Hanging on the telephone. A Russian reservist has begun an 18-year prison sentence for treason after trying to visit his mother in Ukraine — Novaya Gazeta Europe
Olga said she'd check, and assured her that he probably either had no reception or his battery was dead. What she didn't know was that at that very moment, her husband, 57-year-old Gennady Artemenko, was being beaten up nearby in the back of a van by agents of Russia's notorious Federal Security Service (FSB), and that he wouldn't be calling his mother any time soon.
Almost two years have passed since then, during which Olga has repeatedly assured her mother-in-law that her son is fine, but chose to leave Russia and has been stuck in a European refugee camp where his processing has been achingly slow due to him holding the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Russian military.
She came up with the story so that her 84-year-old mother-in-law, Lydia Vasilyevna, could cling to the hope that she'd see her son again one day. But Olga is in fact now living in exile herself, and her husband, who was convicted of treason and justifying terrorism last month, has now begun an 18-year sentence in a high-security prison.
Gennady Artemenko was born, grew up and went to school in the Dnipropetrovsk region of central Ukraine, then part of the USSR, where his childhood was indelibly marked by the death of his sister from leukaemia at the age of 12. Though his family had no military tradition, Gennady honoured his father's wish for him to become an officer in the Red Army, moving to study at an artillery school outside Moscow in 1985. After graduating with top marks, Gennady was given a plum first posting in East Germany, where he served until 1993, by which time the Soviet Union had collapsed.
Gennady and Olga in Kyiv. Photo from family archive
Returning to an independent Ukraine, Gennady initially attempted to find work with the Ukrainian military, but after being told that there were too many artillerymen and too little demand, he decided to try his luck in Russia. There, he was able to find work in his field of expertise, and was posted to the Russian Far East, and later to Tajikistan, where his service earned him early retirement. At the age of just 34, having attained the rank of lieutenant colonel, Artemenko left the army and moved to Dzerzhinsk where he became a reservist.
'All our friends and all the neighbours we'd known for at least 10 years dropped us when Gena was arrested.'
'We would go to visit Gena's mother in Ukraine every year,' Olga says. 'My mother-in-law had already buried her husband and daughter and lived for her son.' But in 2014, the war in Donbas began. Artemenko, a Russian citizen, nevertheless had an overseas Ukrainian certificate intended for those of Ukrainian origin who are citizens of other countries.
According to a Ukrainian law signed in 2004, certificate holders enjoy almost all the same rights in Ukraine as citizens.
On one of their annual visits to Ukraine, Olga even managed to track down relatives she had in the country's northern Chernihiv region. 'My cousin and her family know about my situation and are very supportive. The only family I have in Russia are my parents. All our friends and all the neighbours we'd known for at least 10 years dropped us when Gena was arrested,' Olga says.
Gennady Artemenko. Photo from family archive
The Gang of Three
Olga woke up on the morning of 24 February 2022 to find her husband sitting with his head in his hands. When she asked him what had happened, he replied: 'They're bombing Kyiv.' He tried to call his mother, but was unable to get through.
Having spoken to his mother once a week before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Gennady 'started calling twice a day, in the morning and the evening, on the way to work, and on the way home from work,' Olga recalls, adding, 'They always spoke Ukrainian. … Maybe someone reported him?'
Later that year, the pair travelled to Kyrgyzstan to apply for a visa at the Ukrainian Embassy in Bishkek. In 2021, at the height of the pandemic, Gennady had applied to the Ukrainian Migration Service for a residence permit. He worried that closed borders combined with the lockdown might prevent him from helping his seriously ill mother whenever necessary. But Gennady and Olga could never have imagined that it would be war and prison, not quarantine and the pandemic, that would keep them apart.
Gennady Artemenko. Photo from family archive
The Artemenkos' visa application was turned down. According to Olga, the Ukrainian consul was sympathetic to their situation and tried to help, but told them that during wartime it was the Security Service of Ukraine that granted visas, not consuls.
Gennady wrote to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Migration Service and Presidential Administration. On each occasion, he received the same pro-forma answer: 'We understand, but there is a war going on. We will consider your case after the war.' However, Artemenko persevered, planning another trip to Kyrgyzstan in 2023, which he was ultimately unable to take, as the Russian intelligence services had come for him by then. On the day of his detention, FSB officers lay in wait for him outside his house, and after beating him up in a van parked around the corner, they searched his home.
They brought him back inside and said they had found 60g of explosives in the kitchen radiator.
'They locked Gena out on the balcony and supposedly searched the apartment. Then they brought him back inside and said they had found 60g of explosives in the kitchen radiator,' Olga recalls.
Olga understood immediately that the charge against Gennady for the 'illegal possession of firearms or ammunition by a group of people' had been prepared in advance, and that the explosives had been planted. 'The group of people must have been me, my husband and the cat,' Olga says wryly.
Circumstantial evidence
The charges for a group of people possessing weapons were eventually dropped, only to be replaced by charges of treason and justifying terrorism.
Olga and Gennady. Photo from family archive
'Planting explosives is a standard FSB move,' according to Yevgeny Smirnov, a lawyer with Russian human rights NGO First Department, who knows the Artemenko case. 'They needed to place Gennady in detention to have time to open a criminal case on other charges.'
The charges against Artemenko for treason and justifying terrorism were based principally on his membership of Telegram channel Civil Force, which is run by the Crimean Tatar Atesh movement, an underground guerilla group that aims to free Crimea from Russian occupation. The terror charge was added to his rap sheet when the Atesh movement was recognised as a terrorist organisation by the Russian government late last year.
When leaflets similar to a banner frequently used by Atesh began appearing around Dzerzhinsk saying 'Let's stop the war together!' alongside the Atesh logo, Artemenko was accused of posting them due to his subscription to the channel.
As far as the court was concerned, Artemenko was subscribed to the Atesh channel, and that was all the proof it needed.
Investigators looking into the incident claimed to have seen surveillance footage implicating Artemenko, though they also conceded that it hadn't been sufficiently clear to identify the perpetrator with any certainty. During Artemenko's trial, his lawyer asked to see the footage, but the court turned down the request, as it did nearly all other requests made by the defence. As far as the court was concerned, Artemenko was subscribed to the Atesh channel, and that was all the proof it needed.
The prosecution also presented the leaflet itself as evidence, though the sample they submitted for expert analysis was oddly pristine, as if it had just been downloaded and printed off, and had never been stuck up anywhere in the city at all. The prosecutors said that a psychological and linguistic analysis had revealed 'a desire to stop the war' in conjunction with Atesh.
As if being charged with wanting to stop the war was not absurd enough, Artemenko was also charged with communicating with Atesh members, though no evidence of this was provided, and no correspondence was presented in court.
Atesh leaflet in Dzerzhinsk, Russia. Photo: Civil Force / Telegram
Running out of time
The trial lasted for four days, after which the court convicted Artemenko on both counts and handed him a sentence of 18 years in a maximum-security penal colony and a fine of 360,000 rubles (€3,900).
'There have already been over 1,000 treason and espionage cases since the start of the war,' Smirnov told Novaya Gazeta Europe. 'The defendants are mostly not public figures, but completely ordinary people who for various reasons at some point or other have found themselves in the FSB's crosshairs.'
'I believe Gennady Artemenko came under surveillance when he attempted to seek permission to enter Ukraine. … That's a trigger for the FSB. They might have thought he was planning to commit treason by changing sides,' Smirnov continued.
Gennady and Olga in Kyiv, holding a Ukrainian flag. Photo from personal archive, used as case material
Evidence of Artemenko's anti-Russian position was provided in the form of a 2018 photograph of Gennady and Olga in Kyiv holding a Ukrainian flag. They had taken the trip to celebrate his 50th birthday, and Olga had bought tickets to a concert by Ukrainian rock band Okean Elzy. 'We were tired, but loved the concert. It was our favourite band, it was his birthday in Kyiv, and we had so many happy years ahead of us still to look forward to.'
Seven years later and reserve lieutenant colonel Gennady Artemenko is in detention, waiting to be transferred to a maximum-security penal colony. Now 57, he has a long list of serious health issues, including hypertension, hernias and pancreatitis.
Factoring in time served, he will be 73 when he is finally released, if he serves his full term. Olga now lives outside Russia where she works as a nanny and cleaner, but she hopes she'll soon be allowed to travel to Ukraine to see and reassure her mother-in-law.
To this day, Lydia Vasilyevna knows nothing about the fate of her son, and Olga puts on a brave face every day when she calls her to say: 'Gena is fine, Lydia Vasilyevna! He just can't contact you right now as he's in a refugee camp. But he will soon. Trust me.'
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Novaya Gazeta Europe
2 hours ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Wolf at the door. Europe must now show that it can follow through on its pledges to boost military spending and step up its support for Ukraine — Novaya Gazeta Europe
'Money makes the world go around,' sings the showgirl Sally Bowles in Cabaret, the iconic musical set against the backdrop of the Weimar Republic's decadence. Money will certainly shape Europe's future, as political leaders across the continent are forced to make painful decisions about how to allocate public funds in an increasingly unstable world. Carl Bildt Former Swedish prime minister and foreign minister Three urgent priorities are set to strain Europe's public finances over the next few years. The first — and most obvious — is defence. The push to boost military spending is primarily a response to Vladimir Putin's aggression, compounded by US President Donald Trump's relentless criticism of America's NATO allies. Together, these pressures have made strengthening Europe's defence posture a strategic necessity. The second, and arguably more urgent, priority is to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. 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Following the Trump administration's dramatic foreign-aid cuts and the shutdown of the US Agency for International Development, there is a strong case for Europe to fill the void. A more desperate world will be more volatile and less secure, making development a strategic imperative as well as a moral one. Meeting all of these commitments will not be easy, especially for governments already grappling with high deficits and rising public debt. My guess is that northern European countries will reach NATO's 3.5%-of-GDP defence spending target well before 2035, while southern European countries — with the exception of Greece — will likely fail to meet it. With France, Italy, and Spain all heading for elections by 2027, the political appetite for the spending cuts needed to increase defence budgets will likely remain limited. There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts. This trend is already evident in the distribution of aid to Ukraine. In the first four months of 2025, the Nordic countries contributed $6.8 billion, the UK provided $5.3 billion, and Germany put up $760 million, while Spain and Italy gave only a fraction of those amounts. The irony is that the EU member states often labelled as 'frugal' are the ones actually willing to provide funding to advance the bloc's agreed-upon priorities. Meanwhile, the less frugal countries prefer to call for more borrowing, even though they have limited room to do so themselves. These tensions are now driving the intensifying battle over Europe's finances. There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts. Whatever the outcome, the coming fiscal fight will test how able and willing Europe's leaders are to confront the serious security challenges ahead. This article was first published by Project Syndicate. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe
Balkan Insight
3 days ago
- Balkan Insight
Will Russia attack beyond Ukraine?
July 24, 2025 - Valerii Pekar - Articles and Commentary Damaged buildings after Russian shelling and rocket attacks in Bakhmut. Photo: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock The answer to the question posed in the title of this article depends on how you assess the current international situation. Do you consider Russian aggression in Ukraine a local war or the first act of a global war? Do you have full confidence that the United States will immediately come to the rescue? Do you consider NATO's level of deterrence against Russia to be sufficient? Are you sure you understand Russia's goals and strategies? Are there vulnerabilities in the current system that invite an aggressor? Lately, we have been hearing that Russia will be ready to attack Europe around 2030, and by then the continent needs to be fully prepared and rearmed. But is Russia obliged to wait for such a moment of European readiness? After all, it is appropriate to strike at the moment of least readiness. Why not now? To understand this, we need to answer three questions: What is Russia's strategic goal? How has war changed? And how can Russia use the new nature of the war to achieve its goal? As I wrote in a previous article, in the new world of the 'right of force', American, Russian and Chinese interests coincide. They would all like to see Europe divided and weak, incapable of making strong joint decisions. They want a Europe that is not an independent centre of power but only a set of markets in which they can trade profitably. This leads to steps that can even be seen as a certain American-Russian rapprochement. Thus, the Russian strategic goal is not to seize a part of European territory as was expected during the Cold War. It would be enough now to sow panic and chaos; create a humanitarian crisis; generate refugee flows; and collapse and overthrow governments. This could create a domino effect that could bring radical Eurosceptics to power, destroy European unity and (last but not least) cut support to Ukraine. To understand how this could happen, we need to look at the face of modern war. The new face(s) of war The nature of modern warfare has changed radically over the past three years. While the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 looked like the Second World War, radical innovations since then (some of the most important were mentioned here) have changed the battlefield every few months. This has influenced not only tactics but also strategies. And generals (in a phrase attributed to Churchill) are always preparing for the last war. One of the typical delusions is that the war in Ukraine is a 'poor country's war' that is forced to use a large army, while NATO can wage a 'rich country's war' with a small professional army and high-precision weapons. This concept from the days of Operation Desert Storm is outdated. As one of the leading Ukrainian military experts, Taras Chmut, says, 'You don't need to have the best equipment. You need to have sufficient equipment in enough quantities.' At the same time, war is not only high-tech, but also multi-domain. More than ever before, it includes other types of confrontation, in addition to kinetic engagement. It now covers the economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, political, demographic, cyber, information, psychological and cognitive (semantic) spheres alongside other domains. The third important feature of war is the significant expansion of the amplitude of operations. In addition to clearly hostile actions, modern war includes (and Russian military doctrine emphasizes) so-called liminal operations. These involve activities that are not obviously (at least initially) hostile until they achieve their goals, or those that, in the opinion of the other side, do not cross the threshold of reaction. Examples include the appearance of militants in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 who initially seemed unserious. Following this, recently we have seen the repeated infringement of the Polish border by missiles and drones (seemingly by accident); the inexplicable death of American soldiers in Lithuania; the recent fires involving military equipment in Germany and Belgium; a fire affecting telecommunications networks in Poland; and the dangerous use of electronic warfare in the Baltics. Finally, the fourth important feature of war is that it is taking place for the first time in the postmodern world, which affects all other dimensions. I will only list the most important theses here: The emergence of cognitive (semantic) warfare to the fore, with the main battlefield becoming consciousness itself and what people think. A full-fledged reflection of war in the media and social networks in real time, which completely changes the perception of war within societies. The active use of fakes aimed at the creation of an alternative reality for the opponent and third parties: it does not matter what has happened, what is important is what is said about events. Post-heroic societies that do not approve of mass mobilization, despite the fact that war still requires huge armies. From the point of view of European security, the question arises whether the continent's countries are ready for such a war — high-tech, multi-domain, liminal, postmodern. This means that there must be readiness of not only armies, but societies. Russian strike Most likely, we should not expect a Russian strike as a ground operation, featuring powerful tanks and motorized columns aimed at Baltic countries or the Polish-Lithuanian Suwałki corridor. Instead of this, just imagine an attack on Poland that combines: massive missile and drone attacks on energy, infrastructure and logistics facilities (by the way, drones can be marked as Ukrainian); cyber-attacks on government and infrastructure facilities; a navigation collapse due to the large-scale use of electronic warfare; sabotage and terrorist groups creating sudden 'ecological' and man-made disasters; the destabilization of society (already heated) through social networks; the use of a 'fifth column' and 'useful idiots'; crowds of thousands of Middle Eastern refugees released across the Belarusian border. I am not saying that everything will necessarily be like this. I just want to emphasize that the war could be completely different from the one Europe is preparing for. And such a war requires significantly fewer resources than a Second World War-style one, resources which are available in Russia today. In such a situation, the key issue is not the quantity and quality of weapons, but the readiness of the political and military leadership to react quickly. It is also important to assess the readiness of society to take balanced, mature and responsible actions. Dear reader, ask yourself: what would the political leadership of your country do in such a case? Will governments be at a loss, not knowing how to respond? And what would you and your family do personally? Conclusion The increasingly frequent statements by Russian representatives that Russia is not going to attack Europe sounds like a wake-up call for European politicians. Russia will neither wait for European readiness nor attack where it has long been expected. It will also not use the strategic approaches of the Second World War. This raises a number of questions that go beyond the military dimension. Relevant issues now include the unity and cohesion of societies; control of the domestic information space; the ability of NGOs to support governments and societies in moments of extraordinary challenges; and the preparedness of political leaders to make decisions in a pre-threshold liminal war. Learning the lessons of Ukraine, for which Ukrainians paid with their own blood, is recommended here. Purchasing tanks and armoured vehicles is not enough to oppose a Russian strike. They will not even leave the hangars. Superbly trained and brave soldiers will have no targets to acquire with this equipment. There will be no more wars like February 2022. Europe has all the necessary resources to defend itself. The problem is that governments and societies do not see that war is already on their doorstep. They do not understand that Russia should not be deterred or stopped but defeated. Some will say I am causing panic. I already heard this in early February 2022. Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of the Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. geopolitics, Russian invasion of Ukraine
Novaya Gazeta Europe
4 days ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Russian Supreme Court bans ‘international Satanist movement' — Novaya Gazeta Europe
Russian soldiers attend a service at Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces outside Moscow, on 23 June 2020. EPA/SERGEI ILNITSKY A Russian Supreme Court judge has designated 'Satanism' and the 'International Satanist movement' as 'extremist', and legally banned their operations in Russia, independent news outlet Mediazona reported on Wednesday. The decision means that, among other things, 'the general principles of Satanism' and the performance of 'occult rituals' will now be outlawed in Russia, according to the Prosecutor General's office, which hailed the designation as a triumph for 'legal forces' in the 'eternal struggle between good and evil'. Presiding judge Oleg Nefedov, who previously applied the same designation to the non-existent 'international LGBT movement' in November 2023 and oversaw the April decision to decriminalise the Taliban, conducted the hearing in a closed-door session, with no media or other officials permitted to attend. The designation follows over a year of discussions by top officials and prominent pro-Kremlin voices regarding the fight against Satanism in Russia, which began with a special State Duma session in July 2024, featuring deputies, priests, and several state media propagandists. During the initial discussion, participants broadly classified a variety of groups, including LGBT individuals, 'childfree' advocates, women's abortion rights proponents, Ukraine's Azov battalion members, furry and therian subcultures as 'Satanist' or destructive influences in society. In January, Patriarch Kirill, primate of the Russian Orthodox Church and a close ally of Vladimir Putin, renewed discussion of the topic, demanding that Satanism be legally banned in Russia, and endorsed a proposed law banning the advertisement of 'occult magic services', such as astrology or tarot card readings. 'It is unacceptable that various Satanic sects forming part of the international Satanist movement are still freely conducting their rituals in our country, recruiting young people, and openly registering their groups and communities on social media,' Patriarch Kirill said at the time, adding that Russian soldiers in Ukraine were 'ready to give their lives for values that are clearly trampled upon by Satanists'. Though the legislation endorsed by Kirill was rejected on 11 July by the government of Prime Minister Mikhail Mushustin on the grounds that its definitions were overly nebulous, in early July the Prosecutor General's Office and Justice Ministry jointly filed a lawsuit with the Russian Supreme Court requesting that the 'international Satanist movement' be recognised as extremist. In November 2023, Putin pardoned a member of a Satanist gang that killed four teenagers who was serving a 20-year prison sentence in recognition of his military service in Ukraine.
