Dish in Focus: Sweetcorn tempura at Yardbird
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Rest assured, tables can now be booked, but that hasn't stopped diners from spilling out of Yardbird's doors. Owned and operated by
entrepreneur Lindsay Jang and chef Matt Abergel, Yardbird is a family-style neighbourhood restaurant that combines quality food with good drinks, great service, and a fun and friendly environment.
Yardbird is a family-style neighbourhood restaurant that combines quality food with good drinks, great service, and a fun and friendly environment. Photo: Handout
The restaurant might be centred around chicken, as its 2018
Chicken and Charcoal cookbook suggests, but for those on the hunt for veggie dishes, Yardbird doesn't disappoint. Its menu also consists of rice and noodles, soup, smaller sharing dishes (like the Yardbird caesar or eggplant salad) and bigger sides. This is where the famous sweetcorn tempura can be found, and it's a good representation of Yardbird's signature style, says co-founder Abergel.
Abergel describes their way of cooking as 'using good techniques to let people taste an ingredient in its fullest essence'. This is exactly what the tempura delivers.
Matt Abergel, chef and co-founder of Yardbird. Photo: Handout
Using fresh sweetcorn sourced locally, the kernels are cut from the cob using a circular Japanese technique called marugiri. 'This allows us to take off the corn from the cob without too much of the juice getting out and without taking the bottom of the kernel, to avoid it popping in the oil,' Abergel explains.
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Mixed and made to order, the cut corn is then simply coated in flour and combined with small amounts of tempura batter until sticky. 'We then cover our hands in flour and form about 110g of corn into a ball, and drop it directly into a 180-degree fryer. We fry for about two and a half minutes until golden brown on the outside and just cooked on the inside. We then season with salt and pepper, and serve immediately!'
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