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No role beyond a facilitator: World Bank's Ajay Banga on IWT suspension
World Bank President Ajay Banga refuted reports suggesting that the World Bank may intervene and compel India to overturn its decision of holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance.
Press Information Bureau (PIB) quoted Ajay Banga on X saying, 'We have no role to play beyond a facilitator. There's a lot of speculation in the media about how the World Bank will step in & fix the problem, but it's all bunk. The World Bank's role is merely as a facilitator.'
We have no role to play beyond a facilitator. There's a lot of speculation in the media about how the World Bank will step in & fix the problem but it's all bunk. The World Bank's role is merely as a facilitator -World Bank President, Ajay Banga on #IndusWaterTreaty Suspension… pic.twitter.com/6bbiZpKf0o
— PIB India (@PIB_India) May 9, 2025
On April 25, a day after India held the treaty in abeyance, Pakistan announced its intention of reaching the World Bank, seeking intervention. Rejecting the suspension as 'unilateral and illegal', Islamabad's foreign office added that any attempt to curb Pakistan's water share would be deemed an 'act of war'.
The statement serves as a setback to Pakistan as tensions between the two nations escalated following the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, after which the two nuclear-armed neighbours downgraded their diplomatic ties and India suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.
What is the Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan, signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi. The deal was brokered by the World Bank after nine years of negotiations.
Earlier on May 4, India curtailed the flow of water through the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab and is planning similar measures on the Kishanganga Dam along the Jhelum.
Pahalgam terror attack
The attack took place in Pahalgam's Baisaran valley when 26 civilians, mostly tourists, were killed by terrorists. Following this, India retaliated and announced a series of punitive measures, including the shutdown of the Attari border. The government also cancelled visas for Pakistani nationals under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme.
The government also blocked over 15 Pakistani YouTube channels and Instagram accounts of several Pakistani celebrities, including Hania Amir and Mahira Khan.
After the ties were downgraded between the two countries, India retaliated and launched Operation Sindoor on May 7 and targeted terrorist infrastructure at nine locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). After the missile strikes, Pakistan resorted to heavy shelling, resulting in the death of at least 16 civilians.
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Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security After Pahalgam and Sindoor: Questions India Must Ask Itself Sanjiv Krishan Sood 4 minutes ago While India's armed response to the Pahalgam massacre was swift and strategically effective, the deeper questions about intelligence failures, foreign policy and the sustainability of retaliatory doctrine remain unresolved. Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute now If Operation Sindoor began as a limited attack on nine locations linked to Pakistan-based terrorist groups, the Pakistani response prompted the Indian defence forces to undertake a number of actions aimed at Pakistan's military establishment. Through precision strikes on militant infrastructure, followed by carefully calibrated aggression, the Indian Air Force and Army degraded key assets while preventing any substantial damage to our own military or civilian infrastructure. The response to the massacre at Pahalgam carried out by terrorists linked to Pakistan was measured but resolute. It was aimed as prompting Islamabad to reassess its state policy of harbouring and sponsoring terror. India's declaration that all acts of terrorism will now be treated as acts of war marks a significant shift in doctrine. That said, six weeks after the Pahalgam tragedy and nearly a month since the cessation of hostilities, several critical questions remain unanswered by both our security and political leadership. The first is whether Operation Sindoor achieved its stated objectives. The Prime Minister, in a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting, gave the armed forces a free hand to destroy the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. On the nights of May 6th and 7th, nine terrorist camps were reportedly neutralized, and numerous militants killed. But can we truly say the infrastructure has been dismantled? Is the deterrent strong enough to prevent future attacks? The evidence doesn't inspire confidence. Since the 2016 Uri surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot air strikes following Pulwama, Pakistan-based terrorists have continued to strike at Indian targets. Pathankot, Kathua, Udhampur, and other places have seen terror attacks even after high-profile retaliatory actions. Supporting terrorism in India appears to be entrenched in Pakistan's state doctrine. The reported decision of the Pakistani government to offer financial aid to the families of slain terrorists and rebuild destroyed camps signals no intent to step back. More troubling is the international silence. Aside from muted support from Russia, India has struggled to garner vocal backing from major global powers. In contrast, Pakistan received overt support from China and Turkey—both of whom extended diplomatic cover and material support, including drones and modern aircraft used during the brief conflict. Despite a two-week window before striking the terrorist camps, India failed to shape global opinion or present a compelling narrative. This diplomatic vacuum echoes the aftermath of Balakot, when Pakistan successfully projected its version of events internationally. The all-party delegations India dispatched to various countries gained limited traction, mostly among nations with marginal influence on global affairs. This stands in sharp contrast to India's success in 1971 and during the Kargil conflict in 1999, when it managed to effectively justify its actions and rally international opinion. Why the shift? The present government's handling of foreign policy and communication strategy deserves closer scrutiny. That brings us to the ceasefire itself. By May 10th, Indian forces reportedly had the upper hand. Yet it was the US president who first announced the ceasefire, followed by India's own foreign secretary. President Trump's repeated claims of having mediated the ceasefire raise uncomfortable questions. Has India, which long resisted international mediation and stood firmly for bilateralism, allowed itself to be hyphenated with Pakistan once again? While the decision to end hostilities may have been strategically sound, it was an anti-climax for a public whipped into a frenzy by media speculation and political rhetoric. Talk of reclaiming Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and total victory created unrealistic expectations. The actual motivations for the ceasefire remain speculative. It may have been American pressure, given the escalatory risks between two nuclear powers. Or it could have been India's own calculation—that sufficient punishment had been meted out, and further escalation would only risk unnecessary civilian casualties, particularly in areas like Poonch and Rajouri. The safety of civilians in border areas is another glaring concern. While cities were issued alerts, conducted blackouts, and prepared for contingencies, residents living within range of Pakistani small arms and artillery fire were left dangerously exposed. Civilian deaths and property destruction in border towns were substantial. The state must ensure compensation and future protection for these vulnerable populations. The economic implications of conflict also merit discussion. India, now a $4 trillion economy, has far more to lose than Pakistan in a prolonged war. With vast developmental needs and social infrastructure demands, even short conflicts strain national resources. A quick resolution to conflict is, in this sense, in India's own interest. But that only makes the need for a coherent and sustainable response doctrine even more urgent. Our new policy of equating terror attacks with acts of war raises critical strategic questions. What is the threshold for retaliation? Would attacks outside Kashmir trigger the same response as those within? Does the number of casualties factor into the decision? Can every incident justify cross-border action without risking long-term regional stability and international isolation? Notably, India's responses have escalated over time—from Uri to Balakot to Sindoor. Where does this trajectory end, especially with a politically unstable and militarily erratic neighbour? The potential for future Chinese involvement further complicates matters. India's strategic community must urgently engage with these questions. Yet, above all, the most urgent question remains: how was the Pahalgam massacre allowed to happen in the first place? 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