It makes the world more dangerous

Indian Express

6 hours ago

In the mid-1950s, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, initiated the country's nuclear journey. Amidst stiff opposition from its principal supporter, the United States, and with discreet help from France, Tel Aviv built its nuclear programme by the end of the 1960s. Today, Israel is widely known as a non-declared nuclear weapons state. This exclusive status is often compared to Iran's nuclear programme of today, which was targeted by US President Donald Trump on June 22 as B-2 stealth bombers of the US Air Force dropped 14,000 kg bunker-buster bombs on three of the country's nuclear sites — Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
Iran's nuclear programme has been the centre of delicate political brinkmanship for years. It began under the rule of the former pro-West Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and was pitched as civilian in nature, developed around former US President Dwight D Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' initiative. Tehran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, committing to not attaining nuclear weapon capabilities. All its Arab neighbours are also signatories to the NPT. Internationally, only a handful of nations, including Israel, India, and Pakistan, remain outside the agreement's ambit. In 2003, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons. This, within Iranian polity, is seen as strong an indictment against nuclear weapons as possible coming straight from the ideological leadership. But today, Iran may be on the cusp of exiting the NPT.
A broader nuclearisation of West Asia has been a subject of discussion for many years, and in more contemporary times, Iran has been at the centre of this. Tehran's nuclear brinkmanship could arguably be more related to protecting and sustaining the political system set up post the 1979 Islamic Revolution than the bomb itself. It used this strategy to pull in Western powers, negotiate, and mainstream the state back into the international system via the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.
However, questions over its enrichment activities under the NPT have lingered for years, raising suspicion, fear, and anxiety about Iran's intent, especially in Israel. Over the years, Israel has publicly raised fears that Iran was rushing towards a nuclear weapon as it pushed back against the JCPOA. Under Trump, Israel eventually found success, as whispers about intelligence suggesting Iran had materials to build nine warheads reached Trump's ears. Trump ignored even his own intelligence apparatus, which had aired doubts.
The Israel-Iran conflict is now central to the region's security debate. While speculation continues over the kind of damage the US air strikes have really caused, and how much of a setback has been dealt to potential weaponisation, the path forward could also accelerate nuclearisation instead of deterring it. The impact of nuclear weapons dictating the strategic calculus in West Asia will
not be geographically limited — it will be global. Arguments around the validity of nuclear weapons and their relationship to the protection of sovereignty and power cannot be dismissed. Especially at a time when international norms put in place predominantly by the West after World War II face a potential collapse. The latter is giving rise to a strategic calculus of 'might is right' for the future. And there is no better deterrence than a nuclear weapon. Recently, North Korea has proved this.
Whether Iran remains adamant on gaining nuclear deterrence is an open-ended question after the recent strikes. Israel will do its best to preserve its newfound status as the region's primary military power. Irrespective of who holds power in Tehran — moderates, conservatives or ultra-conservatives — the probability of a unanimous view that nuclear weaponisation is the only way to prevent a repeat of June 2025 may solidify. And if this happens, a domino effect could play out where nuclear shields — one Arab, one Iranian, and a publicly acknowledged Israeli one — cannot be discounted.
Former prime minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto perhaps best described a cornered state's vision of what nuclear capabilities can provide and how it can be marketed to a population. In 1977, according to various accounts, Bhutto said, 'A Jewish bomb, a Christian bomb, now a Hindu bomb. Why not an Islamic bomb?' Pakistan is the only nuclear Islamic country, and its know-how in this regard is widely accepted to be transferable to its Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia if need be. In the end, attaining nuclear weapons in today's day and age is not a technical challenge but a political decision that has long-lasting ramifications. West Asia should make such a decision cautiously and wisely.
The writer is deputy director and fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation