Druze residents near Damascus resist demand to turn in arms as tensions boil
Druze residents near Syria's capital are resisting a demand by the government to hand in their light weapons, saying authorities have yet to address fears of new attacks by Sunni Muslim militants after days of sectarian violence.
Clashes last week pitted Sunni fighters against armed Druze residents of the town of Jaramana southeast of Damascus, later spreading to another district near the capital and then south to the predominantly Druze province of Sweida.
Such violence threatens the new government's control of Syria, where armed gangs are attacking religious minorities and Israel is stepping up its military intervention under the banner of protecting the Druze community.
Syrian authorities have negotiated deals to allow Druze fighters to protect their own areas as enlisted members of Syria's security forces, but this week asked that all weapons held by residents of these areas be turned in to the state.
'We told them, as soon as there is a state capable of regulating its forces, we'll have no problem handing in our weapons,' said Makram Obeid, a member of the Jaramana committee that is negotiating with the Syrian government.
Obeid said his committee had told government officials it would be better for them to focus on disarming the gangs now harassing minorities.
'It's our right to be scared, because we saw what happened in other areas,' he told Reuters, an apparent reference to killings in March of hundreds of civilians from the Alawite minority to which former President Bashar al-Assad belongs.
It was the deadliest episode of sectarian violence in years in Syria, where a 14-year war ended last December when rebels toppled Assad, who fled to Russia.
'People want to feel safe. It's enough to have (more than) 11 years of killing, strikes, and worries,' Obeid said. 'And we're coming to another phase that we thought, with the collapse of the regime, would leave us in a much better place. But until now, we don't feel reassured.'
Fahad Haydar, a resident of Jaramana, echoed those fears.
'These weapons that are turned against us - that's what we're afraid of. If those weapons get handed in, then we'll hand in ours,' he told Reuters.
Seeking guarantees
Mowaffaq Abu Shash, a Druze cleric in Jaramana, said the Druze had already compromised enough.
'We take one step, they ask for a second. We take the second step, they ask for a third,' he said. 'We ask for a guarantee that what happened on the coast will not happen to us.'
One influential Druze spiritual leader, Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri, has called for international intervention to protect his community from Syria's leaders, whom he has branded 'terrorists.'
The Druze, an Arab minority sect who practice a religion originally derived from Islam, live in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel has vowed to protect Syria's Druze militarily if they face threats.
Last week's violence was ignited by a voice recording purportedly cursing the Prophet Mohammad, which Sunni militants suspect was made by a Druze. More than a dozen people were killed in Jaramana before the violence spread west and south.
It also drew in Israel, which carried out a drone strike on what it said were fighters preparing to attack Druze in the town of Sahnaya, west of Jaramana. A Syrian security source told Reuters one member of the security forces was killed in the strike.
As the clashes reached Sweida province, Israel bombed near the presidential palace in Damascus - the clearest sign yet of its hostility towards Syria's new leaders.
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