Former Russian minister ‘shocked' to learn he was subject to sanctions in UK
Dmitrii Ovsiannikov, 48, the former mayor of Sevastopol in illegally annexed Crimea, is facing seven counts of circumventing sanctions between February 2023 and January 2024.
He is said to have deliberately avoided sanctions by opening a Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) account on or before February 2023 and having tens of thousands of pounds transferred to it by his wife, Ekaterina Ovsiannikova, 47.
Ovsiannikova is facing four counts of breaching sanctions by assisting with the payments.
Ovsiannikov's brother, Alexei Owsjanikow, 47, has denied circumventing sanctions to buy him a Mercedes Benz worth £54,500, as well as spending £41,027 on fees at the Royal Russell School in Surrey for Ovsiannikov's children.
Body-worn footage played to the jury showed National Crime Agency (NCA) officers arresting Ovsiannikov in a residential street on January 22 2024 on suspicion of breaching UK financial sanctions.
During an interview he answered no comment, before telling officers that he 'hoped no one knew that he had left Russia and he had spent a number of years' making it possible to leave, prosecutor Lyndon Harris summarised at Southwark Crown Court on Tuesday.
The EU designated Ovsiannikov on November 21 2017, restricting him from entering and accessing funds in member states.
It said his work had compromised or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
EU sanctions ceased to apply in the UK after Brexit and the country created its own regime, the Russia Regulations 2019.
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) designated Ovsiannikov under the Russia Regulations in December 2020 and he remains a designated person.
His name was on the UK Sanctions List public website from December 31 that year. At that time he did not have a British passport.
On August 1 2022, Ovsiannikov travelled from Russia to Turkey and three days later applied online for a UK passport.
It was issued in January and he arrived in the UK on February 1 2023.
That month, he was removed from the EU sanctions list following a previous ruling by the the Court of Justice of the European Union.
On February 7, he emailed the FCDO a form to review his sanctions in the UK.
In March, solicitors Peters and Peters LLP wrote to the same Government office on his behalf about his designation.
During the January 2024 NCA interview, which Ovsiannikov elected to do without a Russian translator, he suggested he had thought he was no longer a designated person in the UK.
A transcript was read to jurors, in which Ovsiannikov said: 'I believed one year ago that the decision in the European Union, when you were inside the European Union when I applied, and (the) European Court said that my designation was unlawful since September 2020, when the United Kingdom was the member of the (European) Union (sic).
'And when I came I found out, it was a shock for me, I didn't know'.
He was asked what he gave for the good character requirement on his UK visa application, and responded he was 'not a criminal and was a positive person for the United Kingdom', Mr Harris told jurors.
He declined to give the pin for either of his phones, stating that they contained privileged legal information.
An investigating NCA officer, who gave evidence behind a screen and was given the alias Alex, told jurors that officers worked out the Pin for one device using CCTV to see where Ovsiannikov tapped the screen.
Most of the uncovered messages between him and Ovsiannikova were about their children and 'ordinary household matters'.
There were none before March 8 2023 about Ovsiannikov being subject to an asset freeze or being unable to bank in the UK.
Messages did not mention concerns about whether he could enter the UK or how they would live while he was designated.
Ovsiannikova was questioned voluntarily about her involvement in the alleged offences eight days later.
She described being 'horrified' by the situation and denied knowing her husband was at the time subject to sanctions.
'I was aware my husband had been sanctioned but this had been overturned in the EU, and I had no knowledge that he was subject to an asset freeze in the UK and I don't think he knew either', she said.
Halifax bank notified her in March 2023 that it would close her account, she told officers.
She added that she was able to move some funds but had 'a few thousand pounds remaining' which she withdrew in cash for day-to-day living expenses such as food and clothes.
Ovsiannikova said 'I'm really upset about this situation and the impact on my children', adding that she would never have transferred funds to her husband 'if I wasn't allowed to', the court heard.
The trial continues.
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