Why the WHO could control the world during an outbreak of ‘Disease X'
5 As part of his new vision for US foreign policy, Pres. Trump withdrew the US from the World Health Organization.
Ron Sachs/CNP / SplashNews.com
Let's review the history. On Jan. 30, 2020, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director general of the WHO, announced a 'public health emergency of international concern' in response to the advancing COVID-19 crisis. With these six magic words, Tedros put into force the WHO's International Health Regulations (IHR), which the United States was obligated to then follow. Upon Tedros' invocation of this IHR 'treaty,' the WHO effectively seized power over all sovereigns, signatories and member nations, including us.
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In America, federal agencies like the National Institutes of Health instantly assumed outsized power, with Dr. Anthony Fauci taking center stage. On March 13, 2020, President Trump issued a 'national public health emergency' — and in doing so, delegated executive control to some of the very people (like Fauci) involved in creating the world's previous coronavirus crises.
5 Despite this notable action, the WHO could still influence the US medical establishment during periods of global health emergencies.
REUTERS
Tedros Ghebreyesus was born in Ethiopia and is not a medical doctor. Instead, he is a Marxist and member of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, a group the Ethiopian government has classified as a terrorist organization. While Tedros was the health minister for Ethiopia, there were three significant cholera outbreaks (2006, 2009 and 2011).
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Allegations continue today that Tedros covered up these outbreaks to avoid international embarrassment. Unsurprisingly, Tedros' response to the COVID-19 crisis was equally reckless, running cover for the Chinese Communist Party and denying resolutely that the virus leaked from their government-run research laboratory in Wuhan.
5 WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus is not a medical doctor, and yet he still leads the most important health organization in the world.
AFP via Getty Images
Although Trump has withdrawn the US from the WHO, America will only be truly decoupled from the organization when Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. — as director of Health and Human Services — fully severs the relationship between the CDC and the WHO. Until then, the public health of all Americans could still be determined by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. This means that if Ghebreyesus were to merely suspect the arrival of a communicable disease, he could require every WHO member nation to submit their jurisdictional powers, their sovereignty and decision-making abilities to him. America may no longer be formally part of the WHO, but it would still be impacted by the tremendous influence it holds over the global health and medical community.
And this could play out most worryingly, if and when the world is confronted with a 'Disease X.'
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5 Ghebreyesus was once a member of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, which many have considered a terror organization.
AFP via Getty Images
'Disease X' is the genetic term used by the WHO to reference an anticipated but unspecified future pandemic. But that future could very likely be now. Our research indicates that 'Disease X' has already been weaponized and released in the form of a gain-of-function enhanced version of COVID-19 that is more contagious and lethal than its predecessor. Even more frightening, our research also indicates that a new, more lethal vaccine has already been prepared as the supposed antidote to 'Disease X.' We suspect both have originated in China.
The new vaccine includes a 'replicon,' so named because of its ability to reproduce the active ingredient of the virus spike protein throughout the patient's body. This has the potential to make it highly contagious — and especially dangerous. In 2024, scientists in Japan developed and began using an experimental 'replicon concoction' named 'Kostaive.' The official website of the European Medicines Agency of the European Union describes Kostaive as 'a vaccine for preventing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in people aged 18 years and over.' Sound familiar?
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Unless RFK Jr. reins in the CDC — and fully decouples it from the WHO — the implications of a 'Disease X' outbreak remain dire. The paramount question is: will the US military in a future 'global health emergency of international concern' bow to the WHO for guidance — as it did in 2020 — or stay under the command and control of the commander in chief? After all, the president is (supposedly) the only government official with constitutional authority to order the United States to avoid medical martial law — no matter how deadly a potential 'Disease X' might turn out to be.
Adapted from 'Disease X and Medical Martial Law' by Todd s. Callender J.D., Jerome R. Corsi Ph.D. and Craig D. Campbell Ph.D, Copyright – Post Hill Press, 2025.
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