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Rebirth Or Rebranding? Reincarnation Under Surveillance

Rebirth Or Rebranding? Reincarnation Under Surveillance

News18a day ago
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India's quiet support for Tibetan culture has provided refuge and continuity for the Dalai Lama's teachings, making Himalayan communities essential anchors in spiritual landscape
The question of who will be recognised as the 15th reincarnation of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama is not merely a matter of religious tradition—it is a litmus test for the global community's commitment to spiritual freedom and cultural autonomy.
At the epicentre of this issue lies a stark confrontation: between the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, rooted in centuries of spiritual wisdom, and the People's Republic of China, whose bureaucratic apparatus seeks to politicise reincarnation itself.
China's 2007 directives on the management of reincarnated lamas—mandating state approval and invoking the archaic 'Golden Urn' method—are not only a distortion of Tibetan religious practice but a calculated attempt to subjugate faith under authoritarian control. These measures, cloaked in the language of regulation, are instruments of ideological domination, designed to erode the spiritual sovereignty of Tibet and replace it with state-sanctioned orthodoxy.
The Buddhist Renaissance, initiated in the wake of systemic religious restrictions, has unfolded within a contested ideological space, marked by fundamentally differing visions of religion's role in contemporary Tibet. The institution of reincarnation (Tib. trulku, sprul sku) is one of the central concepts in not only the Buddhist but almost all Indic traditions with saṃsāra, as the vicious cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. This cycle, according to Buddhist doctrine, is ceaseless and infinite in duration, encompassing all sentient beings until they attain nirvāṇa. Progression through this cycle is determined by one's moral conduct and karmic accumulation. As part of this cultural and religious synthesis, the concept of the trulku—a consciously reincarnated spiritual master—became a hallmark of Tibetan Buddhism.
During the Second Dissemination (phyi dar) of Buddhism in Tibet in the late 10th and early 11th centuries, a process of institutionalisation of Buddhism within Tibetan society and the emergence of distinct Tibetan Buddhist schools also bloomed. Unlike ordinary beings who are subject to involuntary rebirth within saṃsāra, Tulkus are believed to be spiritually realised individuals who, having transcended the cycle of existence, choose to reincarnate voluntarily. Their return in physical form is seen as an act of compassion, intended to benefit sentient beings and further the Dharma. The three kayas thus are:
Dharmakāya (Truth Body): The eternal, formless essence of the Buddha, representing ultimate reality and transcending both physical and spiritual dimensions.
Sambhogakāya (Enjoyment Body): The celestial manifestation of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, perceptible only to advanced practitioners who have attained a high level of spiritual realization.
Nirmāṇakāya (Emanation Body; Tib. trulku): The physical form through which Buddhas and Bodhisattvas appear in the human realm to guide sentient beings toward liberation.
The most prominent and influential reincarnation lineages in the Gelugpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism are the Dalai Lamas (tā la'i bla ma) and the Panchen Lamas (paṇ chen bla ma). The Dalai Lama is revered as the manifestation of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the spiritual protector of the Tibetan people, while the Panchen Lama is regarded as the embodiment of Buddha Amitābha.
The rise of the Gelug school in the 17th century represented a turning point in Tibetan religious and political history. Under the leadership of figures such as the Fifth Dalai Lama, the Gelug tradition consolidated power and became the dominant force in Tibetan Buddhism. With growing support from Mongol patrons and increasing centralization of authority in Lhasa, the school undertook an ambitious program of institutional expansion. As Gelug influence extended across the Tibetan plateau and beyond, this power shift brought about a dramatic increase in monastic construction. Dozens—eventually hundreds—of new monasteries were founded throughout Central Tibet, Amdo, Kham, and even parts of Mongolia and China. These institutions not only served religious functions but also became local centers of education, administration, and cultural life.
Crucially, with the expansion of monastic infrastructure came the proliferation of tulku lineages—hereditary reincarnations of spiritually accomplished lamas. Many of these tulkus were recognised within individual monasteries and functioned primarily at the local level, acting as spiritual leaders and ensuring continuity within their institutions. Though these lineages did not possess the sweeping authority of the Dalai or Panchen Lamas, they were deeply influential within their regional and sectarian contexts. This system also reflected a broader theological and political strategy: While this created a rich and intricate web of spiritual leadership, one in which the influence of most was localised, even as a few achieved pan-Tibetan recognition, like the authority of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, whose influence extended as far as Mongolia.
The conflict over the recognition of Tulkus—reincarnate Tibetan Buddhist leaders—reached a flashpoint in 1995, centering on the succession of the 10th Panchen Lama, who passed away in January 1989 at Tashilhünpo Monastery in Shigatse. The dispute intensified in May 1995, when the 14th Dalai Lama recognized Gendün Chökyi Nyima (b. 1989) as the 11th Panchen Lama. The 1995 abduction of Gendün Chökyi Nyima, the Dalai Lama's recognised 11th Panchen Lama, remains one of the most egregious violations of religious freedom in modern history. His disappearance, followed by the installation of a politically compliant proxy, Gyaltsen Norbu, underscores Beijing's intent: to control not only the narrative of Tibetan Buddhism but its future leadership. It is noteworthy that a substantial number of Tibetans—both within Tibet and across the global diaspora—do not acknowledge him as a legitimate reincarnated tulku. This sentiment reflects long-standing concerns about the authenticity of religious appointments made or endorsed under political authority, rather than through traditional spiritual processes.
China, as a one-party state led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), maintains an officially atheist stance. Historically, CCP leadership has often characterised religious belief as incompatible with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Famously, Mao Zedong once referred to religion as 'poison," a reflection of the party's foundational skepticism toward organized spiritual practice. Although the state now allows limited religious expression under strict regulatory frameworks, many observers note that such policies prioritize ideological conformity over genuine religious freedom. In China, thus Buddha Dhamma is often perceived less as a religious tradition and more as a cultural artifact. China's treatment of Buddhism reveals a stark contradiction. While the state elevates the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) as a legitimate voice in global religious forums, it simultaneously enacts policies that dismantle authentic Buddhist practice—particularly in Tibetan regions. Monasteries are demolished, spiritual leaders are silenced, and reincarnation processes are manipulated to serve political ends. This dual strategy—legitimising state-controlled Buddhism while suppressing independent religious expression—reflects a calculated erosion of religious freedom under the guise of cultural stewardship. Additionally, the Sinicisation of Buddha Dhamma by the Chinese state, under the guise of cultural integration, increasingly appears to be a calculated effort to subordinate a transnational spiritual tradition to the ideological apparatus of the Communist Party. While China asserts its sovereign right to shape religious expression within its borders, the systematic reinterpretation of Buddhist teachings to align with 'socialist core values" and 'Xi Jinping Thought" undermines the doctrinal integrity of the Dhamma and erodes its universal spiritual message. This politicized transformation—framed as modernization—risks reducing Buddha Dhamma to a tool of state propaganda, marginalizing authentic practice, and silencing centuries of pluralistic discourse. The complex interplay between state governance and Tibetan spiritual identity continues to evoke international concern and scholarly debate. It raises fundamental questions about cultural autonomy, spiritual legitimacy, and the appropriate role of political institutions in matters of faith.
Should China attempt to replicate this maneuver with the Dalai Lama's succession, it will not only provoke spiritual outrage but geopolitical consequences. India, home to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile, stands at the crossroads of principle and pragmatism. Any reincarnation recognized on foreign soil would be a direct rebuke to China's claim of religious jurisdiction—a move that could redefine the contours of Chinese diplomacy.
In response, the Chinese government conducted its selection process in November 1995 at Lhasa's Jokhang Temple, proclaiming Gyaltsen Norbu (b. 1990) as the state-sanctioned 11th Panchen Lama, who was formally enthroned the following month at Tashilhünpo. The Chinese appointed Panchen Lama is barely accepted by the people of Tibet who consider it compelling to attend his events; thus remaining largely unconvinced by his public engagements. There is an overwhelming resistance among the people of Tibet to accept the Chinese appointed Panchen Lama. Gendün Chökyi Nyima has remained disappeared since 1995 and is widely believed to be under state detention, where he continues to be regarded by most Tibetans as the rightful Panchen Lama. The Chinese government's unilateral appointment of its own Panchen Lama in 1995—following the disappearance of Gendün Chökyi Nyima, the Dalai Lama's recognised successor—was not merely a breach of religious protocol. It was a calculated maneuver to assert ideological control over Tibetan Buddhism and undermine the spiritual agency of the Tibetan people. This act, condemned internationally, continues to reverberate as a symbol of Beijing's disregard for religious freedom and cultural autonomy. The Panchen Lama's sacred role in identifying the next Dalai Lama makes this interference particularly glaring. By installing a state-sanctioned figure, China has positioned itself to manipulate the future of Tibetan spiritual leadership—a move widely viewed as an attempt to rewrite centuries-old traditions to suit political ends. Should Beijing replicate this strategy in selecting the 15th Dalai Lama, the consequences will be profound. Such a decision would not only deepen Tibetan resistance but also provoke diplomatic backlash from nations with historical and cultural ties to Tibet—most notably India, which hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. The international community must recognize this moment for what it is: a struggle not just over a religious figure, but over the right of a people to preserve their faith, identity, and history. To remain silent is to tacitly endorse the commodification of spirituality by a regime that views religion as a tool of control.
Foremost among the stakeholders is the Gaden Phodrang, the institution established by the 14th Dalai Lama and based in Dharamshala, India. The Dalai Lama has declared that this trust will be the legitimate authority in determining his reincarnation. The Tibetan diaspora, spread across India, Nepal, Bhutan, and much of the Western world, plays a vital role in safeguarding the cultural and religious integrity of Tibetan Buddhism. Many members of the diaspora argue that the next Dalai Lama should be born outside Chinese influence—preferably in a free country where religious practice is not controlled. Their advocacy and support have encouraged the 14th Dalai Lama to outline clear principles for his succession, including the possibility that the institution may end if not viewed as meaningful by Tibetans themselves. The Chinese government claims authority over all Buddhist reincarnations under its jurisdiction, insisting on using the historical 'Golden Urn' method to select the next Dalai Lama. However, many Tibetans inside China continue to revere the Dalai Lama and have sent private appeals urging him to ensure the continuation of the institution. Though public expression is tightly monitored, subtle forms of spiritual dissent endure, making Tibetans inside Tibet vulnerable stakeholders. Mongolia has a longstanding spiritual link with Tibet, rooted in the Cho-yon (patron-priest) relationship. Mongolian Buddhists largely follow the Gelug tradition, of which the Dalai Lama is the head. In recent years, the Dalai Lama's recognition of the 10th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu in Mongolia reaffirmed these connections. Mongolia's spiritual infrastructure and historical reverence for Tibetan Buddhism make it a key stakeholder—some even speculate it could be a site for the 15th Dalai Lama's birth. The term 'Dalai Lama" itself comes from the Mongolian word meaning Ocean of Wisdom. In 1578, Mongol ruler Altan Khan conferred the title upon Sonam Gyatso, the third leader of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. This retroactively made him the 3rd Dalai Lama, and the two previous leaders were posthumously recognized as the 1st and 2nd.
In Russia, (three republics—Kalmykia, Buryatia, and Tuva)—form a distinct cluster of Tibetan Buddhist (Gelugpa) regions. Despite political challenges and restrictions on the Dalai Lama's visits, spiritual relations remain strong. These provinces have expressed support for his teachings, and some local leaders have voiced concern over external interference in the reincarnation process. The growing spiritual and cultural dialogue between Russian Buddhists and the Tibetan Gelugpa tradition has been further strengthened through the visits of esteemed masters such as Ling Rinpoche and Kundeling Rinpoche to Russia. These engagements represent a significant step in fostering deeper understanding and collaboration between the two communities.
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Lastly, the Indian Himalayan region, encompassing areas like Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Darjeeling, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh, houses over a million Tibetan Buddhists who view the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader. Local leaders and monastic communities have voiced their support for a traditional reincarnation process. India's quiet support for Tibetan culture has provided refuge and continuity for the Dalai Lama's teachings, making these Himalayan communities essential anchors in the spiritual landscape. Together, these stakeholders form a mosaic of belief, politics, and heritage. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama will be more than a spiritual event—it will be a referendum on the world's willingness to confront authoritarianism in its most insidious form: the rewriting of sacred tradition to serve political ambition.
Baishali Sarkar is Research Associate at International Buddhist Confederation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views.
About the Author
Baishali Sarkar
Baishali Sarkar is Research Associate at International Buddhist Confederation.
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First Published:
July 21, 2025, 19:43 IST
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