Arts Picks: Basoeki Abdullah at National Gallery, Han Mengyun solo, SG60 strings concert
Indonesian painter Basoeki Abdullah Labour (circa 1950s) is a futuristic landscape based on monuments such as Egyptian pyramids and Ottoman mosques. PHOTO: NATIONAL GALLERY SINGAPORE
Diplomacy And Desire: Basoeki Abdullah In Singapore
One of South-east Asia's most-sought-after portraitists, Indonesian painter Basoeki Abdullah ( 1915 to 1993 ) has painted the likes of Singapore's first elected chief minister David Marshall, Singapore's founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew , as well as former Philippine president and first lady Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos.
In this small and historically intriguing exhibition, some of Basoeki's portraits are on show, including one of Dr Tan Tsze Chor, a businessman dubbed the Pepper King who made his fortune through pepper trading, and several portraits of local models.
The centrepie ce i s, however, two huge paintings that face each other in the main hall of the Dalam Southeast Asia space. They are two significant artworks gifted to Singapore in 1959, coinciding with the country's transition towards self-governance, and in 1981.
The almost 3m-long Labour (circa 1950s), which featured in the gallery's special exhibition Tropical: Stories From Southeast Asia And Latin America in 2024, is a futuristic landscape based on monuments such as Egyptian pyramids and Ottoman mosques.
The painting, accepted by then-Minister of Culture S. Rajaratnam, was Basoeki's representation of the future of Singapore. Basoeki had briefly lived here between 1958 and 1960.
The second piece is Struggle For The Re-establishment Of The Democracy And The Right For The People (1981). The mythical landscape, washed in garish blues, is of a mermaid along with five pearls, said to represent the five founding nations of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean).
The exhibition is a small window into an artist who was adjacent to power and keenly aware of art's political possibilities.
Where: National Gallery Singapore, 1 St Andrew's Road
MRT: City Hall
When: Till Feb 1, 2026, 10am to 7pm daily
Admission: Free for Singaporeans and permanent residents, $20 (standard) and $15 (concession) for foreigners
Info: str.sg/BMrV
Han Mengyun: Jewels Of Impermanence
Reunion (2024) by Han Mengyun.
PHOTO: SHANGHART GALLERY
Wuhan-bo rn a rtist Han Mengyun's upcoming exhibition sets the stage for an encounter between Dutch vanitas paintings and Buddhist depictions of skeletons and skulls.
The largely black-and-white paintings of these transient objects draw from the Western memento mori traditions – which lay bare worldly vanity – and Buddhist meditations on repulsiveness, which confront impermanence as a prerequisite of enlightenment.
The series sees the London-based artist return to the medium of oil painting, which she had rejected for close to a decade, in search of alternative expressions beyond Western materials.
Han says in a statement: 'In the prospect of grim uncertainty, I felt an urgent craving for the corporeal lusciousness of oil, the exhilarating violence of the brush, the humble endurance of canvas – capacities ink and rice paper cannot sustain.'
Where: ShanghART Singapore, 02-22 Gillman Barracks, 9 Lock Road
MRT: Labrador Park
When: May 31 to July 27, noon to 6pm (Wednesdays to Sundays); other hours by appointment only
Admission: Free
Info: str.sg/zMif
Min Lee & Aleksey Igudesman, SG60 Celebrate!
Singaporean violinist Min Lee (pictured) and Russian-German violinist Aleksey Igudesman will join 60 young musicians for a charity concert in celebration of the Republic's 60th birthday.
PHOTO: THE ORGANISERS
Singaporean violinist Min Lee and Russian-German violinist Aleksey Igudesman will join 60 young musicians for a charity concert in celebration of the Republic's 60th birthday.
Expect a multicultural programme with traditional tunes such as the popular Spanish folk song La Cucaracha, as well as Singaporean composer Dick Lee's patriotic anthem Home. The programme is arranged by Igudesman.
Young and prodigious violinists from Lee's Wolfgang Violin Studio , such as 12-year-old Mark Lee and 11-year-old Chua Suen Ern, will also take the stage.
The concert is organised by The Association of Banks in Singapore and the Credit Bureau Singapore in support of the President's Challenge. President Tharman Shanmugaratnam is the concert's guest of honour.
Where: Victoria Concert Hall, 11 Empress Place
MRT: City Hall
When: June 3, 7.30pm
Admission: $50 to $100
Info: str.sg/KUJC
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Business Times
38 minutes ago
- Business Times
Asean's export rush wanes as tariff clock ticks down
[SINGAPORE/KUALA LUMPUR/HANOI/JAKARTA] South-east Asia's export boom may be running on borrowed time as traders rush to front-load goods ahead of the end of US President Donald Trump's 90-day tariff pause on Jul 9, masking signs of fading momentum. While April's export data climbed year on year across much of the region, a closer look reveals a month-on-month slowdown that is already hitting Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines, with the rest of South-east Asia likely to follow by the second half of the year. April trade figures suggest not just front-loading, but also a possible rerouting of US-destined China-origin goods through Asean economies, said Nomura analysts Rob Subbaraman and Toh Si Ying. Such front-loading means Asian export growth in the second quarter of the year could be stronger than projected, noted the duo in a May 28 report. But they warned that this may just be 'a brief respite before an Asian export slump in H2, driven by the inevitable payback from front-loading and an overall slowdown in global trade activity caused by the highest US tariff rates in over 80 years and historically high business uncertainty'. The major exporters in trade-reliant South-east Asia – Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore – face a looming slowdown. On the other hand, the Philippines – a net importer – saw front-loading taper off early. It could ultimately benefit from trade diversion and a potential US deal, as tariffs position its goods to become more competitive. The Business Times breaks down how the shifting trade tide is unfolding across the region. A NEWSLETTER FOR YOU Friday, 8.30 am Asean Business Business insights centering on South-east Asia's fast-growing economies. Sign Up Sign Up Singapore: surge now, strain later Singapore's non-oil domestic exports surged 12.4 per cent in April – the fastest pace since July 2024 – driven by gains in both electronics and non-electronics, with the former buoyed by current tariff exemptions. The surprise jump was largely driven by front-loading, as exporters raced to capitalise on the tariff pause and get ahead of looming sector-specific duties on pharmaceuticals and semiconductors. The current boost is 'really no consolation', as advanced sales mean that exports will slow when markets have stocked up, said Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong recently as he gave an update on the work of the Singapore Economic Resilience Taskforce. Gan, who leads Singapore's tariff talks with the US, said Washington is open to discussion on 'some form of concession' in the impending sectoral tariffs, though it will not budge on the baseline 10 per cent duty. Economists warned of medium to long-term risks amid uncertainty over Trump's next move, though sentiment has improved with the unexpectedly swift easing of US-China trade tensions, said UOB's Jester Koh. But OCBC chief economist Selena Ling warned that whether the two players can reach a permanent trade deal remains to be seen. DBS senior economist Chua Han Teng flagged that global trade frictions remain elevated compared to pre-Trump 2.0 which could be a drag on Singapore's 2025 exports, though likely less severe than earlier feared. — ELYSIA TAN Malaysia: trade momentum meets tariff jitters Malaysia's exports rose 16.4 per cent year on year to RM133.6 billion (S$40.5 billion) in April, as exporters rushed to beat a now-delayed US tariff hike. The jump, from RM114.7 billion a year earlier, was led by a 9.1 per cent rise in domestic exports and a 46 per cent surge in re-exports, driven by strong global demand for electrical and electronic products. Electrical and electronic exports, led by semiconductors and data processing equipment, jumped 35.4 per cent year on year, marking five straight months of double-digit growth. Malaysia's total trade rose 7.2 per cent in the first four months of 2025, with MIDF Research expecting export growth to hold over the next few months as firms take advantage of the temporary tariff reprieve. Analysts remain cautious, with MIDF forecasting a slowdown in export growth to 2 per cent and imports to rise 4.5 per cent, as trade uncertainty and tariff risks persist. Bank Negara expects front-loaded exports to normalise soon. UOB economists Julia Goh and Loke Siew Ting flagged ongoing uncertainty as US trade talks continue, noting firms may scale back production on weaker demand expectations. Pending clearer outcomes, UOB maintains its 2025 export growth for Malaysia forecast at 3.8 per cent. — TAN AI LENG Thailand: export fever cooling Thailand may have notched its tenth straight month of year-on-year export growth in April, but the pre-tariff shipping rush is losing steam. Exports rose 10.2 per cent from the prior year – a clear pullback from March's 17.8 per cent surge. Thailand posted US$25.6 billion in exports in April, amounting to a US$3.3 billion trade deficit, revealed data released by the kingdom on May 26. Bank of America's emerging Asia economist Pipat Luengnaruemitchai said April's cooling confirms the house's view that the strong first-quarter performance was temporary, driven by front-loaded shipments ahead of anticipated tariffs. In a May 26 report on Thailand's trade balance, he said: 'Combined with limited domestic production gains and increasing external pressure, Thailand's export and trade balance outlook remains weak in the coming quarters.' He added that more Chinese products may enter the kingdom as Beijing sources for alternative markets. Industrial and agro-industrial products continue to be key growth drivers of Thailand's exports. Notably, a jump in gold exports for a second month kept Thailand's exports robust. Maybank analysts Erica Tay and Chua Hak Bin noted in a recent report that exports of the yellow metal surged 250.5 per cent in April (and 269.5 per cent in March), which accounted for a third of export growth in Thailand – one of the largest physical gold trading hubs. While there is little visibility on bilateral trade talks with the US, the house expects tariffs on Thailand to stay within 30 per cent. — GOH RUOXUE Vietnam: tariff boost to factory blues Vietnam posted strong export growth in April, driven by a spike in orders after the US delayed its 'Liberation Day' tariffs and temporarily exempted some electronic goods. Despite facing a looming 46 per cent reciprocal tariff – among the highest in Asia – Vietnam's exports and imports surged in April by 19.8 per cent and 22.9 per cent year on year to US$37.45 billion and US$36.87 billion, respectively, Vietnam Customs indicated. However, exports dipped 2.8 per cent from March, while imports were flat. Vietnam's electronics exports surged nearly 59 per cent in April, while footwear and textiles rose more than 20 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively, boosting its trade surplus with the US by 25 per cent in the first four months of 2025. At the same time, its trade deficit with China widened by more than 44 per cent. The balance of trade is a key point in the tariff negotiations between Hanoi and Washington. The two countries concluded their second round of trade talks on May 22 and are expected to continue in early June, based on a statement from Vietnam's trade ministry. So far, Hanoi has not only offered to purchase more US goods and reduced tariffs on certain imports, but has also taken steps to address Washington's non-tariff concerns, including fraud related to the origin of goods transshipped from China. Tariff uncertainty is dampening sentiment among Vietnamese manufacturers, with business confidence sinking to its lowest since August 2021, according to S&P Global's April purchasing manager's index survey. Factory activity shrank at the fastest pace since May 2023, as new orders and overseas demand had sharp declines. — JAMILLE TRAN Indonesia: short-term gains, long-term doubts Indonesia's exports climbed 5.8 per cent year on year in April to US$20.7 billion, driven by a 60 per cent increase in electrical machinery shipments and solid gains in iron and steel. Meanwhile, imports jumped 21.8 per cent year on year to US$20.6 billion in April, outpacing export growth and dragging the monthly trade surplus down to a five-year low of US$158.8 million, based on data released by the statistics agency on Jun 2. On a monthly basis, Indonesia's exports dropped 10.8 per cent, which Permata Bank economist Josua Pardede attributed to the typical slowdown during the Eid holidays. 'Additionally, weaker prices for key commodities like crude palm oil and coal are expected to have contributed to the monthly decline,' he said. Exports to the US jumped 18.4 per cent year on year in April, with Bank Central Asia economist David Sumual attributing the rise to front-loading shipments ahead of impending US tariffs. Indonesia's non-oil and gas exports to the US were driven by machinery and electrical equipment, up 17 per cent, alongside solid gains in footwear and apparel. This helped deliver a US$5.4 billion trade surplus with the US from January to April – now under scrutiny as Washington considers a 32 per cent tariff on key sectors. In contrast, Indonesia posted a US$6.9 billion trade deficit with China over the same period, driven by surging imports of machinery, vehicles parts and electronics. Sumual said: 'It appears there is also dumping of goods from China ahead of the tariff deadline.' Maybank economist Brian Lee said the rerouting and import surge from China will likely ease in May and reduce pressure on the trade surplus, given China's trade deal with the US that cut tariffs to 30 per cent from 145 per cent for 90 days. Economists at Samuel Sekuritas wrote while exports are expected to stay positive, global uncertainties and a weaker rupiah could limit gains and raise import costs. — ELISA VALENTA The Philippines: modest tariffs, muted trade Front-loading tied to the Philippines tapered off after the announcement of the tariffs, which imposed a relatively modest 17 per cent levy – the second-lowest among Asean countries after Singapore. If enacted after the 90-day pause, the lower tariff could make Philippine goods more competitive in the US, positioning the net-importing nation to attract diverted trade and investment despite its limited reliance on export-led growth. 'We'll have to wait and see if this does materialise into better export volumes to the US,' said Nicholas Antonio T Mapa, chief economist at Metropolitan Bank. ANZ Research expects a trade agreement between Manila and Washington could be struck by the end of June, with a possible lower tariff rate of 10 to 15 per cent. Preliminary data from the Philippine Statistics Authority showed weaker trade in April, with total value down 2 per cent year on year. Exports rose 7 per cent but marked their slowest growth this year and fell 9.2 per cent from March, while imports dropped 7.2 per cent year on year and 8 per cent monthly – the first decline since December. Electronics remained the top export, accounting for more than half of outbound sales. The trade deficit from January to April narrowed slightly to US$15.9 billion. April's import slump reversed the sharp 17.8 per cent surge seen in March – the strongest since August 2022. The steepest drop came from mineral fuels and lubricants, down 35.1 per cent, while imports of raw materials and intermediate goods – a key gauge of production outlook – swung from a 22.4 per cent rise to an 11 per cent decline. 'It was partly tied to softer prices (on weakening greenback) but perhaps also evidence of moderating demand,' added Mapa. The Philippines' economy relies heavily on domestic consumption, which accounts for about two-thirds of the country's gross domestic product. –– JAMILLE TRAN
CNA
2 hours ago
- CNA
IN FOCUS: How a string of remote Pacific islands is emerging as a new front in US-China rivalry
SINGAPORE: In the vast blue expanse of the Pacific Ocean, a new front in the great power rivalry between the United States and China is quietly taking shape. Along a string of small islands and atolls that make up what's dubbed the Second Island Chain, Washington and Beijing have stepped up military and diplomatic manoeuvring as they work to fortify their presence and deny each other unbridled access to this strategic theatre, observers note. The US under President Donald Trump is effectively doubling down on his predecessor Joe Biden's actions in this region even as a slew of other policies is rolled back, reflecting how high the area is placed on the priority list, analysts say. They add that the island chain strategy that was once a geographic footnote in Cold War strategy could now potentially recast the stakes in the contested flashpoints of the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The regional stakes are significant, they further warn. Further militarisation of the area could lead to misunderstandings and confrontation, raising the risks of a conflict. 'Tensions will be high (in the Pacific) if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish (more) military outposts or bases … especially as other regional powers, including Australia and Japan, come into the scene as well,' said Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow in the Southeast Asia Programme at the Lowy Institute. While not directly in the line of fire, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states could also come under increasing pressure to choose sides as the Sino-US divide widens - an unwelcome scenario, as the bloc's leaders have repeatedly made clear. But amid the geopolitical tussle, there could be a silver lining for Pacific island nations. They have an 'unprecedented opportunity' to leverage the geopolitical climate and 'extract benefits,' Blake Johnson, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's (ASPI) Pacific Centre, told CNA. WHAT IS THE SECOND ISLAND CHAIN? The island chain strategy stems from how US military strategists visualised defence and force projection perimeters across the Pacific during the Cold War between the US and then-Soviet Union. The First Island Chain, being closer to China's coast, was seen as a front line in any potential confrontation. The line runs down Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, ending at Borneo. The Second Island Chain - located further east and stretching from the Ogasarawa Islands south of Japan, through the US territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, down to Palau and parts of Micronesia - was designated as the second line of defence and reinforcement. The third island chain stretches from Alaska through Hawaii and down to New Zealand, marking the outermost perimeter of US strategic interest in the Pacific. While the Cold War is decades past, the terms have endured. Instead of the Soviet Union, China is now the primary target of the island chain strategy as the US looks to contain and counter Beijing's expanding military reach in the Indo-Pacific. 'Now, the competition is very much Pacific-focused, with China as the main adversary (of the US) in the theatre,' said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at ASPI. 'The PLA (People's Liberation Army) now is far more capable than the old PLA of the Cold War era.' Pacific territories and states along the Second Island Chain Ogasawara Islands (Japan) Remote Japanese territory ~1,000 km south of Tokyo Population: ~2,500 Land area: ~84 sq km Northern Mariana Islands (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~47,000 Land area: ~464 sq km Guam (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~170,000 Land area: ~540 sq km Federated States of Micronesia Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~115,000 Land area: ~700 sq km (total) Palau Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~18,000 Land area: ~460 sq km *Freely associated states receive US economic assistance and grant the US access to their territories for military purposes. Collapse The spotlight on the US' island chain strategy and in particular the Second Island Chain, was intensified after remarks by its Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on his inaugural Indo-Pacific tour that included Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines and Japan. During his stop in Hawaii on Mar 26, Hegseth said America's island chain strategy is designed for deterrence rather than aggression. 'The rehearsals, the exercises, the campaigns we're doing in and around the first island chain are not meant to be the precursor to an attack. We're here to deter. We're here to show strength with our allies,' he said. Hegseth, who also announced investments in Yap and Micronesia and reiterated American commitment to bolstering Second Island Chain defence, stressed that the US remains committed to avoiding conflict while maintaining a strong and ready posture in the Indo-Pacific. 'We don't want to see a conflict at all … but we're going to be postured forward and leaning forward as much as necessary to ensure (a conflict) doesn't happen,' he added. Hegseth reaffirmed Washington's strategic commitment to the island chain strategy during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, as he marked his first appearance as defence secretary at the security-focused forum. He said the US is implementing a multi-pronged approach to reinforce deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including improving its forward force posture, enhancing the defense capabilities of allies, and rebuilding its defence industrial base. 'So first, the Department of Defense is prioritising forward-postured, combat credible forces in the Western Pacific to deter by denial along the first and second island chains,' he said. He highlighted a key example from his visit to the Philippines in March, where the US pledged to deploy more advanced military assets. 'We announced the inaugural overseas deployment of NMESIS, a US Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Philippines,' he said. The system, deployed jointly with the Philippines' military to the Batanes Islands near the Taiwan Strait, 'enhanced our interoperability and improved our readiness on cutting-edge platforms where we need them, and when we need them'. BOLSTERING AMERICA'S PACIFIC PRESENCE The US under Trump has made clear it intends to augment its Pacific presence, digging in on actions overseen by the previous administration, even as the businessman-turned-president seeks to undo Biden's other policies. Abdul Rahman Yaacob from the Lowy Institute pointed to the late-April deployment of the USS Ohio - a nuclear-powered, guided-missile submarine - to the western Pacific. The US Navy stated that it was the third deployment of an Ohio-class submarine to the region in less than a year. The move highlights Washington's drive to bolster its undersea deterrence in the Pacific amid escalating maritime competition with Beijing, Abdul Rahman said. A month before that, Hegseth, the US defence chief, reaffirmed Washington's commitment to a strong regional deterrence posture during a visit to Guam. While there, he met with President Wesley Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), a country of about 110,000 people situated along the strategic path of the Second Island Chain. According to the US Department of Defense, both men reached a 'mutual understanding' for it to begin 'planning and construction on key infrastructure projects' in Yap, one of FSM's four states. The department said that its future investments in FSM are estimated to exceed US$2 billion. 'These projects are designed to provide strategic operational and exercise capabilities for US forces,' it said. These include airfield modernisation and seaport development, improvements to a commercial port and harbour infrastructure enhancements. The move expands an already substantial US military footprint across the Southwest Pacific, which includes air and naval bases in Guam, a ballistic missile defence test site in the Marshall Islands, and a high-frequency radar system under development in Palau. EXPANDING CHINESE OUTREACH Chinese state media, including the Global Times, have consistently framed the US' island chain strategy as a relic of Cold War-era geopolitics, arguing that it is designed to contain China's rise and undermine regional stability. The Chinese narrative portrays the strategy as part of a broader US effort to stifle China's peaceful development through military build-ups, alliance networks, and operations under the banner of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. 'The so-called 'first island chain' is a product of Cold War geopolitics. Any attempt to block and contain China is nothing but wishful thinking,' said Wu Qian, spokesperson for China's Ministry of National Defense, at a press briefing on Apr 12 last year. In the meantime, China has equally been buttressing its Pacific presence, making inroads in a region traditionally within the US sphere of influence. While much of the strategic attention has traditionally focused on the first island chain, Beijing has quietly laid the groundwork for influence and access further east, said Ridzwan Rahmat, principal defence analyst at Janes, an intelligence firm specialising in military and national security. Steps taken include expanding satellite tracking and intelligence-gathering capabilities, and deepening ties through economic aid, infrastructure financing, and training exchanges. China has increasingly leveraged economic and infrastructure initiatives to deepen its influence among Pacific Island nations, including those situated along the Second and Third Island Chains. In countries like Vanuatu and Kiribati - both situated along or near the Third Island Chain - Beijing has invested in critical infrastructure projects, such as port developments and airstrip renovations, which analysts suggest could serve dual civilian and military purposes. In Vanuatu, for instance, China holds a significant portion of the nation's sovereign debt and has attempted to establish a military base. Similarly, in Kiribati, China has made plans to revitalise an airstrip, which some observers have viewed as efforts to project the PLA's power into the South Pacific. Diplomatically, China has also made concerted efforts to shift allegiances in the Pacific, persuading several nations to switch recognition from Taiwan to Beijing. China has also been building up its maritime presence in the Pacific. It currently ranks third in the Pacific, behind only the US and Australia, according to Anne-Marie Brady, a specialist in Chinese, Pacific and polar politics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. Last year, it registered 26 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to operate within the jurisdiction of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Analysts have said the CCG is often deployed in grey-zone operations in contested waters. This gives the designated CCG vessels legal authority to board foreign fishing ships operating on the high seas within an expansive area covering nearly 20 per cent of the Earth's surface. Notably, this area encompasses all three of the island chains. CCG vessels have frequently been deployed to assert Beijing's maritime claims in contested areas of the South China Sea, including near Philippine-held features. Their presence has often led to tense standoffs, with Manila accusing them of blocking resupply missions and using water cannons against Filipino boats. TUSSLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE A tussle for strategic dominance underlies the actions by the US and China in the Second Island Chain and overall Pacific, observers say. China's push into the Second Island Chain has been deliberate and multi-faceted, particularly in safeguarding what it sees as core national interests, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'China imports 80 per cent of its energy sources via the sea. The land connection that it has with Russia and Pakistan is not enough to keep up with this demand for energy imports,' he said. 'It's very easy for the Americans to cut off China's sea lines of communication that are beyond the First Island Chain. So I think that's the emphasis on the Second Island Chain - to make sure that its sea lines of communication remain open.' Davis from ASPI believes China isn't just concerned about protecting its communication channels - it also wants to open up offensive options. 'It's about laying the groundwork for a future presence that could cut critical sea lines of communication between Australia and the US, as well as those running south of Australia through the Coral Sea up to Japan,' he told CNA. Against this backdrop, he said the US has ramped up its efforts in Micronesia to maintain control over key sea lines of communication and check China's expanding Pacific footprint. Davis described the back and forth as a 'game of geostrategic wei qi', referencing the Chinese name for the board game Go. In Go, players often disperse stones across the board to build influence and flexibility, rather than overcommitting in a concentrated area. Davis said this mirrors the US strategy of spreading forces across the Second Island Chain to reduce vulnerability and maintain operational resilience against a concentrated strike. At the same time, growing American emphasis on the defence line in the western Pacific is driven by mounting concerns over China's increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he said. A2/AD is a military strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from entering or operating freely within a specific region. Tools include long-range missiles, air defences and naval assets, as well as cyber attacks and electronic warfare. China's growing wartime capabilities are making it increasingly challenging for the US and its allies to operate effectively or hold ground within the first island chain - China's immediate maritime buffer - should a conflict break out, Davis said. 'China is extending its counter-intervention capabilities further (beyond its shores) and developing more effective A2/AD capabilities, to the point where the potential cost of deploying within its near seas is becoming too costly,' he said. 'So, the US (wants) to make use of the Second Island Chain - centred on Guam - to project power from, and also to deny China the ability to project power beyond the island chain out into the far seas.' The new infrastructure and anticipated deployment of air defence systems in FSM's Yap will further solidify the US' position within the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'If all your key assets are within the First Island Chain, and they are taken out by the Chinese, you will not be able to respond against the Chinese, so you'll be a sitting duck,' he said. Abdul Rahman added that the US is shifting towards a strategy of force dispersal across the Pacific, deploying smaller, more agile units throughout the region. 'Deploying in a place like (Micronesia) will enable them to be able to strike against China in return in the event of (a conflict) … having forces deployed (along the Second Island Chain) will make it a bit difficult for the Chinese to take down your forces at the same time.' China's accelerating military modernisation - especially in long-range precision strike capabilities - is reshaping the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region, noted Ridzwan from Janes. According to a 2024 Pentagon report, Beijing has been expanding its missile arsenal with systems designed to reach deep into the Pacific. This includes intercontinental ballistic missiles like the Dongfeng-31AG, which can strike targets as far afield as Hawaii, and intermediate-range missiles such as the Dongfeng-26, capable of striking US bases in Guam. China test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean in September last year, the first such launch in 44 years. But Ridzwan said questions remain about the real-world effectiveness of China's advanced missile systems. 'One of the biggest weaknesses that the Chinese face is that this hardware developed over the past few years has never really been tested in actual operational conflict,' he told CNA. 'Compared to the American military, which has gone to war many times - from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan - the Chinese have not had this opportunity to operationally test their weapon systems or combat systems against a proper, true adversary,' Ridzwan noted. 'The kind of data you get from training is not as valuable as what you collect in real combat scenarios.' Before becoming US defence chief in January, Hegseth had already sounded the alarm over China's growing military capabilities. Speaking on a podcast in November 2024, he warned that the PLA was being built 'specifically dedicated to defeating the United States of America'. He claimed that China's hypersonic missiles could destroy all of America's aircraft carriers 'within the first minutes of a potential conflict', and pointed out that in classified Pentagon war games simulating a clash with China, 'the US lost every time'. While Hegseth's remarks focused on China's growing edge in hypersonic missile capabilities - an area where the US currently lags in - Abdul Rahman pointed out that Washington's broader posture in the Pacific goes beyond countering specific threats. Stationing forces and assets across Pacific island states, he said, allows them to function as critical command-and-control hubs, backup airfields, and logistical nodes for fuel and munitions. 'These locations also play a key role in facilitating the flow of troops and supplies from the US mainland to East Asia,' he added. PACIFIC STATES CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE As the Sino-US contest spills increasingly over into the blue waters of the Pacific, island nations there find themselves caught in the middle. Analysts say they have a chance to seize on the current situation and eke out gains as Washington and Beijing look to court them. China leverages economic incentives and development aid to encourage nations to recognise it over Taiwan, Joshua Bernard Espena, an international relations lecturer at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), told CNA. China regained its place as the second-biggest bilateral donor to the Pacific islands in 2022, displacing the US to come in behind Australia, according to a Lowy Institute report. It ramped up projects after a COVID-19 pandemic lull to fork out US$256 million in development support. This approach, Espena said, has been effective in swaying countries facing financial challenges, as they seek infrastructure development and economic support. 'China seeks to further turn Taiwan's international identity in the Pacific into rubble. Washington does not wish this to happen despite its own withdrawal from Taipei in 1979,' Espena said. China views Taiwan as part of its territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary. Beijing sends warplanes and navy vessels near the self-ruled island regularly, and in recent years, it has stepped up the scope and scale of military exercises around Taiwan. Several Pacific island nations have shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in recent years. Nauru was the latest to do so in January 2024, following similar moves by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019. These changes have reduced Taiwan's diplomatic partners in the Pacific to just three - Tuvalu, Palau and the Marshall Islands. Johnson from ASPI cautioned that drawing closer to China could have risks. 'Some are choosing to forge deeper ties with China in the economic and security space, which poses additional risks for sea lines of communication and other strategic concerns,' he said. 'It also poses risks to undermining democracy in these countries - risks that their governments might not fully appreciate.' At the same time, countries like Nauru and Tuvalu have opted for stable alignments. 'They're electing for a more comprehensive partnership with Australia to avoid the burdens of playing off competition for benefit,' Johnson said. As for the US, Espena from PUP suggested that island states like Palau could play a 'critical role' in enabling the expansion of the US military's footprint across the Pacific. He noted that they 'may be able to host dual-use runways and ports' to support a credible supply line for American and allied maritime operations - albeit on a limited scale. Espena said Taiwan's sole three diplomatic partners in the Pacific islands could serve as 'useful liaisons' for Washington to sustain unofficial lines of communication with Taipei, in line with its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. But analysts have warned that aid cuts and reduced climate funding under the Trump administration risk eroding goodwill among Pacific island nations - an outcome at odds with Washington's broader push to expand its regional presence. The Pacific island states are among the most vulnerable to the impact of climate change due to their geographical location and limited resources. They are also heavily reliant on foreign aid, with the US a significant donor before Trump took steps to turn off the tap. 'Nothing is more detrimental' than viewing the Freely Associated States (FAS) as merely a launchpad for military operations, said Espena, referring to the three Pacific nations of FSM, the Marshall Islands and Palau. The three countries share Compacts of Free Association with the US, arrangements that effectively give the US strategic positioning in the Pacific while providing economic and security support to the associated states. A 20-year renewal to the agreements was enacted in March last year. Espena said relative stability in the western Pacific has long depended on the US bearing the economic cost in exchange for political influence. 'While American transactionalism is now becoming the new normal, it's up to the FAS to renegotiate the terms they need to assert,' he said, adding that Washington 'must not brush off these concerns'. Echoing this, Davis from ASPI said slashing aid not only weakens America's standing but opens the door for Chinese influence. 'China will seek to exploit such cuts to Beijing's benefit,' he said. 'It may save the US some dollars, but cost them far more in the broader strategic competition that is now ongoing.' HEADING FOR CHOPPY REGIONAL WATERS? While geographically distant from much of the world and often viewed as a secondary theatre, what's playing out in the Second Island Chain could still trigger ripple effects across the broader region if tensions escalate, analysts warn. One consideration is Taiwan. Analysts have suggested that China's course of action regarding the self-ruled island hinges primarily on whether the US would intervene militarily. Noting China's steadily advancing military capabilities, Davis from ASPI said the US has had to adapt by dispersing its forces across the Pacific region. Such a move could come at a cost to existing US deployments in the region. The Wall Street Journal reported in late May, citing sources familiar with internal discussions, that the Pentagon was considering relocating around 4,500 troops from South Korea to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam. These claims, however, were swiftly dismissed by Washington. 'Reports that the DoD (US Department of Defense) will reduce US troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are not true,' Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell posted on social media platform X a day after the WSJ report. 'Anyone who's covered the Pentagon knows that we always evaluate force posture. That said, the US remains firmly committed to the ROK. Our alliance is ironclad,' he added. South Korea's defence ministry also responded, saying Seoul and Washington had not held any discussions about withdrawing US troops stationed in the country. When asked whether an American strategic shift to the Second Island Chain would affect Taiwan's security, Ridzwan from Janes said dispersing US forces could lead to 'weaker protection' within the First Island Chain. However, he stressed that this does not automatically leave Taiwan exposed or vulnerable, as the island's defence hinges on many other factors such as air superiority and the cost of intervention. 'China doesn't yet have the bandwidth to carry out a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. And by bandwidth, I mean the ability to deploy and sustain a large number of troops within a limited time frame - without that, any landing force can easily be repelled,' Ridzwan said. He suggested that Beijing's current objective is to isolate rather than invade Taiwan. 'The best option for the Chinese at the moment is to cut Taiwan off from its sea lines of communication. And Washington knows this. That's likely why there's now more emphasis (from China) on the Second Island Chain - to support a strategy of containment rather than direct confrontation,' he said. Meanwhile, China's efforts to expand its presence in the Pacific islands are part of a calculated, step-by-step plan aimed at first building political influence, which can later pave the way for economic and military footholds, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'I think they are trying to gain some political influence first,' he said, pointing to Beijing's success in persuading several island nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. 'That's the first step. Once you are able to establish political influence, later on, you can have military influence, economic influence following suit. That's their strategy.' Abdul Rahman warned that the eventual goal could be access to key infrastructure. 'I'm certain that once they have strong political influence, they could have access to either port or air facilities in some of these islands,' he said. Such a scenario, he added, would carry serious strategic implications. 'If the Chinese have access to the ports and air facilities on some of these small islands, it could cut off maritime and air travels between the US and Australia, in times of a military conflict.' He added that Chinese control over the Second Island Chain could potentially limit US manoeuvrability in the event of a conflict. 'If there is a conflict in Taiwan, then it will be very difficult for the Americans to quickly assist the Taiwanese … because the Chinese will be blocking the second island chain.' However, Abdul Rahman stressed that such a scenario remains some way off. 'At this point in time, I do not think the Chinese will be able to set up any air or military outpost in the Second Island Chain in the short and medium term,' he said, noting that Beijing is still in the process of trying to 'establish strong political influence' there. Nevertheless, the extension of US-China competition into the island chains could potentially heighten the risk of confrontation - not just within those geographical lines, but across the wider Indo-Pacific region, warn analysts. For instance, increased deployments and competing military postures could exacerbate tensions in flashpoints such as the South China Sea, where overlapping claims and naval stand-offs are already common, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'I think the Philippines is a very important node in the American strategy for Second Island Chain capability,' said Ridzwan, pointing out Washington's deployment of various weapon systems in the country. The US military has deployed its NMESIS missile system to the Philippines for ongoing bilateral drills. Barely two months ago, the same system featured on Batan Island, close to the Luzon Strait, during another joint exercise. Ridzwan said this reflects a wider pattern of militarisation not only in the Pacific islands but also among South China Sea claimants. Such moves, he said, risk fuelling an arms buildup and mistrust that could raise the chances of miscalculation - particularly in contested waters where US-aligned forces and Chinese maritime assets already operate in close proximity. Countries such as the Philippines and Japan are 'understandably' wary of China's growing interest in the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'The Second Island Chain actually covers the eastern part of their security zone,' he said. 'So if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish either military outposts or bases, the Philippines will be stuck between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain - and it will be similar for Japan too.' A growing Chinese military presence in the Pacific could leave Southeast Asian nations having to make hard choices, regardless of whether they want to. 'As the PLA Navy evolves into a more capable blue-water (force) and begins projecting power more frequently through Southeast Asia into the south-west Pacific, ASEAN will come under increasing pressure to choose sides,' said Davis from ASPI. 'Their space to remain non-aligned will shrink.'
International Business Times
4 hours ago
- International Business Times
Mohamed Sabry Soliman: Colorado Terror Attack Suspect's Wife and 5 Children Arrested by ICE for Illegally Staying in US
The wife and all five children of suspected Colorado terrorist Mohamed Sabry Soliman have been arrested by federal immigration agents, sources told The New York Post. Soliman, 45, an Egyptian citizen, who is accused of injuring 12 people in an antisemitic assault in Boulder using a makeshift flamethrower and Molotov cocktails, had been living in the U.S. illegally for two months after his legal status expired on March 28. After his arrest on Sunday, ICE and Homeland Security Investigations agents took his family into federal custody, according to a Department of Homeland Security official who spoke to the publication. It's understood that Soliman's family was also in the U.S. illegally. Chilling Details Emerge This came as it was revealed on Monday that Soliman had planned to carry out a mass shooting, but was unable to buy a gun due to his immigration status. Soliman, 45, now faces up to 624 years behind the bars if found guilty, officials said on Monday. Soliman confessed to a detective that he originally planned to shoot his victims and had even taken a concealed-carry class to learn how to use a firearm, according to authorities. However, Boulder Judicial District Attorney Michael Dougherty said at a press conference on Monday that the Egyptian citizen could not buy a gun because his U.S. visa was blocked. Soliman made a brief appearance in a Denver court on Monday afternoon, wearing an orange jail uniform and white bandages wrapped around his head. When the judge asked if he understood the protective orders issued on behalf of the 12 victims, he replied yes. District Attorney Michael Dougherty said that Soliman is now charged with 16 counts of attempted murder, which could result in up to 384 years behind bars if he is found guilty. He also faces a 48-year sentence for using two Molotov cocktails and another 192 years for the "attempted use" of 16 unused incendiary devices that were found near his arrest location. Authorities also confirmed he has been charged with federal hate crimes. Mark Michalek, the FBI's special agent in charge in Denver, said that although evidence suggests Soliman acted alone in the attack, authorities are continuing to explore all potential angles and follow every lead in the investigation. No Prior Criminal Record Authorities said the suspect was not known to federal agencies prior to Sunday's incident. Court records reveal that Soliman had been tracking and intentionally targeting a local pro-Israel walking group called Run For Their Lives, which has been holding weekly walks to show support for Israeli hostages captured by Hamas following the October 7, 2023 terror attacks. Soliman told investigators that he planned to "kill all Zionist people" and "wished they were all dead." He said he found out about the group — including the planned route of their most recent walk — through their Facebook page, and positioned himself along Boulder's busy Pearl Street to carry out the ambush. Soliman carried out the attack using a homemade flamethrower, he fashioned by filling a garden hose with 87-octane gasoline and igniting it with a lighter. He also threw two Molotov cocktails during the attack. According to his arrest warrant, Soliman told detectives multiple times that he "wanted to be dead." Soliman lived in Colorado Springs — roughly 100 miles south of Boulder — left handwritten notes for his family, which he hid in a desk drawer at their home. Officials said that Soliman lived in Kuwait for 17 years before coming to the United States. He entered the country on a tourist visa through California and moved to Colorado Springs in 2022.
