Viewed from China, Trump's crackdown on LA unrest seems a risky ‘political gamble'
Los Angeles unrest , which they said had been exploited by US President Donald Trump for political theatre, jeopardising public safety and stability.
One high-profile commentator also predicted that Trump's heavy-handed tactics could escalate into a constitutional crisis.
The remarks followed days of protests in Los Angeles over immigration raids, which led to a
curfew in some downtown areas of the city aimed at cracking down on vandalism. The comments also came after a breakthrough in US-China trade talks on Tuesday, when the two countries agreed on a
framework pending approval from their leaders.
The Los Angeles demonstrations have prompted Trump to mobilise thousands of National Guard troops and
the US Marines
The protests, held in response to a sweeping operation to arrest and deport unauthorised immigrants, have spread to other US cities, including San Francisco, Chicago, Houston and New York.
Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Beijing's Renmin University, said the deployment of troops by Trump made his 'despotic nature' much clearer to Americans and added nothing to his domestic prestige.
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AllAfrica
6 minutes ago
- AllAfrica
Modi's American embrace backfires badly on India
India-US ties have entered a fraught and intricate phase, marked by tensions that challenge India's long-cherished strategic autonomy. Once overly hyped as a burgeoning partnership of mutual benefit, the Indo-US relationship is now strained by diplomatic pressures, economic threats and a shifting global order. India's signing of four foundational US defense agreements—the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the Industrial Security Annex (ISA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)—positioned it as a strategic partner and ally. However, these agreements, coupled with increasing US trade pressure under President Donald Trump, have raised serious questions about India's ability to maintain an independent foreign policy. This article critically examines the trajectory of US-India relations, the carrot-and-stick approach of Trump's policies, the myth of India's strategic autonomy and the challenges India faces in navigating a multipolar world. It argues that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's pro-American tilt has miscalculated India's strategic and economic capacity, risking its autonomy and global standing. During the Cold War, India's non-aligned stance allowed it to balance relations with the Soviet Union and the West, maintaining strategic autonomy while fostering ties with Moscow. The post-Cold War era, however, saw a pivot toward the US, driven by shared concerns about China's rise and India's aspirations to become a global power. Key milestones included the 2008 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement under President George W Bush, which legitimized India's nuclear program, and enhanced defense cooperation under President Barack Obama. During Trump's first term (2017–2021), intelligence-sharing agreements and defense technology transfers deepened ties, while the Biden administration facilitated fighter jet engine technology transfers in 2023. These developments, coupled with India's active role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alongside the US, Japan and Australia, signaled a strategic alignment with Washington. The four foundational defense agreements, signed between 2016 and 2020, were pivotal. LEMOA enabled mutual logistics support, COMCASA facilitated secure communications, ISA allowed technology transfers, and BECA enhanced geospatial intelligence sharing. These agreements granted India access to advanced US defense systems, but they also tethered its military and strategic apparatus to Washington's orbit. Modi's government framed this as a step to counter China and elevate India's global stature. However, the cost of this alignment has become increasingly apparent, as it undermines India's non-aligned heritage and exposes it to US pressures, particularly under Trump's second term. Trump's first term was characterized by a 'carrot' approach, enticing India with defense cooperation, technology transfers and diplomatic gestures like the 'Howdy Modi' event in 2019. These moves were designed to pull India into the US-led Indo-Pacific framework to counter China. The US also enticed India by vowing it would encourage American companies to shift manufacturing from China to India during the Covid-19 pandemic, though firms like General Motors, Ford, and Harley-Davidson exited India, citing economic challenges. Despite these setbacks, the narrative of a robust US-India 'friendship' was carefully cultivated. In contrast, Trump's second term has adopted a 'stick' approach, marked by economic and diplomatic coercion. Trump has criticized India's oil and arms purchases from Russia, threatening tariffs first of 25% and now 50% on Indian goods and additional penalties. This pressure stems from India's continued engagement with Russia and its role in the BRICS grouping, which Trump perceives as an anti-American bloc. By leveraging tariffs and public criticism, Trump aims to curb India's economic autonomy and align its policies with US interests, particularly in ongoing trade negotiations with China. For instance, Trump's push for India to open its agricultural market to US products—such as genetically modified corn, soybeans, dairy, and fruits—threatens India's domestic producers. His demand that India halt Russian oil purchases in favor of pricier US alternatives further strains India's economy. Trump's rhetoric has also been humiliating. He has called India's economy 'dead' for not aligning with US economic interests and threatened 150–250% tariffs on India's pharmaceutical exports, a critical sector. Additionally, his deportation of Indian illegal immigrants via military aircraft and his repeated claim of halting India-Pakistan airstrikes in India's Operation Sindoor have embarrassed New Delhi. A particularly egregious slight was Trump's plan to host Modi alongside Pakistan's army chief at a White House dinner, an invitation Modi declined. These actions reflect a broader pattern of American exceptionalism, where the US seeks to subordinate India's ambitions to its hegemonic interests. What Modi fails to grasp is that friendship with America is like the Cuscuta plant (commonly known as dodder or amarbel in Hindi) — once it entwines itself around a tree, it eventually destroys its host. India has long prided itself on strategic autonomy, rooted in its non-aligned policy and balanced relations with global powers. Its participation in BRICS and continued trade with Russia and Iran bolster this narrative. However, the deepening US partnership, particularly through defense agreements, has eroded this autonomy. The US increasingly views India as a 'vassal state'—a nation that, while formally independent, aligns its foreign policy with a dominant power. The 2019 US pressure to halt Iranian oil imports, which India complied with, and current demands to reduce Russian oil purchases highlight this dynamic. India's compliance risks transforming it into a subordinate partner, undermining its multipolar aspirations. Modi's pro-Western tilt has exacerbated this vulnerability. By prioritizing US ties over regional partnerships like China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade bloc, India has isolated itself from alternative economic frameworks. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash with China, which greatly strained India-China relations, was a strategic misstep. Modi's decision to abandon earlier understandings from the 2018 Wuhan and 2019 Mahabalipuram summits with China, coupled with India's withdrawal from RCEP, reflects an overreliance on the US. This has left India economically exposed, particularly as US tariffs loom and trade deficits grow. India's strategic miscalculations under Modi's leadership are stark. Despite being the world's fifth-largest economy, with a GDP of approximately US$3.5 trillion in 2025, India lacks the economic and military heft of the US or China. Modi's government projected India as a $10 trillion economy by 2025, capable of rivaling China, but economic growth has fallen short. Unlike China, which adopted a 'Hide Your Strength, Bide Your Time' strategy until its economy surpassed $10 trillion, India has prematurely positioned itself as a global power. This hubris has invited US scrutiny, as rising powers challenging the hegemon are rarely tolerated. Modi's pro-Western orientation was partly fueled by Western media and leaders who lauded him as a global statesman, a narrative designed to draw India into the US-led order. India's strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its 1.4 billion population made it an attractive partner to counter China. However, this flattery obscured the risks of aligning too closely with the US. Modi's rejection of BRI and RCEP, driven by fears of Chinese economic dominance, has backfired. India's trade deficit with China has ballooned, and its absence from these frameworks has limited its regional influence. Meanwhile, the US has exploited India's alignment without offering reciprocal benefits, as evidenced by the withdrawal of American companies and now escalating tariffs. At the core of US-India tensions lies American exceptionalism—the belief that the US is the preeminent global power tasked with upholding its so-called rules-based order. Trump's 'America First' policy amplifies this, prioritizing US economic and strategic interests over allies' aspirations. India's own sense of exceptionalism, rooted in its ancient civilization and emerging power status, clashes with this framework on the global stage. India's pursuit of a multipolar world, through BRICS and ties with Russia and Iran, challenges US hegemony, making it a target for coercion. Henry Kissinger's adage— 'It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal'—rings especially true for India. The US seeks to limit India's autonomy, ensuring it remains a subordinate partner rather than an independent power. Trump's pressures—on trade, oil purchases, and agricultural markets—are designed to align India's policies with US interests, even at the cost of India's economic and strategic sovereignty. India faces a precarious future with limited options, each fraught with risks. The first is to maintain the status quo, enduring US insults and pressures while hoping for a shift in US leadership post-2028. However, even a Democratic administration is unlikely to deviate significantly from the current hegemonic approach, leaving India vulnerable to continued American coercion. For example, in April 2021—less than 100 days after Biden entered the White House—the US Navy's USS John Paul Jones conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) near the Lakshadweep Islands, inside India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), asserting navigational rights and freedoms in a move widely seen as a breach of India's sovereignty. The second option is to diversify partnerships with Russia, the European Union, the UK and emerging market economies to bolster strategic autonomy. This requires economic reforms to boost domestic consumption and replace US trade with alternative markets. However, this path risks short-term economic losses and demands bold policy shifts, which Modi's government has been reluctant to pursue. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, who served as the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, frequently highlighted the political challenges in implementing bold economic reforms in India. One of his notable observations was that 'There is a strong consensus in India for weak economic reforms,' reflecting the cautious, incremental approach often adopted due to political and social resistance to more radical changes. So Modi can't undertake radical reforms immediately. The third option involves accepting the US tariff in the short term while investing in military and economic capabilities to reduce dependence over time. This requires long-term planning and resilience, which India's current economic constraints may not support. A fourth, more radical option is to pivot toward regional frameworks like BRI and RCEP, deepening ties with China and the Global South. This would require overcoming domestic political resistance and addressing security concerns with China, a challenging prospect given the 2020 Galwan armed confrontation. However, such a move could enhance India's economic prospects and regional influence, leveraging its strategic location in the Indian Ocean. Finally, a theoretical but implausible option is to wage a trade war with the US, akin to China's approach. India lacks the strategic resources, technology and economic power to sustain such a trade war, making this unfeasible. Instead, India must adopt a pragmatic approach, learning from China's strategy of understated strength and strategic timing. In sum, the US-India relationship, once hailed as a strategic partnership, has devolved into a complex game of coercion and dependency. Trump's carrot-and-stick approach—enticing India with opening up the US economy, defense and technology transfers in the first term and imposing economic and diplomatic pressures in the second term—has exposed the fragility of India's strategic autonomy. Modi's pro-Western policy, driven by an overestimation of India's capabilities and an underestimation of US hegemonic ambitions, has placed India in a vulnerable position. To navigate this crisis, India must recalibrate its foreign policy, balancing relations with the US, China, Russia and other regional powers while accelerating domestic economic reforms. Failure to do so risks reducing India to a vassal state, undermining its aspirations to be an independent global power. The path forward demands diplomatic finesse, economic resilience and a sober reassessment of India's place in a multipolar world.
AllAfrica
3 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Trump-Putin summit to produce more dread than hope
It will be the moment Ukraine and its European supporters have been hoping for, but also one they have been dreading. The summit between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, which the White House and Kremlin have said will take place in Alaska on August 15, in theory, represents the best chance this year that America could put real pressure on Russia to stop its war on Ukraine. But, sadly and much more likely, it also represents the worst danger that Putin could sweet-talk Trump into selling out Ukraine's legitimate interests. Like Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky, the leaders of France, Germany, Britain and Italy have not been invited to the summit, as superpowers prefer to talk to each other alone, rather as if they own the world. But all the Europeans must make sure that their influence is present, firmly in the minds of both the Russian and the American presidents. And they will need to make it clear that a Putin-Trump deal over Ukraine without Ukraine's or its European neighbors' consent will be no deal at all. The prospects are not good. The latest demands made by Russia during lower-level talks with Ukraine in June left the two sides impossibly far apart. Those included Russia's demand that Ukraine should be 'demilitarized', that there should be no foreign armies involved in policing a ceasefire or protecting Ukraine, and that Russia should gain all the lands in eastern Ukraine that it has claimed, including areas it has failed to conquer. For Putin to abandon those demands in talks with Trump would represent a major climbdown — yet that climbdown is exactly what is needed if peace is ever to be achieved. As we have seen with tariffs, Trump's normal negotiating technique is to make bold demands and loud threats, in the hope that his opponents will be intimidated, allowing a deal to be struck somewhere Trump sees as being favorable to him. Yet for Russia, his technique has been neither bold nor loud. So far, it has not seemed at all designed to intimidate Putin into making compromises. This may be because he loves dictators like Putin more than he does democratically elected leaders. But it is also because in this case he is negotiating over lands, interests and above all people that are somebody else's, not his. So his definition of 'success' seems to pay little heed to the interests of Ukraine or its public opinion. This is illustrated by the fact that the few threats Trump has made towards Putin have been uncharacteristically vague and not terribly threatening. He has spoken rather unspecifically of being 'disappointed' at Putin, while saying quite softly that he is considering tougher economic sanctions on Russia while, strangely, imposing tariffs on American imports from some buyers of Russian oil, but not all, in the hope of hurting Russian revenues. India is wondering why it has been singled out for such punitive tariffs, leaving Turkey, China and other Russian customers untouched. Last month, Trump reversed course on a decision by his defense department to stop supplying Ukraine with weapons, but only on condition that European governments should pay for them. Moreover, the quantities of weapons so far involved do not represent a major threat to Russia. Some optimistic commentators have labeled Trump's change on this issue as a 'pivot' to Ukraine's side, but while the change was certainly welcome, it would be premature to see it as decisive. Ukrainians' and Europeans' greatest fear will be that in his desperation to come out of a summit looking like a peacemaker, Trump will be the one who makes concessions to Putin, not the other way around, and that Zelensky will find himself trapped in a position of having to oppose what he and the Ukrainian public see as an unacceptable peace. European leaders now need to work hard to reduce that danger. One way to do that would be immediately to announce further supplies of long-range missiles and other weapons systems to Ukraine, showing that the Europeans are determined that the Ukrainians will continue to be able to fight back and to hurt Russia badly for however long the war goes on. Another way would be to use the days before the summit to communicate clearly to Trump and his staff what Ukraine's, and hence also the Europeans', priorities will be in any negotiation. European diplomats could also mutter, unofficially of course, that if America sells Ukraine out, then it can go whistle for the US$600 billion of energy, defense purchases and investments that Trump has claimed the EU has agreed to make in America. Trump's claim was largely imaginary in any case, but it clearly mattered a lot to him, so threatening to make it clear that such investments and purchases will now never happen might make him cautious. The main reason why the EU chose not to retaliate against Trump's tariffs and to go along with his claim about investments is that it couldn't afford to risk losing American support for Ukraine. If that motive disappears, the gloves can come off. Territory should be the easiest issue to set clear rules for in any peace negotiation. Ukraine has already made it clear that it can accept a ceasefire that freezes the lands already occupied by the Russians, even if it will be unwilling to sign any permanent treaty ceding those territories to Russia. But neither Europeans nor Ukrainians would accept Russian occupation of any lands the Russians do not currently hold. Immediately after Trump started talking airily of 'swapping of territories', Zelensky stated unequivocally that Ukrainians are 'not willing to gift their land to the occupier.' Second, the Europeans can make it clear that there is zero chance that a country that has been invaded and has seen hundreds of thousands of its citizens killed is going to accept any form of 'demilitarization', which would simply leave it vulnerable to a new invasion. The 'reassurance force' of troops and aircraft to be assembled by France, Britain and other members of the 30-country 'coalition of the willing' must be allowed to enter Ukraine and help to enforce the ceasefire. Otherwise, no ceasefire agreement can be expected to last for more than a few months. Putin's demands that Ukraine should be barred from joining NATO are the easiest to agree to: there is no chance of it joining anyway for as long as Trump is in the White House, and no promise made now can bind Trump's successors. But there is no reason why this should also exclude the presence in Ukraine of the foreign 'reassurance force.' A third issue that Europeans should encourage Trump to highlight at the summit is Russia's abduction during the war of an estimated 35,000 Ukrainian children. Russia has held these children to undermine morale in Ukraine. By highlighting the issue in a high-profile international setting, Trump would have a chance of embarrassing Putin, even though the ex-KGB agent is not easily embarrassed. There should be no chance in any case of agreeing to drop war crimes indictments against Putin and Russia's military leaders, but the issue of the abducted children should surely be the clincher on this, even for Trump. Plenty of his pro-Ukrainian Republican Party backers should be persuadable to come out on Ukraine's side on this. The biggest question lying behind this summit is whether Putin will arrive feeling he is in a strong or weak position. Trump's soft treatment of him will doubtless make Putin feel confident. However, Russia's attempts this summer to win more Ukrainian territory have largely failed, meaning that the Russian military's estimated by some as one million or more casualties in this war have occurred for little benefit. Some economists think that with the global oil price below US$70, the Russian economy is showing signs of strain. Putin really ought to feel weak, even if he will do his best not to show it. Europeans can and should brief Trump about how weak Putin's position really is. Let us be realistic: the forthcoming summit, if it actually takes place, is unlikely to produce any sudden move toward a credible peace. The best we can hope for is for the summit to begin a process that would consist of several events during the next few months at which the pressure on Russia can be steadily increased, changing Putin's calculations and those of the people around him about the benefits of continuing to fight. The worst outcome would be a public row between Ukraine, European leaders and America over the shape of a future peace deal. Nonetheless, one thing is clear: no one, including even Russia, should want this war to continue into 2026. This article first appeared on Bill Emmott's Global View Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here .
AllAfrica
4 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Trump-Putin meeting speculation a road to nowhere
Speculation is rife about the upcoming Donald Trump-Vladimir Putin meeting in Alaska, the leaders' first meeting during the second Trump administration. Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine is deeply fraught because he thinks the Trump-Zelensky deal will involve (give away?) Ukrainian territory. Zelensky says no way. Meanwhile, the Europeans, those countries that cannot defend themselves on their own and will never be able to do so because of their cumulative incompetence, are demanding a seat at the table where they intend to scuttle any deal. The Europeans were not invited, but Trump sent Vice President J.D. Vance to mollycoddle them. He will do as instructed by his boss. He apparently says that a Trump-Putin deal should be based on current battle lines. Other than that, we only have wild speculation on what any Trump-Putin deal will look like. We are operating in the dark. Trump and Putin want to talk about Ukraine and possible strategic issues between Russia and the United States. Putin's and Russia's goals are clear and unambiguous. There is little doubt Trump knows exactly what they are. To remind him, Russian politicians, with Putin in the lead, repeat them often. What do we know? Putin and Trump's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, spent three hours, more or less, talking over the issues. As was evident from the brief video released by the Kremlin, Putin warmly welcomed Witkoff, all smiles. This tells us there was a lot of preliminary work done through various diplomatic channels. None of these channels included Ukraine or any European leader. Still, Putin and Witkoff needed three hours to achieve some precision in what had previously been discussed, and no doubt they were laser-focused on the issues. The outcome was enough for Trump to praise the Witkoff-Putin meeting, and a meeting between the two heads of state was agreed. (Anyone who claims to know what was said in detail is smoking the New York Times.) Beyond that, we know that Trump wants a deal that ends the fighting, so whatever was worked out includes an end to the fighting. Some could call it a Ukrainian capitulation (which is precisely what Zelensky thinks he is fighting against); in Trump's language, though, it would be a ceasefire But there would be no further reason for the two leaders to meet unless there were many other parts to the deal that they are trying to conclude. It is the 'other parts' that are intriguing and unknown, even though everyone thinks they know what they don't know. (Parts are not parts in this context.) Everyone knows, and Zelensky vociferously confirms, that Zelensky cannot agree to any territorial concessions. It is hard to figure out any workaround that would bring Zelensky on board, and it may well be that no other prospective Ukrainian leaders could agree either (unless they were stooges of the Russians, and then they would have a short life span). From Zelensky's point of view, which is probably no longer supported by the Ukrainian public that is increasingly tired of the war and the casualties, giving up territory would signal the collapse of Ukraine's army, making Ukraine subject to full Russian control. The Russians say they do not want to control Ukraine, that Putin wants a neutral and peaceful Ukrainian neighbor with only a small army and with no NATO membership. Oddly enough, a peaceful Ukraine would strategically suit Europe, which needs at least a decade to get its armed forces and defense industries in order. That is, of course, if you buy all the claims being made by European countries (UK, France and Germany especially) and by the EU that they are going to build a strong fortress Europe and support Ukraine all-in, as if they have the resources and will to make any of this happen. If you think it may be a scam, you are likely on the right track: Europe's objective is to get the US to provide the real security backbone for the continent. Meanwhile, the money flowing into European defense companies is more designed to provide employment (jobs) rather than to build weapons. The latest indicator is that the Italian government has asked its flagship defense company, Leonardo, to figure out how to spend a windfall of euros, so they will find some gold-plated, irrelevant solutions to meet a political and economic need. It is also clear, though, that the 'big' European governments, and the EU itself, are in a lot of political trouble. The ridiculous low polling of Britain's Labor government shows, as Henny Penny said, the sky is falling. The current gaggle of European leaders – Germany, France, UK, Poland (maybe not Italy) – is not likely to last, at most, a few years, after which conservative, nationalist governments will replace them. Thinking that these in-power leaders can really arrange the future is not believable. For Trump, the problem is a different one. In a perfect world, he would like to settle the Ukraine war and stabilize the US's role in Europe, which is nearly impossible because of the European leadership clique. But beyond that, Trump wants to counter China, and he needs to find a way to pull Russia away from its strategic alignment with the Beijing behemoth. That is one of the big reasons he wants to court Putin. Trump has leverage: he can help Russia restart its economy by lifting sanctions and making investments. He can share 'big tech', including American AI. There is a risk in doing so, but either Russia gets the technology from China or from the United States. Trump's real secret weapon is to restore Russia's legitimacy as not just a leader of failed states such as North Korea and Iran. But Trump may not be able to fashion a package that will have US domestic support, let alone anything forthcoming in a positive direction from Europe. We really don't know if he is even serious or if he is setting Putin up. The captive Western press, unfortunately, has it all backwards: they think Putin has Trump in the palm of his hand. This is nonsense and terribly misleading. Trump has more cards than Putin, though both like poker. We have to wait and see how all this plays out – whether any success comes from the upcoming meeting, or the failure in Ukraine is left to the two fighting forces to settle somehow. But speculation for now is folly. Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
