Mufti Taqi Usmani and top Pakistani scholars say war on Israel 'obligatory'
Speaking at the National Palestine Conference in Islamabad on Thursday, Usmani said Muslim countries had "failed to provide sufficient support to those fighting to protect" Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
"What is the use of the armies of Muslim countries if they do not engage in jihad?" he asked.
The conference gathered prominent Islamic scholars from across the country, and its official declaration on Thursday echoed Usmani's remarks - concluding that "jihad" against Israel is obligatory for all Muslim countries.
In his speech, Usmani also said that Muslims who intended to go on voluntary pilgrimages, such as Umrah, should spend their money on supporting the Palestinian resistance instead.
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"We have assembled within this very same convention hall one year ago in an act of solidarity for Palestine. Yet, ever since then, we have merely done conferences and not true action."
Usmani further referenced Pakistan's first leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, saying: "The founder of Pakistan referred to Israel as an illegitimate state, and our stance will not be altered irrespective of how strong Israel may become."
Muslim scholars issue 'fatwa' calling for 'jihad' against Israel as strikes pummel Gaza Read More »
Pakistan, which was established in 1947 - a year before the founding of Israel - has opposed the creation of the Israeli state and has never recognised its sovereignty.
Many scholars at the conference criticised the Pakistani government for not declaring war on Israel.
This comes just days after Ali al-Qaradaghi, the secretary general of the International Union Of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), an organisation previously led by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, called on all Muslim countries 'to intervene immediately militarily, economically and politically to stop this genocide and comprehensive destruction, in accordance with their mandate'.
His statement, which was also backed by 14 other prominent Muslim scholars, called on all Muslim countries to 'review their peace treaties' with Israel and for Muslims in the United States to pressure President Donald Trump to 'fulfil his election promises to stop the aggression and establish peace'.
Opposing the 'fatwa'
But Egypt's Grand Mufti Nazir Ayyad this Monday criticised the "fatwa" as "irresponsible".
A "fatwa" is a non-binding Islamic legal ruling from a respected religious scholar, usually based on the Quran or the Sunnah - the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad.
Ayyad, who is the highest authority for issuing religious opinions in Egypt, rejected the "fatwa" and said that "no individual group or entity has the right to issue fatwas on such delicate and critical matters in violation of Sharia principles and its higher objectives".
"Such actions may endanger the security of societies and the stability of Muslim states," he added.
Egypt's grand mufti rejects fatwa for jihad against Israel as 'irresponsible' Read More »
"Supporting the Palestinian people in their legitimate rights is a religious, humanitarian and moral duty. However, this support must be provided in a way that truly serves the interests of the Palestinian people and not to advance specific agendas or reckless ventures that could lead to further destruction, displacement and disaster for the Palestinians themselves."
Ayyad said that the declaration of "jihad" in Islam must be made by a "legitimate authority".
"In our current era, this authority is embodied in the recognised state and political leadership, not in statements issued by entities or unions that lack legal authority and do not represent Muslims either religiously or in practice," he said.
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'The US might push resettling of Palestinians as part of any deal, but that is unlikely to be sufficient and would be politically combustible within Somaliland' - Omar Mahmood, International Crisis Group According to Faisal Roble, a prominent Horn of Africa analyst, 'If the focus is on US interests, Washington can utilise Bosaaso, located on the Gulf of Aden, gateway to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, offering comparable strategic advantages to Berbera.' Somaliland also faces a separate threat of encroachment by the Mogadishu goverment. Over the years, Somaliland's total landmass has decreased and the unrecognised state has been reduced to an enclave. Recently, Somalia's federal government recognised the Sool and Sanaag provinces, long considered part of Somaliland, as a new regional state aligned with a unified Somalia. The new state called North-East constitutes approximately 60 percent of Somaliland's total landmass and its loss is viewed as a significant setback to Somaliland's quest for recognition. 'The newly formed state will not accept the relocation of Palestinians,' says Roble. 'Even the regions remaining under Hargeisa are not likely to accept.'
