Israeli army seizes weapons in southern Syria raid
Syrian army, Kurdish-led SDF exchange blame over northern Syria attack
Suspected ISIS militants kill school principal in east Syria
Damascus forms committee to probe Suwayda violence
US concerned groups remain out of Syrian government control
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ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The Israeli military said on Sunday that it carried out raids across several locations in Druze-majority southern Syria to seize 'trafficked weapons,' weeks after deadly violence between Damascus-affiliated forces and Druze fighters near the area.
'Our troops entered 4 locations simultaneously and located numerous trafficked weapons after on-site questioning of several suspects involved in weapons trafficking in the Hader area in southern Syria,' the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) said in a statement.
Hader, a Druze-majority village, is part of the Golan Heights, under de jure Syrian control but reportedly occupied by Israel since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December.
The IDF added that the operation came after 'prior intelligence surveillance and an in-depth field investigation.'
Deadly clashes in southern Syria's Suwayda province in July between Druze fighters and Sunni Bedouin tribes, supported by the Damascus government, killed nearly 1,400 people, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
Israel intervened militarily in support of the Druze, striking Syrian government positions and targeting the defense ministry building in Damascus.
A US-brokered ceasefire on July 18 halted the fighting. Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa later ordered a truce between the Druze and the Bedouin tribes in an attempt to contain the crisis.
Since the Islamist Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), headed by Sharaa, spearheaded a coalition of opposition groups in early December that toppled Assad's regime, Israel has intensified efforts to destroy Damascus's military stockpiles.
Israeli forces have also entered a buffer zone east of the annexed Golan Heights, justifying their actions as a security precaution amid Syria's ongoing political instability.
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Memri
3 hours ago
- Memri
Following Damascus Church Bombing, Syrian Christians Slam Ahmad Al-Sharaa Regime: It Allows Extremism To Spread In Society; Syria's Christians Need Protection
Since the Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) organization, headed by Ahmed Al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani), took over Syria on December 8, 2024, Syria's Christians and other minority groups in the country have felt a growing sense of concern. Their fear is due to the jihadist past of the HTS organization and to the fact that many of its members are extremist foreign activists identified with the Salafi-jihadi current of Islam.[1] The new regime has made a point of emphasizing that Syria under its rule will uphold freedom of religion and respect all the religious and ethnic groups in the country; this was also stated in the Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic, ratified on March 13, 2025, which serves as a constitution for the five-year transition period.[2] But in practice, there has been a conspicuous surge in incidents of harassment against minority groups, which on some occasions escalated into fierce violence. The new regime, for its part, presented the incidents as "isolated" and did not hold the perpetrators to account, which allowed the phenomenon to continue and in fact to intensify. The first to suffer this violence were the Alawite communities on the Syrian coast. In March 2025, security forces of the HTS government, and Syrian riffraff, carried out brutal acts of violence against them, murdering hundreds of civilians, destroying property and humiliating Alawites in public.[3] In late April incitement against the Druze minority began as well, leading to armed action against them in the Damascus area and in the south of the country. According to some heads of the Druze community and commanders of Druze armed factions, members of the Syrian security forces were involved in the violence.[4] In mid-July the violence against the Druze resurged. Clashes between the Druze population and Beduine tribes in the Druze-majority Al-Suwayda province were used by the regime as an opportunity to send military forces to the province, and there were many documented incidents of these forces torching homes, destroying property, and robbing and humiliating civilians. Dozens of Druze civilians have been killed in these events.[5] In June the violence against Christians resurged as well. On June 22, a suicide bombing and shooting at the Mar Elias Church in Dweila'a. a Christian-majority neighborhood of Damascus, left 27 people dead and dozens wounded.[6] The attack on the church sparked intense criticism in Syria against the regime, including from Christian clerics and Christians on social media. They accused the regime of laying the groundwork for violence by ignoring the spread of religious extremism in society and by preserving the extremist ideology of HTS. The clerics also condemned the fact that no government official – except for the single Christian minister, Hind Kabawat – bothered to visit the church after the bombing, as well as the fact that government officials, including Al-Sharaa himself, refrained from referring to the victims as "martyrs," a term they reserve for Muslims. Christian Syrian writer Bassel KasNasrallah, who formerly served as an advisor to Syria's Mufti, noted in a June 23 article that the bombing has reignited the fear felt by Christians in Arab countries about the extremist Islamist discourse that does not regard them as part of society and even wants to purge them from society. Even before the bombing, in March 2025, KasNasrallah warned that Syria's Christians were concerned for their future and that many were thinking of leaving the country.[7] The Damascus church bombing was in fact the worst in a series of violent incidents against Christians in Syria under the HTS regime. During Christmas 2024, only two weeks after this regime came to power, foreign fighters torched a Christmas tree in the Christian town of Al-Suqaylabiyah in the Hama governorate, and Christian facilities were attacked in other parts of the country.[8] In addition, on several occasions Muslim preachers, some of them armed, entered Christian neighborhoods, including Dweila'a, and called on the residents to convert to Islam. They handed out pamphlets advocating the Islamic dress code for women, the segregation of the sexes and the prohibition of alcohol and of singing.[9] In May 2025 notices were hung on the wall of a church in Tartous calling on Christians to convert to Islam or else pay the jizya (poll tax), and proclaiming that Islam is the one true religion while all others are false.[10] The Damascus church in the aftermath of the bombing (Image: June 23, 2025) This report presents the criticism voiced in Syria against the regime, especially by Christians, following the Damascus church bombing, as well as articles expressing the Christians' fear for their future in the country. Christian Clerics: It Is The Regime's Negligence That Led To The Bombing The bombing at the Mar Elias Church was a sore blow to the new Syrian government, which since coming to power has tried to present itself as a protector of the minorities, including the Christians, as part of its efforts to gain Western support. Accordingly, the Syrian Interior Ministry hurried to announce that ISIS was behind the bombing,[11] although this organization has not claimed responsibility for it. On June 24, 2025 a jihadist organization, Saraya Ansar Al-Sunna, claimed the bombing,[12] but, according to assessments in the Arab press, this was only an attempt to gain support and attract recruits from extremist Sunni circles. Following the bombing, Syrian Christians, as well as others, condemned the regime and questioned its ability to protect them. For example, at a funeral of victims of the bombing, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, John X Yazigi, who is considered to be the most senior Christian cleric in Syria, addressed President Al-Sharaa, saying: "Mr. President, we were highly dismayed to see that no government official other than the Christian [minister] Hind Kabawat came to visit the site of the crime… Your phone call… expressing your condolences was not enough. We thank you for this call, but the crime that had been committed merited more than that." The Patriarch added: "We want to know who was behind this shameful act… but we [also] wish to stress that the government bears full responsibility [for it]." He also condemned several Syrian officials that had referred to the victims as "fatalities" rather than "martyrs," saying: "These martyrs are not 'fatalities,' as some Syrian officials have called them, nor are they 'casualties' – they are martyrs. I even dare to call them martyrs of the faith and the homeland."[13] Father Melatios Shatahi, the priest serving at the Mar Elias Church, told Syrian media outlets that the church had informed the security forces about anti-Christian incidents, but the latter always dismissed them as "acts by individuals." "Today proves that these were not [acts by] individuals, but the result of negligence by the authorities and failure to hold anyone to account," he said.[14] Christian clerics pay their respects to the bombing victims (Image: Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, June 25, 2025). Christian Syrians On Social Media: The Government Backs Extremists And Allows Them To Act Like the Christian clerics, Syrian Christians on social media expressed fear following the bombing and accused the Syrian regime of laying the groundwork for it. A post on the Facebook page "Christians at Home and Abroad," which frequently criticizes the new Syrian regime, read: "Don't be surprised at a church bombing in a 'state' where ISIS flags hang in the marketplaces, security officers wear the ISIS symbol, the army is sectarian [i.e., comprised of only one sect, the Sunnis], [members of] minorities are fired from their jobs, non-Sunnis are banished, provocations and the destruction of religious sites belonging to minorities continue on a daily basis, the perpetrators of previous massacres are ignored, and people are kidnapped and murdered every day yet no one is held accountable. This is a hijacked country ruled by a gang of takfiris [i.e., Muslims who accuse other Muslims of apostacy]. It must be liberated from these extremist groups."[15] Syrian writer Anas Hamdoun stated that the Syrian regime has allowed extremist Islamist ideas to permeate society and has thus created a climate conducive to harming minorities: "As expected, the regime hastened to attribute the attack to ISIS in an attempt to rebrand itself as a 'savior and protector.' But as a Syrian citizen I am not satisfied with this claim. The government's statement that it is 'combatting terror' is not enough, given that it itself, along the course of its history, has moved from the embrace of one terrorist organization to the next and from loyalty to a bloodstained takfiri ideology to security dependency on regional and international [forces] – without supplying any [proof], to this day, that it has really broken away from its ideological heritage… On the contrary, we see the Salafist jihadi ideology steadily gaining dominance in Syrian society, not just in [extremist] organizations but as a general approach cultivated by the regime itself… The regime still behaves as though consenting to the presence of churches and minorities is an act of charity and a generous [favor] it is doing to society… "Today it is necessary to hold accountable not only whoever attacked the Mar Elias Church but also whoever laid the conceptual groundwork for it and whoever adopted this discourse, promoted it and allowed it to permeate society. The time has come to disconnect not only from ISIS but from everyone who espouses its ideology. The [Syrian] regime must stop presenting itself as a victim, or as the protector [of the minorities], when [in practice] it nurtures [extremist ideology]…"[16] Syrian Christian diplomat Bassam Hanna, who often covers the situation in Syria on social media and has millions of followers, wrote that, after the attack on the Mar Elias Church, he wrote to U.S. President Trump to inform him about the persecution of the Christians in Syria and the violations perpetrated against them, and asked him to help protect them.[17] A Christmas tree was set alight in the Syrian city of Al-Suqaylabiyah in the Hama Governorate in December 2024 (Image: December 23, 2024) Syrian Christian Writer: Eastern Christians Fear Extremist Islam, Which Is Spreading In an article he published after the church bombing, Bassel KasNasrallah, a Syrian Christian who frequently writes about the state of the Christians in Syria, noted that the attack had reawakened the concern of the Christians in Arab countries regarding the extremist Islamist discourse that does not view them as part of society. He wrote: "The Mar Elias Church in the Dweila'a neighborhood in Damascus has been attacked, [and] this was [ostensibly just] a terrorist attack on a stone [building] and on whoever was praying inside it. But in actuality it reopens old wounds that have never healed and reawakens the hidden concern in the heart of the Christians, who have lived in the East for hundreds of years, not as guests or foreigners but as an authentic part of its [social] fabric. "The Christian [who lives] in societies with a Muslim majority understands that 'democracy' is the rule of the majority, and that he is therefore in a vulnerable position, likely to lose cultural or essential gains under pressure from the extremist religious discourse which sees him as 'the other' who must be restricted and perhaps even 'purged.' This Christian fear is nothing new. It has built up over the course of history, from [the time of] the Ottoman massacres and the scenes of slaughter and persecution in several regions, and ever since the voice of Islamist extremism, which accuses everyone who is different of heresy, become louder… "The greatest danger is that extremism is no longer [just] individual, but has become a conceptual system [that motivated] those who carry bombs and explosive belts. The problem doesn't lie with the person who blew up the Mar Elias Church, but with the one who taught him that the blood of the [Christian] worshippers may be spilled, while presenting this under the slogan of 'Islamic victory'... "Yes, the Eastern Christian is afraid. But he does not fear the Muslim [himself] but the Islamic ignorance, the false Islam, the Islam that has been hijacked by the ignorant to establish a regime that excludes anyone who is different. This is the fear that drives [the Christians] to retreat [into their communities] or to emigrate abroad, never to return… "Fear is not dealt with through [media] carnivals but through education, learning, true religious dialogue, conscious communication and social justice, by amending our [attitude] to poverty and exclusion and through the participation of Christians as citizens rather than guests in the homeland. The war on terrorism is not waged only by repressing it, but by drying up its sources and dealing with the poor areas that breed hatred. An extremist is not born an extremist' [extremism] is created by environments of ignorance, unemployment and exclusion… The Eastern Christians will remain [in Syria], but we want security, not slogans… We want to live together in the light of Allah, not in the darkness of those who claim to be His helpers…"[18] Notice urging Christians to convert to Islam that was hung on a church in the Syrian city of Tartous in May 2025 (Image: May 20, 2025) The New Regime's Harassment Of Minorities Spurs Christians To Emigrate; The Christian Presence In Syria Must Be Safeguarded KasNasrallah expressed the Syrian Christians' fear of attacks against them even before the Mar Elias bombing. In a March 2025 article, against the backdrop of the massacres perpetrated by Syrian regime forces against Alawites on the Syrian coast, he noted that many Syrian Christians were considering leaving the country. He wrote: "Despite the reassurances from several factions of the [former Syrian] opposition, which claimed that the Christians are not a target for attack, the fears still exist, especially given the growing influence of the extremist organizations and the alarming reports coming from here and there, the most recent of which was [the report] about the 'security collapse' that led to violations of the law and to bloodshed on the [Syrian] coast… "The absence of security and political stability has led to increased emigration, and threatens the loss of the religious-cultural diversity that has characterized Syria throughout its history. These circumstances cause the Christians to fear for their future there… This fear, alongside the media hubbub, the provocative discourse and the sectarian incitement, cause all the minorities, and the Christians among them, to constantly feel afraid and to think again and again of emigrating. This is what is happening now, if we ignore the pretty words and the [media] carnivals of reassurances [by the regime]. There is a large group of people with weapons and extremist views that has already erupted once on the Syrian coast, and we don't know when it might erupt again – once or several times – with complete impunity. 'In conclusion, the Christian presence in Syria must be preserved through a joint effort by all elements, so as to ensure [the Christians'] rights and safety from danger and establish a country that respects religious and cultural diversity and guarantees a life of dignity and security to its citizens.' [19] * O. Peri is a research fellow at MEMRI.
Memri
3 hours ago
- Memri
Lebanese Writer: Syria's President Al-Sharaa Must Protect The Minorities – Not Blame Israel For The Sectarian Violence In The Country
Under the shadow of the bloody events in the Druze stronghold of southern Syria, that began July 13, 2025 and involved Druze factions and Bedouin tribes backed by Syria's Al-Sharaa regime, and in which over 1,000 Druze were massacred, Lebanese columnist Khairallah Khairallah called in his July 21, 2025 column in the London-based UAE daily Al-Arab for Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to prove that he is the president of all Syrians "in deeds and not words." Stressing that the broad international and regional legitimacy enjoyed by his administration does not exempt him from reconciliation with all Syrians, including the Druze, he added that it also does not mean that he need not learn lessons from the harm that has been done to Syria's minorities since he took power. In his column, Khairallah rejected the Syrian regime's depiction of Israel as responsible for the sectarian tensions in the country. He wrote that Israel's support for the Druze in Syria is more than natural, given that they are part of the Israeli social fabric and serve in the Israeli military, and that Israel has not intervened in other cases of harm to Syrian minorities such as the Alawites or the Christians. The Syrian people under a cloud of violence (Source: Al-Arab, London, July 17, 2025) The following is the translation of Khairallah's column: "...The events in the Syrian province of Al-Suwayda, which has experienced and continues to experience crimes and atrocities against the Druze community, are an opportunity for the new Syrian regime, led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, to reinvent itself – instead of settling for accusing Israel [of fanning the violence] or turning a blind eye to the attack on the Druze, committed by so-called Bedouin tribes, [if we believe the regime's] claims, which are unsubstantiated, to say the least! "This is an opportunity for Al-Shara to prove, in deeds and not words, that he is the president of all of Syria and of all the Syrians – and not the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham [HTS] and its supporters. He can do so by proving that the [new] Syrian state, which has been in existence for just seven months, can be different from the Alawite regime that had existed from 1966... "There is no way out of the profound crisis in which Syria finds itself unless this young regime takes charge of protecting the Druze, who are first and foremost Syrian citizens. In this realm, Ahmed Al-Sharaa and his aides can learn from recent past experience, and avoid what happened to the Alawites and Christians. "Last March [2025], the Alawites were slaughtered in the Syrian coastal region, after armed militias suppressed a move they had made to bring up what could be called 'the Alawite issue,' based on the assumption that the world takes an interest in their fate. But it turned out that the Alawites were the world's least concern, and that no one, including Israel, was willing to embrace the cause of a minority that had ruled Syria with an iron fist and with fire for some six decades. The Alawites are now paying the price for the crimes of Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad and other members of their family, who considered Syria nothing more than the ruling family's [private] ranch. "Israel did not interfere in events in Syria, particularly when they concerned the Alawites and then the Christians. It was clear that the Christians in Syria were the least concern of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, even though they were massacred by an ISIS fighter inside a church in one of the Damascus neighborhoods.[1] The Syrian officials treated the Christians somewhat contemptuously, considering that they were a minority that played an important role in shaping Syria's history... "The Christians were the victims of the Egypt-Syria union [i.e., the United Arab Republic, a union of Egypt and Syria that existed in 1958-1961], and later they were the victims of the Ba'ath Party because of its dearth of political thought and its wickedness. [They were also] one of the victims of the Alawite regime, which handed the Golan over to Israel in June 1967 in order to ensure Hafez Al-Assad a monopoly on power after [the 1967 War] and also to ensure that Syria would be inherited by his son Bashar in 2000. "Ahmed Al-Sharaa received strong American and Western support, for example, meeting with President Donald Trump in Riyadh and visiting Paris. He played the card of the relations with Israel wisely, and at all times hinted at a return to the 1974 [Israeli-Syrian] separation of forces agreement. [2] He disregarded all Israeli attacks aimed at specific Syrian military sites. Moreover, he has established close ties with influential Arab countries, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He maintained the special relationship with Turkey and did not for one moment take lightly the issue of the Iranian presence in Syria. He took care to emphasize that this presence had ended permanently and that Syria would never again serve as a bridge between the Islamic Republic and its proxy Hizbullah in Lebanon. This great achievement, historic in nature, cannot be spent on marginal battles in which the Druze are required to be the victims. "Everything that Ahmed Al-Sharaa has done is good. But this does not mean that there is no need for reconciliation with the Syrians – all Syrians, including the Druze, who throughout the state's modern history have played an important and central role on the national level, starting with their rejection of the idea that Syria would include several states, including a Druze state. The Druze had a role in strengthening the Syrian national unity that Hafez Al-Assad, and later his son, tore to shreds, by gambling on an alliance of minorities led by the Alawites in order to confront the Sunni [majority]. The most dangerous thing that the elder and younger Assads did was to use the Islamic Republic of Iran to create a new demographic reality in Syria, and to change the political balance [of power] in Lebanon. "Yes, Ahmed Al-Sharaa has a chance to prove that he is the president of all of Syria and of all Syrians, without discrimination or distinction. It is easy to blame Israel [for the sectarian violence in the country], but it is difficult to block its interference in Syria's domestic affairs in a sensitive region like Al-Suwayda province. Israel's support for the Druze of Al-Suwayda is more than natural, given that Israeli Druze serve in the Israeli military and given the Druze community's historical role in the Israeli sphere. "To put it more clearly, Ahmed Al-Sharaa has no choice but to play the role of the historic head of state who leads the people and is not led by them. More important than anything else is the new Syrian president's duty to prove that he is Ahmed Al-Sharaa and not Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani [the name by which he was once known].[3] This requires both great courage and political maturity. Additionally, there is a need to play the role of the national leader who reconciles first with the Sunni moderates, and [then] also with the Druze, Christians, Alawites, and Kurds, of course."[4]
Memri
3 hours ago
- Memri
Druze Documentation Nexus Releases Initial Estimates Following Massacre Of Druze In Swaida: 228,100 People Displaced From Over 40 Cities And Villages
The following is a report compiled by the Druze Documentation Nexus. It is an initial estimate of the numbers people displaced after the massacre of Druze in the Swaida Governorate, in Southern Syria.[1] On July 14, 2025, the City of Swaida witnessed a brutal campaign of sectarian violence targeting the Druze community. Initially framed as retaliatory operations by Bedouin groups and extremist elements, the events quickly escalated into a coordinated campaign of systematic atrocities. What began as sporadic assaults evolved into a deliberate and sustained onslaught involving state-aligned forces, local militias, and jihadist factions. Contrary to their official mandate, units from the General Security Force of the Interior Ministry and Multiple Syrian Army Divisions operating under the Syrian Defense Ministry not only failed to protect civilians in Swaida but actively collaborated with Bedouin militias and extremist fighters. The result was a multi-day campaign characterized by targeted killings, acts of sexual violence, use of Turkish drones to bomb civilians, mass executions, looting, burning down houses, and widespread desecration of cultural and religious sites. It is worth noting that the Druze Documentation Nexus reported that the preliminary number of deaths caused by the massacre is 1,500, according to official records from the National Hospital of Swaida. The figure is expected to rise due to the presence of corpses not yet recovered in homes and on roads across 31 villages that remain under the control of security forces and Bedouin militias. Massacre in Swaida (Source: Druze Documentation Nexus) Below are estimated statistics of internally displaced persons (IDPs) after the massacre of Swaida, which amount to 228,100 IDPs: 1. City of Swaida Pre-Massacre Population: 125,000 Post-Massacre Population: 50,000 Situation: Infrastructure destroyed, markets stormed, shops looted, homes burned, civilians killed, public executions, women and children kidnapped, elderly abused/shaved, hospitals attacked, services unavailable, security/food threatened, most residents fled east/south. 2. Village of Walga Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 3. Village of Reema Hazem Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 4. Village of Al-Mazraa Pre-Massacre Population: 10,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 5. Village of Al-Tayr Pre-Massacre Population: 1,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 6. Village of Sama Al-Hunaidat Pre-Massacre Population: 1,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 7. Village of Samma Pre-Massacre Population: 2,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 8. Village of Al-Dour Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 9. Village of Taara Pre-Massacre Population: 2,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 10. Village of Qarrasa Pre-Massacre Population: 1,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 11. Village of Al-Duwairi Pre-Massacre Population: 2,100 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 12. Village of Najran Pre-Massacre Population: 8,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 13. Samma Al-Hunaidat Pre-Massacre Population: 1,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 14. Town of Thaala Pre-Massacre Population: 10,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 15. Village of Al-Dara Pre-Massacre Population: 1,950 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Churches burned and vandalized. 16. Village of Al-Aslehah Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Churches burned and vandalized. 17. Village of Kanaker Pre-Massacre Population: 1,100 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 18. Village of Ara Pre-Massacre Population: 11,000 Post-Massacre Population: 6,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 19. Village of Al-Mujaymir Pre-Massacre Population: 5,000 Post-Massacre Population: 2,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 20. Village of Al-Majdal Pre-Massacre Population: 6,500 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 21. Village of Kafr Al-Lahf Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 22. Village of Reema Al-Fakhour Pre-Massacre Population: Unknown Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 23. Village of Salakhed Pre-Massacre Population: 2,500 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 24. Majadel, Smayd, Al-Kharsa Pre-Massacre Population: 20,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 25. City of Shahba Pre-Massacre Population: 20,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, homes/property destroyed, militant presence, declared devastated. 26. Village of Umm Al-Zeitoun Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 1,000 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 27. Village of Al-Sweimrah Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 28. Village of Al-Metouneh Pre-Massacre Population: 3,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 29. Village of Al-Hayyat Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 1,800 Situation: Partial displacement. The gas station, village entrances and public facilities were vandalized. Currently it's not with HTS. 30. Village of Al-Heett Pre-Massacre Population: 2,450 Post-Massacre Population: 1,200 Situation: Partial displacement, most of the population is Christian. Currently it is not under HTS control. 31. Village of Al-Khalidiyah Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 32. Village of Lahtha Pre-Massacre Population: 8,900 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 33. Village of Radhimah Al-Liwaa Pre-Massacre Population: 3,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 34. Village of Al-Soura Al-Kabir Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 35. Village of Hazm Pre-Massacre Population: 1,700 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 36. Village of Khalkhala Pre-Massacre Population: 2,700 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 37. Village of Dhakir Pre-Massacre Population: 1,200 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 38. Village of Al-Soura Al-Sagheer Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 39. Town of Areeqa Pre-Massacre Population: 9,000 Post-Massacre Population: 5,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 40. Village of Dama Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 41. Village of Lebbain Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 42. Village of Haraan Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. Total Pre-Massacre Population: 295,100 Total Post-Massacre Population: 67,000 Total Number Of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 228,100
