French TV regulator orders Eutelsat to stop broadcasting two Russian channels
By Alban Kacher
(Reuters) - French media regulator Arcom has ordered Eutelsat to cease broadcasting Russian channels STS and Channel 5, after a probe revealed the satellite provider's commercial agreements had links to a sanctioned entity.
The formal notice follows an investigation prompted by requests from several non-governmental organizations that the broadcasting watchdog should take action against Eutelsat.
"These channels are controlled by the Russian company JSC National Media Group, whose financial resources have been frozen ... which entails a ban on their distribution," Arcom said in a statement on Friday.
National Media Group, Russia's largest private media holding company, has been subject to European sanctions since December 2022.
"Eutelsat scrupulously respects ARCOM's directives, and this request will be implemented as soon as possible," the group said in an emailed statement.
Eutelsat added National Media Group was not its direct customer, but that of an intermediary distributor.
STS and Channel 5 are broadcast through Eutelsat's capacity on the Eutelsat 36C satellite, operated by Russian Satellite Communications Company (RSCC).
The company has three days to stop broadcasting them, Arcom said, after which the regulator could trigger a sanction procedure leading to an eventual fine.
During the investigation, Arcom also notified several internet providers of the presence of irregular content on their platforms, which was then withdrawn, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters.
The regulator is still investigating several other channels that were reported to it as not conforming with sanctions, the source said.
Eutelsat said that to its knowledge, there were no other channels targeted by Arcom at the present.
French NGO Comité Diderot welcomed Arcom's decision, but noted it applied only to 21 of the 190 frequencies it had indicated to the watchdog in November.
"In our view, priority should have been given to the Russian army's three Zvezda channels and the Orthodox Church's Spas channel," Comité Diderot's coordinator André Lange told reporters.
In 2022, Eutelsat stopped broadcasting three Russian TV channels after Arcom urged it to do so.
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