Lt Gen. (retd.) D.S. Hooda on the Pahalgam Attack: Strategic Failures, Pakistan's Role, and India's Response Options

The Hindu

04-05-2025

Published : May 03, 2025 17:48 IST - 8 MINS READ
In September 2016, the Indian Army carried out a surgical strike across the Line of Control (LoC) targeting terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir in response to the deadly Uri attack. This high-risk counterterrorism operation, executed by the elite Para Special Forces, was overseen by Lt Gen. (retd.) D.S. Hooda, then General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Northern Command. Over a distinguished four-decade-long career in the Indian Army, Lt. Gen. Hooda has tackled critical security challenges along India's borders with both Pakistan and China. In an interview with Frontline,Lt Gen. Hooda, currently Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group and co-founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, spoke about the rising tensions between India and Pakistan in the wake of the Pahalgam attack. Excerpts:
The Pahalgam attack has been attributed to a significant intelligence failure. What specific measures could have been taken to prevent such a security lapse?
After every high-profile attack, there is talk of intelligence failure and security lapses. I don't think there is any lack of effort on the part of the security forces. The terrorists are also always probing for some vulnerabilities and weak spots. In this case, a more aggressive area domination of tourist spots could perhaps have prevented this attack. But then hindsight makes every flaw obvious.
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In the past, you have stated that both ground operations and aerial strikes remain viable options for retaliation. Given India's enhanced capabilities since the 2016 surgical strikes you led, what form do you think a military response to the Pahalgam attack might take?
The form will be decided by the political leadership in consultation with the military. I would only state that the use of military force is not off the table. In this, both ground and air forces could be employed in a manner that fulfills the objectives that have been planned to be achieved.
The Pahalgam attack has intensified calls to revisit India's counterterrorism policy in Jammu and Kashmir. What key changes or innovations in policy and tactics could strengthen India's ability to pre-empt and respond to such attacks?
India's counterterrorism strategy has stood the test of time. We have seen a steady decline in violence in Jammu and Kashmir in the last few years. However, refinements must constantly be made. One urgent need is to have a much more technology-enabled border fence that could help cut down infiltration from Pakistan. I also think there is a need for greater outreach towards the local population, whose support is needed if terrorism is to be eradicated.
The government has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty and taken diplomatic measures post the Pahalgam attack. How effective are these non-military actions in addressing Pakistan's role in cross-border terrorism?
Deterring Pakistan from using terrorism as an instrument of state policy requires a comprehensive approach that includes both military and non-military actions. Holding the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance is a powerful message that has far-reaching consequences for Pakistan's water security. That is why you have seen panicky reactions from Pakistani leaders.
'An urgent need is to have a much more technology-enabled border fence that could help cut down infiltration from Pakistan.'
Given Pakistan's recent suspension of the 1972 Simla Agreement in response to India's actions, what are the potential consequences for India-Pakistan relations, particularly regarding the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir?
This is a typical knee-jerk reaction with little thought to the consequences. The LoC was created and mutually drawn on maps after the 1971 war. The Simla Agreement states that neither side shall seek to alter the LoC unilaterally. If the agreement is void, there would be no respect for the LoC, and tensions would vastly increase as both sides are free to secure territory across the LoC.
Do you see any link between the Pahalgam attack and Pakistan Army chief General Asim Munir's public speech about the 'two-nation theory', where he stated that Muslims and Hindus are two different nations and Kashmir is Pakistan's 'jugular vein'? The Pahalgam attack targeted civilians, particularly Hindu tourists, seemingly to inflame communal tensions within India.
There is a definite link between the Pahalgam attack and General Munir's rant. The terrorists have used the playbook described by General Munir in which he sought to distinguish the identity of the two countries on the basis of religion. The terrorists also specifically singled out Hindu tourists before brutally killing them. Despite Pakistani denials that they have no role in the Pahalgam attack, it is evident that this is a deliberate provocation engineered by Pakistan's military leadership.
Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has warned of a potential 'all-out war' following the attack while also admitting, in a recent interview with Sky News, to past support for terrorism. Asif has admitted Pakistan's history of supporting, training, and funding terrorist organisations as 'dirty work' for the West, a mistake for which he said Pakistan had suffered.
The use of terror groups has been the main element of their strategy in contesting stronger neighbours. Despite suffering enormously from the 'snakes in their backyard', as Hillary Clinton famously said, Pakistan has not abandoned its support to terrorist organisations. The military, having nurtured these groups, is also not in a position to abandon them, as it would face a radical backlash as witnessed after the Lal Masjid siege of 2007. Maybe the 'dirty work' was done for the West, but Pakistan was a very willing partner and also did its own dirty work.
Given Pakistan Minister Hanif Abbasi's nuclear threat post Pahalgam, how should India strategically respond to ensure deterrence, manage escalation risks, and maintain regional stability?
Pakistan regularly flashes the nuclear card to throw up the spectre of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia if India uses military force against it. This narrative is now sounding like a broken record and has run its course. I do not think it will deter India from employing the military option, just as it did in 2016 and 2019.
'The open protests by the people in Kashmir rejecting terrorism is a very good sign. The government should use this opportunity to find ways to reinforce this sentiment.'
The attack has reignited debates about the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35(A) and its impact on Kashmir's security. Do you believe the changed political landscape in Jammu and Kashmir has influenced the nature or frequency of such attacks?
We should be careful about linking the larger issue of Article 370 with this attack. It is, in fact, the improving security landscape in Jammu and Kashmir in the last few years that has prompted this massacre. The terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan wish to instil fear and create a perception of insecurity in the general public. That is their sole aim, and it has little to do with the political landscape.
This is possibly the first time that people in Kashmir have openly protested against a terrorist attack. But the attack has also raised concerns about the radicalisation of local youth and their potential involvement in such operations. From your perspective, what long-term strategies should be adopted to counter radicalisation in Jammu and Kashmir?
The open protests by the people in Kashmir rejecting terrorism is a very good sign. The government should use this opportunity to find ways to reinforce this sentiment and diminish local support for terrorists.
On the issue of radicalisation, we need a comprehensive approach focussing on madrasa education, community involvement, the assistance of Muslim clerics, identification of potential threats, and enhancing resilience against radicalisation through a compelling counter-narrative.
The government has responded swiftly. The Indus Waters Treaty has been held in abeyance 'until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism'. This has already created panic in Pakistan. Prime Minister [Narendra] Modi's speech in Bihar is a clear indication that India will take strong steps against Pakistan, and we could see further action in the coming days.
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How can India leverage international support to pressure Pakistan to address cross-border terrorism more effectively?
Among other steps, India will definitely attempt to put international pressure on Pakistan. We can use institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Action Task Force to pressure Pakistan. With a fragile economy, Pakistan is vulnerable to actions by these institutions. However, we should not expect that international pressure alone will be sufficient for Pakistan Army generals to have a change of heart.
What long-term strategy should India adopt to establish what experts call a 'ruthless and fearsome deterrence' against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism while avoiding a full-scale war?
We need a comprehensive, long-term strategy for deterring Pakistan from using terrorism against India. Some argue that the Pakistan Army has such deep-rooted hostility against India that deterrence is not possible. However, India today has immense comprehensive national power as compared to Pakistan. A consistent approach applying all instruments—military, diplomatic, and economic—can yield results if applied as a part of a well-thought-out strategy.