like this on a navy ship. Back on August 2, 1939 Albert Einstein sent a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt. In that letter, Einstein pointed out that while a uranium weapon probably would be too heavy for an aircraft, it could be carried by a boat. 'A single bomb,' Einstein told Roosevelt, 'carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port with some surrounding territory.'
The NCRI report concurs that Iran does not yet have a bomb it can mount on a missile but unlike the US Intelligence report, it makes clear that the IRGC is working on a weapon that is deliverable by missile – meaning a miniaturized plutonium bomb.
An interesting question is: If Iran closely cooperates with North Korea on its nuclear and missile programs, why does it not have a usable warhead? Iranian (and Syrian) collaboration with North Korea has been ongoing for years, and the North Koreans claim they have missile-deliverable nuclear warheads.
The Federation of American Scientists estimates that North Korea has enough fissile material to build up to 90 nuclear warheads, but has likely assembled closer to 50.
The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) says that North Korea has built around 30 fissile material cores for use in nuclear weapons, including four-to-six two-stage thermonuclear weapons. While the DIA does not say the 'fissile material cores' can be mounted on missiles, a Japanese report says that North Korea can miniaturize nuclear warheads.
In September, 2007 in an audacious operation called 'Operation Outside the Box,' Israel destroyed a nuclear reactor at al-Kibar in Syria. That reactor was a carbon-copy of North Korea's Yongbyon 5 megawatt nuclear reactor, which produces plutonium for North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The North Koreans partnered with Syria and Iran for the al-Kibar project.
Had the reactor been operating it would have been outside of IAEA's inspection and could have produced a significant amount of fuel for sophisticated plutonium bombs.
Both reports could be right in that Iran may be trying to produce both uranium and plutonium-fueled weapons. This would track just how the US developed atomic weapons leading to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and eventually to an entire arsenal of nukes with various delivery means.
The US Intelligence argument that Iran's supreme leader has not made a decision on fielding nuclear weapons seems disingenuous. The IRGC, which really runs the show in Iran, is certainly investing billions in the effort, and if anything the effort has been intensified and sped up.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission .