C Raja Mohan writes: When Trump meets Putin, hurdles crossed and yet to come

Indian Express

14 hours ago

That Vladimir Putin is being hosted on American soil this week — after a decade of deep tensions —marks a significant moment in the shifting relations between the United States, Russia, Europe, and China. The Alaska peace talks on Ukraine, alongside broader discussions on US-Russia ties between President Donald Trump and Putin, could have far-reaching consequences for Eurasian security and the global order. India, now facing a 25 per cent additional tariff on exports to the US because of its Russian oil imports, has a direct stake in the summit's outcome. PM Narendra Modi called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to reaffirm India's support for the peace process.
Putin's last visit to the US was in 2015 for a UN summit, when he met President Obama on the margins. Subsequent meetings with US presidents took place in third countries — Helsinki in 2018 and Geneva in 2021. His last formal White House summit was in 2005.
Since the late 2000s, US-Russia relations have steadily worsened, fuelled by NATO's eastward expansion, Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2022. Given two decades of political hostility toward Russia in the US, suspicions within the American 'deep state' that Trump is a Russian asset, and Democratic attempts to impeach him in his first term, the decision to host Putin is a bold political move.
That, in turn, is rooted in Trump's worldview. Three elements stand out. First, Trump has consistently signalled a desire to break from Washington's entrenched antagonism to Russia and bear the political cost. Constrained in his first term, he now appears determined to explore a different relationship.
Second is Trump's claim to be the 'peace president'. In 2024, he claimed the invasion would not have occurred if he were president and that he could end it 'on day one.' In his January 2025 inaugural address, he declared: 'We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end — and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.' This aligns with the MAGA movement's rejection of 'endless wars' and focus on rebuilding the homeland.
Third is Trump's instinct to link peace with profit. His ideas — turning Gaza into a resort, securing mineral rights in Ukraine, exploring business with Russia or selling Pakistani oil to India — reflect a 'peace-for-profit' logic. If the Alaska summit produces a deal, expect significant commercial components.
Trump's Ukraine envoy Steve Witkoff and Putin aide Kirill Dmitriev have been developing 'peace-for-business' proposals. These centre on de-escalation in exchange for commercial openings between the US and Russia. Core areas involve structured oil and LNG flows, protections for energy infrastructure, and penalties if hostilities resume. Arctic cooperation is also on the table. Another track explores controlled trade in critical minerals and rare earths.
Significant hurdles remain in the pursuit of peace for profit: Political resistance in Congress and Europe, and Kyiv's opposition to arrangements that reward aggression. More challenging are the structural problems in the complex negotiations over ending the war.
The summit's format excludes Ukraine and sidelines Europe, raising doubts about legitimacy and durability. Efforts are being made to engage the Europeans and include Zelenskyy in some form, but the essential dilemma remains — whether to pursue a rapid ceasefire that freezes current lines or a slower process that secures broader legitimacy. Meanwhile, Putin's emphasis is on direct talks with Trump.
Five intertwined issues are at the heart of the peace talks: First is the question of a ceasefire — an immediate, verifiable halt to hostilities, with clearly agreed lines of control. Next comes territory and sovereignty: Russia seeks recognition, or at least de facto acceptance, of its control over Crimea and the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, while Ukraine firmly rejects any land-for-peace arrangement.
The third issue is security architecture, with Moscow demanding binding limits on Ukraine's NATO membership, Western bases, and arms supplies, and Kyiv insisting on its sovereign right to choose its alignments. Fourth is sanctions relief: Russia wants rapid easing, but the West insists that meaningful concessions must come first. Finally, there is enforcement — credible monitoring mechanisms, withdrawal schedules, buffer zones, and dispute-resolution arrangements to prevent any agreement from collapsing. Each of these issues is difficult to resolve to the satisfaction of all parties. Any one can derail the peace talks.
To complicate matters, the stakeholders of peace have divergent positions. Trump wants a quick and big 'win', but some in the administration and many in Washington insist on caution. Moscow is seeking a durable settlement in which the Russian role in European security is secured. It wants to block NATO expansion and seeks a say in Ukraine's internal order. Kyiv demands full sovereignty and the freedom to choose its security partners.
Europe is split on tactics: Some urge 'ceasefire first', others insist on Ukraine's place at the table and reject unilateral concessions. European leaders fear Trump and Putin could cut a 'Yalta-style' bargain over their heads, but they have limited leverage in persuading Trump. Beijing is also wary that a US-Russia rapprochement might free Washington to concentrate pressure on China in Asia.
For India, reconciliation between Washington and Moscow is welcome. The Russia-West conflict has historically strengthened China and Pakistan, constraining India's regional policies. Delhi hoped Trump's pursuit of peace with Russia would align with its interests. But India has now become collateral damage in Trump's bid to pressure Moscow into a deal. Failure in Alaska would be bad news for India; success, however, would not guarantee tariff relief. Trump has embraced tariffs as a diplomatic and political weapon and may continue to use them against India.
It would be ironic if Delhi's long-standing bet on Moscow left it in a position where US-Russia ties improve while its own troubles with Washington persist. This would not be unprecedented. During the detente of the 1970s, the USSR's focus was on managing the global order in partnership with the US. After the Cold War, Russia ignored its old friends in favour of building partnerships with the US and Europe. It took more than a decade to restore India's close ties to Moscow. The lesson for Delhi is clear: It cannot take any great power for granted, but must strive to develop independent relations with all of them. Ukraine is a stark reminder that India should not get drawn into great power conflict, despite the transient opportunities that may present themselves.
The writer is distinguished fellow at the Council on Strategic and Defence Research and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express