Helpline activated to assist Telangana residents residing or traveling in affected regions
In view of the escalating geopolitical tensions and military developments in the Middle East, particularly between Iran and Israel, Telangana government has activated a dedicated helpline at Telangana Bhavan, New Delhi, to assist and respond swiftly to any concerns related to the State residents who may be currently residing or traveling in the affected regions.
Also read: Israel-Iran conflict updates on June 17, 2025
'As per the latest available inputs from the Ministry of External Affairs and Indian Embassies abroad, no Telangana citizens have been reported as directly impacted as of now. However, as a proactive measure, the helpline has been set up to offer guidance, collect information, and extend support to families or individuals who may require assistance or wish to report concerns,' as per a press note issued on Tuesday (June 17, 2025).
The helpline numbers
For any support or information, people can reach out to Vandhana at +919871999044; G. Rakshith Naik, liaison officer at +919643723157; Javed Hussain, liaison officer at +919910014749 and CH. Chakravarthi, public relations officer at +919949351270.
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