Mustafa Al-Kadhimi's Return to Iraq

Asharq Al-Awsat

04-03-2025

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi is returning to Iraq as a geopolitical earthquake shakes the Middle East, depriving Iran of its strategic footholds in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.
The first conclusion we can draw is that Tehran does not set the tempo any longer. Meanwhile, the factions in Iraq that take their marching orders from Iran are confronting existential challenges as calls for restoring the state's authority and sovereignty, liberating it from the dominance of militias, are growing louder. However, the irony is that Iran's weakness adds to the significance of Iraq, as Al-Kadhimi returns, in Iran's calculations.
Within the span of just ten weeks from - September 27 to December 8, 2024 - Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah's assassination crowned the collapse of Hezbollah's leadership, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime ended the strategic framework that Iran had been operating through to take its influence to historically unprecedented levels. In addition, Hamas was destroyed and almost all of Gaza has been turned to dust.
As a result, Baghdad has become Iran's most suitable alternative to compensate for losses in Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. On the other hand, increasing numbers of Iraqis are now calling for the "liberation of Iraq's decision-making from Iranian hegemony" amid growing pressure, both domestically and globally, on the government to rein in armed factions and remove the threat they pose to internal, regional, and global stability.
Therefore, it is difficult to view Kadhimi's return as merely a footnote in a shifting regional landscape or to dismiss it as just one of many signs pointing to an opportunity for Iraq to redefine its relationship with its neighbor based on new rules dictated by the changing regional balance of power and Iran's evolving position within it.
If it is true, as his opponents claim to undermine his popular legitimacy, that Al-Kadhimi did not become prime minister (2020–2022) through democratic elections, it is also true that he left a strong mark on the political landscape. His government made progress on several issues that matter to Iraqi citizens, taking unprecedented steps to contain the armed factions that had long dominated governance, and it balanced Iraq's foreign policy, recalibrating its relations with regional and international powers.
The assassination attempt he survived in November 2021 is concrete evidence of the deep resentment that his policies left and their impact on Iran's agenda in Iraq.
Al-Kadhimi is part of a broad segment of Iraq's Shiite political forces that seek to reinforce Iraq's independence from Iran, going against the other faction that maintains strong allegiance to Tehran. His return will invigorate a political agenda that prioritizes dissolving the armed factions into the regular security forces, which Iran's proxy militias see as a direct threat to their influence.
His return to Baghdad also coincides with the growing influence of Arab state actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and with the continued presence of the United States. Recent months have seen an increase in Gulf investment, as well as indications from Washington that it is willing to help Baghdad rebuild its armed forces - on the condition that the latter curbs the influence of Iran-backed militias.
The fact is that Al-Kadhimi is not merely a controversial politician of post-Saddam Iraq returning to power. His comeback is not just part of his personal trajectory, it is closely tied to the resurgence of the narrative advocating the independence of the Iraqi state, among both politicians and the public, as well as the growing momentum behind the push to reshape relations with Iran on new terms that respect Iraq's sovereignty.
At the same time, Iran has room to maneuver. It understands that the domestic shifts in Iraq will not necessarily cost it all of its influence. Iran may see the political formula in Iraq to alleviate US pressure, especially with President Donald Trump's administration now in power. In contrast to what happened in Syria, where the regime collapsed entirely, developments in Iraq are likely to redistribute power within the current framework, giving Iran the option to adapt instead of gambling away its influence all at once.
After Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, there is now an opportunity for an Iraqi political alliance that includes Al-Kadhimi, who can leverage his symbolism and ties to patriotic and non-ideological Shiite factions, the Kurds, with their political and geographic weight, and the Sunnis, with their weight in the Arab world. This coalition could exploit Iran's frailty and render it a steppingstone on the path to reinforcing Iraq's national sovereignty.
It would be no surprise if, in the upcoming elections, this alliance's campaign revolves around containing the militias' influence, integrating them into state institutions, strengthening ties with Gulf states as an economic and strategic alternative to Iran, rebalancing Iraq's relations with international powers so that its foreign policy serves national in isolation of regional conflicts, and, ultimately, advancing a new political vision centered on the notion of "Iraq First" that ends Baghdad's dependence on foreign axes.
Iraq will not remain immune to the political shifts precipitated by the October 7, 2023, attack and the military and political upheaval in the Arab Levant that followed. Despite the challenges, Iraq is now in a better position than ever to reclaim its sovereignty and go from being a passive recipient of Iranian pressure to an active player that shapes its policies in line with its national interests.