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Ya Libnan
2 days ago
- Politics
- Ya Libnan
There is no better time to disarm Hezbollah
File : Hezbollah top commanders that were killed in its last war with Israel by David Schenker With the group and its Iranian patrons at their weakest point in decades, Beirut has a real opportunity to restore its sovereignty, but waiting for another futile 'national dialogue' may close that window Last week, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun announced that Beirut would not forcibly disarm the Iran-backed Shiite militia Hezbollah as part of its effort to gain a state monopoly on weapons. Instead, Aoun said Hezbollah would be convinced to give up its arms on its own, through dialogue and negotiations. Moreover, the president suggested the militia's troops could then be integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). This approach, which avoids a potentially bloody face-off, will be unacceptable to both the US and Israel, and will ultimately undermine the hopeful progress Lebanon has made toward reasserting its sovereignty. Undoubtedly, President Aoun is in a difficult position. In the November 2024 ceasefire that ended the Hezbollah-Israel war, the Lebanese government agreed to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559, which require the disarmament of all militias in the country. For its part, Hezbollah agreed to move its military hardware and personnel to the area above the Litani River, but it has rejected demilitarization elsewhere. Since the ceasefire was signed in December, the LAF has largely fulfilled its obligations to seize the militia's weapons and dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure along the frontier with Israel. Lacking sufficient numbers of troops and concerned about sparking a resumption of its sectarian civil war, however, Beirut has baulked at going after Hezbollah's arsenal north of the Litani. Meanwhile, consistent with the terms of the ceasefire, Israel continues to target Hezbollah assets and personnel throughout the state. Default Approach To square the circle while avoiding a seemingly inevitable confrontation with Hezbollah, Aoun has defaulted to Lebanon's perennial preferred method of dealing with uncomfortable and insoluble problems: national dialogue. Aoun is calling for a 'bilateral dialogue' with Hezbollah to reach an agreement on the organization's disarmament. Since 2005, Hezbollah has periodically engaged with the Lebanese government and political factions in dialogues focused on designing a 'national defense strategy.' These discussions proved sterile, largely because Hezbollah always refused to discuss ceding its weapons but also because the organization routinely murdered Lebanese critics who had the temerity to suggest that Hezbollah surrender its arms. Accordingly, until 2025, successive Lebanese governments accepted and legitimated, in their ministerial statements, the militia's possession of weapons and 'resistance.' For example, in 2010, Hezbollah participated in several rounds of talks. But Hezbollah maintained its position, and negotiations, unsurprisingly, made no progress. In 2012, then-President Michel Suleiman advocated for placing Hezbollah's arms under the authority of the LAF, but the group swiftly rejected it. In 2016, President Michel Aoun endorsed Hezbollah's arms as 'complementary' to the LAF. After years of futile efforts, in 2018, negotiations finally broke down after the militia deployed to Syria to defend the Assad regime against a popular revolt. Now, Hezbollah says it is again willing to participate in a dialogue. According to Hezbollah MP Ihab Hamadeh, this dialogue would focus on establishing a 'defensive strategy' that would have to 'convince' the Lebanese that the state could defend the country from Israel. Militia officials have said they could agree to disarm if Israel withdraws from Lebanon—a reference to five hilltop locations Israel continues to occupy in Lebanon—and ends its targeting of Hezbollah. But that position has since been contradicted by the organization's current leader, Naim Qassem, who said on 19 April that 'no one will be allowed to remove the weapons of the resistance.' In any event, these officials say the dialogue will not occur until after the parliamentary elections in 2026, currently slated for May. Delay Tactic As in previous failed national dialogues, it appears that Hezbollah is once again embracing talks as a delay tactic . The United States and Israel, as well as many critics of Hezbollah in Lebanon, understand that after sustaining so many losses in its war of choice in support of Hamas, the militia is looking to buy time to regroup and reconstitute. For his part, President Aoun is seeking to avoid a direct confrontation with Hezbollah, but he is under pressure. US Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East Morgan Ortagus continues to press Aoun and the Lebanese government to fulfil their ceasefire obligations vis-a-vis Hezbollah. As Ortagus recently reiterated to the Lebanese network LBCI, 'that includes disarming Hezbollah and all militias .' Aoun's National Dialogue initiative and his trial balloon suggestion of incorporating Hezbollah fighters into the LAF were a well-intentioned effort to cajole Hezbollah into concessions the group is loath to make. To be sure, conscripting the militia into the LAF was the unstated policy vision for Hezbollah during the Clinton Administration. Yet Aoun clearly understands this approach won't fly with Trump's Washington. Indeed, immediately after floating the idea, Aoun clarified that absorbing Hezbollah into the LAF would not resemble the structure of Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces, known as the Hashd al Shaaby , into the Iraqi military. The Hashd—another Iranian-backed militia force—operates separately and outside the control of the Iraqi government. In the case of Hezbollah, Aoun said, militia members would not be permitted to operate as an independent unit like the Hashd, but would instead be recruited into the military as individuals. Despite Aoun's assurances, the approach—in which Hezbollah loyalists would receive military training and continue to possess weapons—is unlikely to advance the disarmament objective. Predictable Initiative Sadly, this initiative was predictable. On 8 October 2024—two months prior to the ceasefire and three months before Aoun was elected president—I anticipated this outcome in a paper published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy . At the time, I wrote: 'To avoid antagonizing the group (Hezbollah) while placating the West, they may be tempted to finesse the resolution to 'incorporate' Hezbollah into the LAF. This would be unacceptable, however.' Seven months on, the idea remains problematic. Lebanon has committed itself to disarming all militias and establishing a state monopoly on weapons. This is the sine qua non if Lebanon hopes to become a sovereign and successful state. And it is for the first time possible because of Israeli military operations in October and November 2024 that degraded Hezbollah to an unprecedented extent. Incorporating Hezbollah into the LAF will preserve the militia's latent capabilities and undercut the army. Delaying efforts to disarm the militia via an interminable dialogue will provide the group with a reprieve from extreme pressure. With both Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons at their weakest point, Lebanon has a fleeting opportunity to restore its eroded sovereignty. Washington will continue to press Beirut to seize this opportunity, but the decision ultimately rests with President Aoun and the Lebanese government. No doubt, Hezbollah will try to delay its demilitarization in hopes of maintaining a residual capability, and should the government persist and broaden its efforts against the group, there could be violent clashes. Despite the risks, however, there will never be a more favorable time to disarm Hezbollah—with or without its consent—than now. David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute . He worked in the Department of Defense during the George W. Bush administration, and was nominated on April 9, 2018, to head the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department . . He has written two books, Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian–Iraqi Relations (2003) and Palestinian Democracy and Governance: An Appraisal of the Legislative Council (2000). ( The Washington Institute )
Shafaq News
2 days ago
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Iraq's CF ‘uneasy' over three political shifts ahead of 2025 polls
Shafaq News/ The Iraqi Home Front movement (Harak al-Bayt al-Iraqi) warned on Wednesday that the Coordination Framework (CF), a political alliance of predominantly Shiite parties, is growing increasingly uneasy over three key shifts that could upend the political landscape ahead of the November 2025 elections. Movement leader Muhyi al-Ansari told Shafaq News the CF fears the possible return of the Patriotic Shiite Movement (formerly the Sadrists), especially if it aligns with civil groups or Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, arguing such a coalition could seriously disrupt the current balance of power. Al-Ansari also criticized Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission for 'failing' to enforce the Political Parties Law, which prohibits armed factions from contesting elections—calling the lapse a 'direct constitutional breach.' The third concern, he noted, is growing public support for independents and technocrats, which threatens to weaken traditional political blocs. Several key figures have already announced their candidacies, including Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition; al-Sudani of the Euphrates Movement (Al-Furatain); Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organization; Former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi of the Progressive (Taqaddum) Party; and Mohsen al-Mandalawi, head of the National Foundation (Al-Asas) Coalition. Badr MP Mukhtar al-Mousawi called the upcoming vote 'difficult and decisive,' pointing to a trend among veteran leaders forming separate lists as Sudani distances himself from the CF. Analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi told Shafaq News that the return of familiar names signals a tactical shift amid changing dynamics. 'Baghdad has become the focal point of political competition,' he said, warning that reformist forces could challenge entrenched elites. Meanwhile, the CF scrapped earlier plans to run fragmented slates and will now field joint lists in Diyala, Nineveh, and Saladin. The decision follows the formation of a new alliance—Qarar (Decision)—led by al-Sudani's al-Furatin Movement, al-Amiri's Badr Organization, and PMF chief Faleh al-Fayyadh.
Shafaq News
3 days ago
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Baghdad: Ground zero in the battle for Iraq's Parliament
Shafaq News/ Iraq's old-guard power players are reclaiming the spotlight as Capital Frontmen, each locking in the number one ballot position in Baghdad ahead of a high-stakes parliamentary election in the country's most contested arena. Among the political 'veterans' contesting the capital are Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition; Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani of the Euphrates Movement (Al-Furatain); Hadi al-Ameri, head of the Badr Organization; Former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi of the Taqaddum Party; and Mohsen al-Mandalawi, head of the Al-Asas Coalition. All are entering the race with individual lists. These figures remain "popularly accepted" in Baghdad, according to Mukhtar al-Moussawi, a senior official in the Badr Organization, who described, to Shafaq News Agency, the upcoming election on November 11, 2025, as 'difficult and decisive,' reflecting rising tensions within the ruling coalition and beyond. It remains unclear where the largest voting bloc will lean, especially if the previous election serves as a benchmark. At the time, the Sadrist Movement secured 27 seats before its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, withdrew his parliamentary bloc amid fierce disputes over the results and subsequent calls to rerun the vote. Al-Moussawi attributed the fragmentation to recent moves by al-Sudani to distance himself from the Coordination Framework, a Shiite bloc that underpins much of the current government. Al-Sudani's Coalition Al-Sudani unveiled a broad electoral alliance under the banner of the "Reconstruction and Development Coalition' bringing together seven political forces: al-Sudani's own Euphrates Movement, the Bilad Sumer Gathering led by Labor Minister Ahmed al-Asadi, the National Coalition of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Karbala Innovation Alliance headed by Karbala Governor Nassif al-Khattabi, Ajyal Bloc of MP Mohammed al-Sayhoud, National Solutions Alliance led by Mohammed Sahib al-Daraji, and the National Contract party led by Faleh al-Fayyadh. The Coordination Framework, once a unified force, will now enter the vote with multiple lists. State of Law, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Ammar al-Hakim's Hikma Movement are each fielding their slates. Still, leaders maintain the option to reunify post-election, potentially forming a consolidated bloc depending on the outcome. All eyes are now on the potential gains of several blocs, particularly those that underperformed in Baghdad during the last election compared to the Sadrists' strong showing. Key questions linger about the possibility of the State of Law Coalition surpassing its previous 11-seat tally, or the Euphrates Movement winning more than a single seat. Similar doubts surround other factions that secured only minimal representation at the time. Regional and Local Contexts Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi framed the return of veteran leaders as part of a larger recalibration driven by internal and regional developments. Domestically, Baghdad's role as the epicenter of political power has magnified its importance, making it a crucial battleground for influence. 'The resurgence of younger, reform-oriented figures poses a visible challenge to traditional elites,' al-Tamimi noted to Shafaq News, emphasizing that these established leaders are keen to reinforce their relevance and maintain control of the political narrative. Regionally, Iraqi factions are navigating shifting dynamics. Waning Iranian influence, changes in Syria's political regime, and pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon have redrawn the regional landscape. Also, Ongoing US-Iran talks, viewed as nearing resolution, may further reshape power alignments, prompting Iraqi players to seek legitimacy at home. 'Elections in Baghdad send the clearest message, those who want to influence Iraq's future must begin here, not in neighboring capitals,' al-Tamimi added. Baghdad: The Heart of Competition Former MP Kazem al-Sayyadi pointed to Baghdad's electoral weight, 69 parliamentary seats, equal to roughly five southern provinces combined, as the core reason for the fierce contest. He also flagged growing concerns over vote-buying, with reports of ballots fetching up to one million dinars or $300 in some districts, as he revealed to Shafaq News. Despite the mounting momentum, the race remains unpredictable. Former lawmaker Kamel al-Ghurairi observed that while some figures wield nationwide influence, 'no single leader is guaranteed dominance in Baghdad,' he stated in an interview with Shafaq News. Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission confirmed that over 29 million Iraqis are eligible to vote, with ongoing updates to the voter registry. Campaigning is expected to begin shortly before the election date.
Shafaq News
3 days ago
- Shafaq News
Nearly 5M mark Shia Imam al-Jawad's martyrdom in Baghdad
2025-05-28T07:33:15+00:00 Shafaq News/ About five million people visited the city of Al-Kadhimiya in Baghdad to commemorate the death anniversary of Imam Muhammad al-Jawad, the ninth Imam in Twelver Shia Islam. Al-Kadhimiya is home to the mausoleums of Imams Musa al-Kadhim and Muhammad al-Jawad. In a statement, the shrine said that 4,734,772 pilgrims had arrived in the area as of the time of the announcement. "The influx of pilgrims continues, with prayers for the acceptance of their rituals and safe return," the statement added. Iraq hosts some of the most significant religious sites in the Islamic world, particularly for followers of the Shiite sect. Each year, tens of millions of pilgrims from Iraq and abroad visit cities such as Najaf, where the shrine of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib is located, and Karbala, which houses the shrine of Imam Hussein ibn Ali. Samarra is revered for the al-Askari shrine, the burial place of Imams Ali al-Hadi and Hassan al-Askari.
Shafaq News
5 days ago
- Politics
- Shafaq News
EXCLUSIVE: Iraq in talks to free Israeli-Russian researcher Tsurkov
Shafaq News/ The Iraqi government is engaged in negotiations to secure the release of Israeli-Russian researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov, the Coordination Framework (CF), a political alliance of predominantly Shiite parties, confirmed on Monday. CF member Adi Abdul-Hadi told Shafaq News that 'negotiations are underway between government officials and other parties to obtain Tsurkov's release,' without disclosing the identities of those involved. 'However,' he added, 'her fate remains unknown.' He also described the talks as promising, expressing optimism that they would yield 'satisfactory results for all groups involved.' Tsurkov, a Stanford University doctoral researcher, disappeared in Baghdad over two years ago while conducting fieldwork. She is believed to be held by an Iran-aligned armed group, reportedly Kataib Hezbollah. However, the group denied any involvement in the incident. Earlier on Monday, a US State Department spokesperson told our agency that discussions are still ongoing over Tsurkov's case but rejected reports suggesting a prisoner exchange deal involving Iranian detainees. Western outlets had previously speculated that a potential agreement might include the release of a detained member of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and several other Iranian nationals held in US custody under a quiet US-Iraqi understanding.
