
‘Korean Donald Trump' emerges from the chaos in Seoul
On June 3, 2025, a snap presidential election was held in the Republic of Korea in which Democratic candidate Lee Jae-myung won with over 49% of the vote.
The election followed an attempt on December 3, 2024 to impose martial law in the country, which led the Constitutional Court to unanimously vote for the impeachment of then-President Yoon Suk-yeol. There were several candidates, but the main contest took place between the ruling conservative People Power Party and the opposition Democratic Party.
Chairman Lee is a striking and controversial figure. During the presidency of the previous Democrat, Moon Jae-in, Lee led an independent faction within the party and was considered an even more leftist populist than Moon. Moon viewed him as a dangerous rival and tried to remove him via a series of criminal cases. Lee managed to fend off these attacks and eventually became the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in 2022 after all of Moon's protégés lost the primaries. Although he once called himself the 'Korean Bernie Sanders' due to his populist slogans and ideas such as universal basic income, his circle now prefers the term 'Korean Donald Trump', as both share a flamboyant style and peculiar reputations.
Even before entering the presidential race, Lee was implicated in several criminal cases involving corruption, abuse of power, perjury, election law violations, and even cash smuggling into North Korea. The accusations were serious – several of Lee's close associates were imprisoned. He was, however, saved by a series of miraculous coincidences: Five key witnesses in different cases who could testify against him either committed suicide or died from various causes. Though his enemies consider the deaths highly suspicious, police found no evidence of foul play.
The constitutional crisis that led to the snap election began when, on November 15, 2024, Lee received a suspended sentence. Although conditional, the verdict threatened his political career. If upheld by the Supreme Court, Lee would be barred from holding public office for five years. With nearly two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the Democrats intensified their opposition. Yoon attempted to 'cut the Gordian knot' by declaring martial law, but the public saw this as a return to military dictatorship, which unsurprisingly failed. After a long deliberation and despite contentious points, the Constitutional Court unanimously impeached the president, as reinstating him would plunge the country into chaos.
Lee easily won his party's primary with 89.77% of the vote. His opponents were the former independent left-centrist Kim Dong-yeon and ex-Governor Kim Kyung-soo, an ally of Moon Jae-in. Before the parliamentary elections, Lee either subdued or pushed out strong figures from other factions, earning accusations that he turned the Democratic Party into a personal fan club.
Still, Lee's path to the presidency was not easy. On March 26, 2025, the Seoul appellate court overturned Lee's conviction, formally reopening his political path. This surprised legal experts, especially conservatives. The reason became clear: The presiding judges were members of a progressive NGO associated with the Democratic Party.
However, on May 1, 2025, the Supreme Court reversed the acquittal and sent the case for retrial. Theoretically, this could disqualify Lee if the outcome was unfavorable, but the Democrats launched protests, calling the court's decision a coup comparable to martial law. Facing threats of impeachment (parliament can impeach any official, including judges), the judiciary made a 'compromise' decision: Lee's retrial and other investigations would resume only after the election.
Disqualifying Lee would decapitate the opposition, which lacked a viable substitute. But there's an unusual dilemma: The Constitution states that a sitting president can only be imprisoned for treason or rebellion. Yet, if someone under criminal investigation wins and is later convicted, there is no clear precedent. Democrats are preemptively addressing this: A parliamentary committee has reviewed a law that would terminate all criminal proceedings against an elected president and amend the penal code to decriminalize the charges Lee faced.
Such legal manipulation doesn't please everyone. Hence, Lee enjoys both the highest approval and disapproval ratings – meaning a sizable bloc could unite under the slogan 'anyone but Lee Jae-myung'.
While Lee achieved party unity, the conservatives have been plagued by infighting. The party has factions – center-rights, Yoon loyalists, and traditional conservatives. Initially, eight candidates entered the race, and a three-stage process narrowed the field.
The first round eliminated four weaker or controversial figures, such as ex-Speaker Na Kyung-won. In the second round, moderate An Heol-su ('the Korean Kaspersky') and classical conservative Won Joon-pyo – who ran against Moon Jae-in in 2017 and might have been the nominee again if not for Yoon – were dropped. Two finalists remained.
One was Han Dong-hoon, Yoon's longtime ally from the Prosecutor's Office, former justice minister and party leader. However, Han opposed martial law and voted against it. After Yoon's impeachment, Han resigned. Analysts saw in him a fresh conservative image, but he lost the final round.
Instead, the 2025 conservative candidate is ex-Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo. He has two notable qualities: A former union activist repressed under military rule, he later joined the conservatives. And he was the only cabinet member who refused to apologize after the failed martial law attempt. Instead, he argued that Yoon may have erred in methods, but the problem required resolution. Kim became a symbol of uncompromising conservatism. But party leaders worried whether he could attract undecided voters – those alienated by both Lee and Yoon. Fortunately, they had an alternative.
After some thought, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo (also acting president post-impeachment) entered the race. Once a leftist and prime minister in the 2000s, he too joined the conservatives. Some see him as a centrist technocrat; others, a political opportunist. On May 2, 2025 – after the conservative primaries ended – Han announced his independent candidacy. He vowed to act as a transitional 'technical president' to reform the government and step down, ushering in a 'Seventh Republic.'
In fact, all major candidates proposed constitutional reforms. Most advocated limiting presidential power and replacing the current five-year single term with two four-year terms, US-style. Given nearly 40 years since the last constitution, some anti-dictatorship clauses seem outdated.
Han's resignation triggered a mini-government crisis. Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, next in line, resigned minutes before a parliamentary impeachment vote against him. The role of acting leader passed to Education Minister Lee Joo-ho.
Han effectively represented the conservative camp. Yoon's allies saw him as a unifying, rational figure. A split right would guarantee Lee's win. The party pressured Kim Moon-soo to withdraw for Han, even voiding the primary results. Kim denounced this as betrayal, demanded a new vote – and won again. The old leadership resigned. Han withdrew, urging support for Kim. Meanwhile, Kim softened his rhetoric and leaned toward the center. This showed in debates about whether Yoon should leave the party. While a symbol for conservatives, his presence burdened them with his failures – especially martial law. Ultimately, Yoon left People Power, but might form a new party post-election.
There were more candidates. Some from truly left-wing parties, as Lee has shifted right – dropping the idea of basic income and even proposing Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Independents include ex-conservative leader Hwang Kyo-ahn, now ultra-right. But only one got over 5%: Lee Jun-seok, leader of the Reform Party. A center-right former conservative leader ousted for opposing Yoon, Lee is youthful and energetic. Though his party failed to become a 'third force', he remains popular. Conservatives wanted him to quit and unify the right. Some party members disenchanted with him have even joined the Democrats.
Many promises were made by all candidates, and listing them all here is pointless – each of them essentially promises good things and opposes bad things. Beyond key issues such as North Korea-US relations, party platforms differ little. Where they do, differences stem more from factional struggles than ideology. If conservatives say a cat is black, Democrats will insist it's white – regardless of the truth.
As for where Lee's victory will take South Korea, that remains to be seen – stay tuned for the next article.
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