When Donald Trump visited his mum's Lewis home 'for 40 seconds' - from someone who was there
A fleeting appearance in the crofting village of Tong drew cameras, raised eyebrows, and left islanders more bemused than starstruck.
Travelling with his sister, Maryanne Trump Barry — a retired US federal judge and fluent Gaelic speaker — Mr Trump came in search of their mother's birthplace.
The modest family home they visited was where Mary Anne MacLeod was born in 1912.
Press and Journal photographer Sandy McCook was there to document the moment.
'His private jet, with TRUMP on the side, flew right over us,' he recalled.
'And he came with a security detail, which caught the local police completely off guard.'
Mr Trump met cousins Alasdair and Calum Murray, spent 'about 40 seconds' inside the house, then held a press conference at the Old Sawmill at Lews Castle.
'It was surreal,' said Sandy.
'He said he'd been at a concert the night before with 'his friend' Elton John.
'When asked how he'd fund the still-to-be-completed Menie golf course during the looming crash, he said 'When the banks run out of money, they come to me'.'
Maryanne, meanwhile, downplayed any official role, telling reporters she was simply there for 'moral support.'
She even answered a question in Gaelic, a gesture that won hearts on the island.
Mr Trump described the croft house as his mother's 'Scotch house' and left by mid-afternoon.
Back then, he was still a reality TV host and property mogul — known more for The Apprentice than politics.
But for Lewis, his whirlwind visit was a strange collision of island quiet and global celebrity.
'It was hard to believe it actually happened,' said Sandy.
'And just like that, he was gone.'
A moment in history — Hebridean style.
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