3 Hong Kong universities move up in QS top 50 rankings, with HKU jumping to 11th place
Three Hong Kong universities have climbed in education analytics firm QS's rankings of the world's top 50 institutions, with the University of Hong Kong (HKU) jumping to 11th place.
Quacquarelli Symonds, also known as QS, released its new 2026 rankings on Thursday.
HKU rose six spots from last year's rankings, moving from 17th to 11th place. It is the second-highest ranked university in Asia after the National University of Singapore, which came in 8th.
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) ranked 32nd, up from 36th place last year. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) saw its position move from 44th to 47th place.
Two other universities, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU) and the City University of Hong Kong (CityU), made the top 100 list. PolyU ranked 54th, while CityU ranked 63rd.
In a statement on Thursday, a spokesperson for the Education Bureau said the city's university rankings were encouraging and a testament to the government's long-term investment in higher education.
The spokesperson said the rankings reflected Hong Kong's 'attractiveness as a hub for international talent.'
Last month, Chief Executive John Lee pledged 'full support' to universities in attracting foreign students after US President Donald Trump moved to restrict the enrolment of international students at American universities.
Some universities have announced streamlined application procedures for students affected by the US president's new policies.
In the Chinese-language statement on Thursday, the government said it would continue to promote the diversity of the city's universities.
It is 'not only to strengthen Hong Kong's development momentum, but also to actively contribute to [China]'s development,' the spokesperson added.
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