Meeting Change and Missed Opportunities

Asharq Al-Awsat

2 days ago

The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa to the Syrian presidency is the foundational episode of the regional transformation that is currently underway. It may well be one of the most consequential outcomes of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and its aftermath or even the most consequential strategic shift the region has witnessed since the 1967 defeat.
We did not merely see a change at the top of the Syrian regime. The entire regional order that had been built around an Iranian-Syrian-Lebanese axis, whose influence stretched into Iraq and Palestine, has collapsed. A new phase has begun, and the door to the Levant has now been closed to Iranian expansion. The United States has returned to the region through the front door, with its role bolstered by a rare moment of Arab consensus regarding the need to curb the non-Arab spheres of influence that had crystalized over the past two decades.
This turning point has drawn unprecedented Arab and international attention, led by Saudi Arabia and crowned by President Donald Trump's meeting with al-Sharaa. Global powers then raced to Damascus as they sought a role in reshaping Syria's regional role and strategic posture.
This surge of attention has come as a surprise to Lebanon. The frustration of the Lebanese has raised legitimate questions about the gulf in Arab and international engagement with Syria when compared to Lebanon. Indeed, a change in leadership has also emerged in Beirut, which has now also exited the Syrian and Iranian spheres of influence. How could the spotlight shift away from a country long seen as the 'Arab world's concern' and the 'laboratory of international settlements'? Has the world made up its mind about Beirut?
Lebanon, which has sustained Arab and international attention since the 1969 Palestinian crisis, is now squandering opportunity after opportunity, gradually losing what remains of international confidence in the country. Neither limited resources nor Lebanon's fragile political system explain this failure alone; the absence of a unified national vision, political will, and commitment to reform are also crucial factors.
At the same time, most Arab states and international powers had been expecting a clear stance on the key question of sovereignty in the wake of regional and domestic changes. The authorities were expected to consolidate the state's monopoly over arms, fight corruption, and affirm judicial independence. Instead, Lebanon chose ambiguity, seemingly unaware of the significance of what has happened in Syria, Iran's retreat from the Levant, and Hezbollah's waning power.
The result, three months into the new government's tenure, has been stagnation, kicking the can down the road, and petty deals. Hesitation continues to prevail, fueled by a fear of the specter of civil war and the daunting task of dismantling Hezbollah's deep entrenchment in the public sector, Lebanon's security apparatus and other state institutions The authorities are also reluctant to embark on the complex and delicate process of disentangling the Shiite community from Hezbollah.
It seems that Lebanon is being steadily pushed to the margins, while Syria has been granted a historic opportunity backed by broad Arab and international support. Lebanon has received little more than initiatives that lack meaningful political backing, despite the formation of a new government that signals a desire for change.
Rather than deliberate neglect, this state of affairs is a reflection of deepening despair over Lebanon's ability to seize the moment and engage with clear messages. Chief among them is the demand for a clear political decision on ending all forms of armed resistance, deeming Hezbollah's weapons as illegitimate, setting a timeframe for its disarmament and pursuing a permanent truce with Israel similar to that of the 1949 armistice.
These steps would strip Israel of its pretexts, though it is nonetheless unlikely to play a constructive role in either Lebanon or Syria. The current ultra-right Israeli government is gripped by paranoia. It sees every political shift in an Arab country as a direct threat, demanding everything while offering no political concessions and favoring military solutions over political compromise.
The successes it has achieved in its latest war have only hardened this disposition and deepened its delusion that force alone can dictate realities on the ground, even if this comes at the cost of regional stability and risks straining Israel's relations with the Trump administration, which seeks to broaden the Abraham Accords.
In the end, the difference between Syria and Lebanon lies not in the scale of their respective crises, but in each country's ability to respond to those crises.
The collapse of the Syrian regime has triggered a structural and strategic metamorphosis that has drawn in international and Arab actors eager to fill the vacuum and redraw the regional map. Syria finds itself at a moment that mirrors the post-Cold War era. This is a moment of reckoning, reshuffling, and opening up to new possibilities.
Lebanon, by contrast, remains caught in a grey zone. It is neither fully collapsing nor genuinely recovering, content to manage its crises without resolving them. As Damascus transforms into the foundation of a new regional order in which it plays an active role, Beirut is fading from the world's view.
The bell of transformation has rung, and opportunities do not wait for those who squander them. In a world ruled by hard reality rather than good intentions, hedging and delay no longer convince anyone.