
On Regional Tensions, Don't Expect Too Much of ASEAN
In the last week of May, Southeast Asia witnessed a series of significant diplomatic developments. Multiple ASEAN-led meetings were convened in Kuala Lumpur, including the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN-GCC Summit, and the inaugural ASEAN-GCC-China Summit. Immediately following these meetings, the Shangri-La Dialogue defense conference 2025 took place in Singapore.
During the same week, Thai and Cambodian troops skirmished along a disputed part of their nations' border, leaving one Cambodian soldier dead. These incidents – alongside the ongoing conflict in Myanmar and persistent maritime clashes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea – underscore the increasingly dynamic and complex security environment facing the region.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is well-positioned to play an active role in managing, though not solving, these regional conflicts. While some believe that ASEAN should attempt to resolve such conflicts, it is important to clarify that ASEAN was established primarily as a conflict management platform. It is not structured, nor is it equipped, for conflict resolution in the traditional sense, given the nature of its operating and decision-making mechanisms. To understand ASEAN's limitations in resolving conflicts, we must revisit the rationale behind its formation and the foundational principles that guide its operations.
ASEAN was founded in August 1967, in the aftermath of the Indonesia–Malaysia Konfrontasi and during the intensification of the Vietnam War. Its aim was to foster peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Its five founding members – Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines – envisioned it as a platform for regional confidence-building. Initially, ASEAN focused on cooperation on socio-economic and cultural matters.
Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has expanded to include all Southeast Asian nations, with the last remaining outlier, Timor-Leste, expected to become a full member by the end of 2025. It has also broadened its multilateral engagements through various mechanisms – such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and the ASEAN Community – which aim to facilitate dialogue on security and economic cooperation. These forums allow for inclusive discussions and trust-building but often stop short of producing concrete and binding outcomes, particularly on contentious geopolitical matters.
Two core principles define ASEAN's identity: non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states, and consensus-based decision-making. These enduring and pragmatic principles have enabled ASEAN to remain an inclusive and sustainable organization. ASEAN's approach to regional disputes stems from these principles, as demonstrated in the Five-Point Consensus plan addressing the Myanmar conflict, and in the ongoing negotiations over an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.
The Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar was adopted in April 2021, three months after the Myanmar military's coup d'état, when ASEAN leaders reached a collective agreement on how to manage the Myanmar crisis, though the Consensus lacks binding and enforceable actions. Meanwhile, negotiations for the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct have spanned over two decades, illustrating both the inclusive nature of ASEAN's consensus-based approach, which values every member's input, and the inherent difficulty of reaching unified agreement on complex and sensitive issues. Moreover, external actors such as China, the United States, and the European Union continue to exert influence on ASEAN's internal dynamics, further complicating the process of establishing unified regional positions.
It is therefore necessary to temper expectations regarding ASEAN's capacity to resolve deeply rooted regional issues. ASEAN and its mechanisms were never intended for such a role. The bloc lacks binding legal instruments and enforcement capabilities, and its consensus-based approach means that it is often hampered by divergent political priorities among member states, particularly on issues that touch upon their core national interests.
In light of these structural limitations, ASEAN cannot be expected to assume a greater role in managing today's regional security challenges. Instead, its value lies in providing an important platform for fostering dialogues and confidence-building measures. While limited in yielding immediate and context-specific tangible outcomes, these remain essential for long-term regional stability.
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In the last week of May, Southeast Asia witnessed a series of significant diplomatic developments. Multiple ASEAN-led meetings were convened in Kuala Lumpur, including the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN-GCC Summit, and the inaugural ASEAN-GCC-China Summit. Immediately following these meetings, the Shangri-La Dialogue defense conference 2025 took place in Singapore. During the same week, Thai and Cambodian troops skirmished along a disputed part of their nations' border, leaving one Cambodian soldier dead. These incidents – alongside the ongoing conflict in Myanmar and persistent maritime clashes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea – underscore the increasingly dynamic and complex security environment facing the region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is well-positioned to play an active role in managing, though not solving, these regional conflicts. While some believe that ASEAN should attempt to resolve such conflicts, it is important to clarify that ASEAN was established primarily as a conflict management platform. It is not structured, nor is it equipped, for conflict resolution in the traditional sense, given the nature of its operating and decision-making mechanisms. To understand ASEAN's limitations in resolving conflicts, we must revisit the rationale behind its formation and the foundational principles that guide its operations. ASEAN was founded in August 1967, in the aftermath of the Indonesia–Malaysia Konfrontasi and during the intensification of the Vietnam War. Its aim was to foster peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Its five founding members – Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines – envisioned it as a platform for regional confidence-building. Initially, ASEAN focused on cooperation on socio-economic and cultural matters. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has expanded to include all Southeast Asian nations, with the last remaining outlier, Timor-Leste, expected to become a full member by the end of 2025. It has also broadened its multilateral engagements through various mechanisms – such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and the ASEAN Community – which aim to facilitate dialogue on security and economic cooperation. These forums allow for inclusive discussions and trust-building but often stop short of producing concrete and binding outcomes, particularly on contentious geopolitical matters. Two core principles define ASEAN's identity: non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states, and consensus-based decision-making. These enduring and pragmatic principles have enabled ASEAN to remain an inclusive and sustainable organization. ASEAN's approach to regional disputes stems from these principles, as demonstrated in the Five-Point Consensus plan addressing the Myanmar conflict, and in the ongoing negotiations over an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. The Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar was adopted in April 2021, three months after the Myanmar military's coup d'état, when ASEAN leaders reached a collective agreement on how to manage the Myanmar crisis, though the Consensus lacks binding and enforceable actions. Meanwhile, negotiations for the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct have spanned over two decades, illustrating both the inclusive nature of ASEAN's consensus-based approach, which values every member's input, and the inherent difficulty of reaching unified agreement on complex and sensitive issues. Moreover, external actors such as China, the United States, and the European Union continue to exert influence on ASEAN's internal dynamics, further complicating the process of establishing unified regional positions. It is therefore necessary to temper expectations regarding ASEAN's capacity to resolve deeply rooted regional issues. ASEAN and its mechanisms were never intended for such a role. The bloc lacks binding legal instruments and enforcement capabilities, and its consensus-based approach means that it is often hampered by divergent political priorities among member states, particularly on issues that touch upon their core national interests. In light of these structural limitations, ASEAN cannot be expected to assume a greater role in managing today's regional security challenges. Instead, its value lies in providing an important platform for fostering dialogues and confidence-building measures. While limited in yielding immediate and context-specific tangible outcomes, these remain essential for long-term regional stability.