Why China's sitting on the Iran war sidelines

Asia Times

9 hours ago

On a visit to Shanghai some years ago, I asked a leading Chinese strategist how Beijing would view a war between the US and Iran, which even back then seemed a high probability. I thought he would opine on how higher oil prices could threaten Chinese manufacturing.
Instead, he shocked me by explaining that China would benefit from the US fighting yet another costly war in the Middle East, since that could mark the 'end of US global hegemony.' The Chinese have indeed always considered the Middle East as 'the graveyard of empires.'
While hostilities have subsided for now, there remains a grim possibility that the Israel-Iran ceasefire could break down and the US will once again face pressure to come to Israel's defense. If China were to aid Iran, as it has Pakistan, with aircraft, missiles, and battle management technologies, that would mark a troubling escalation.
But now, Beijing remains cautious about wielding its military power abroad. Still, China will likely reap geopolitical benefits if the US continues to be on an adversarial footing with Iran.
The Chinese government condemned the American strike on Iran, saying, 'The actions of the US seriously violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, and have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East.'
An editorial published on June 22 in the Chinese newspaper Global Times asserts that Washington's resort to force amounts to 'adding fuel to the fire of war and pushing the Iran-Israel conflict to a more uncontrollable situation.'
It's fair to say the Chinese have been increasing their presence in the Middle East. A month ago, the Chinese Air Force arrived in Egypt for a military exercise, which featured joint aerial refueling for the first time.
China's warships have been conducting regular visits to the region for about a decade and it's only a matter of time before one of its new aircraft carriers makes an appearance in these crowded waters. Back in March, there was even a trilateral naval exercise, now an annual occurrence, between warships from Russia, Iran, and China.
On the other hand, these exercises were all rather small in scale and could not be described as threatening shows of force. Overall, Beijing has declined to militarize its foreign policy toward the Middle East.
Even when Trump in mid-2019 essentially invited the Chinese Navy to patrol the Strait of Hormuz, Chinese strategists answered with an unequivocal refusal.
Likewise, Beijing has declined to join any military actions against the Houthis over the last few years, preferring to negotiate with the Houthis to secure passage for its ships through the contested waterway.
China puts diplomacy rather than military might at the forefront of its foreign policy. True, Beijing maintains a military base at Djibouti. Yet that facility is notably situated next to bases from other foreign countries, including the US, France, and Japan. It's hardly a launching pad for globe-spanning power projection or regional aggression.
More to the point, China has notched a number of diplomatic achievements in the Middle East in recent years. Its star has been rising steadily among Arab states, helped along no doubt by its sympathy for the Palestinians.
But it's also been actively fostering development in much quieter corners of the Middle East, such as in countries like Morocco and Oman that are gradually changing the region's complexion.
Most strikingly, Beijing set off a veritable foreign policy earthquake in the Persian Gulf when it announced that it had successfully mediated an Iran-Saudi rapprochement in 2023.
We cannot rule out that this situation could still take a turn for the worse, especially now that Washington has shown a willingness to take offensive action against Iran. There have been rumors of secret Chinese flights into Iran.
Even before the war, it was reported that Beijing was shipping key components for ballistic missiles to Tehran. One can also easily imagine how Pakistan might serve as a conduit for Chinese military aid to Iran. Washington should take note and act cautiously under the present circumstances.
But let's not lose track of the fundamentals here. The bottom line is that China does not have a military alliance with Iran. Remarkably, despite decades of great power jostling in the Middle East, Beijing has not sold a single major weapons system to Tehran since the early 1990s.
That is an impressive show of restraint from Beijing and one Washington ought to reflect on as it one again resorts to the major use of force in the Middle East.
We might also recall that in previous great power crises in this volatile region, our rivals have sometimes been much more willing to go to the brink. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, both the US and the Soviet Union put their nuclear forces on alert as the Kremlin considered direct military intervention.
In this present crisis, Russia is thoroughly distracted by the war in Ukraine and no longer able to throw its weight around the Middle East. Likewise, China is not inclined to increase its military involvement, which should thankfully set some kind of upper limit to the dangers for escalation if hostilities resume.
Perhaps Beijing is wise to 'sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight.' Washington would do well to take note of Chinese restraint as the situation with Iran is likely to remain fraught for the foreseeable future.
Lyle Goldstein is director of the Asia Program at Defense Priorities.