Jirga brokers deal on Torkham reopening
Members of Pakistani delegation arrive after holding talks with the Afghan side on the opening of the Torkham border crossing. Photo: Express
The Torkham border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is set to reopen on Tuesday (today) after successful talks during a jirga between designated religious, political, and tribal elders from both sides, the head of the Pakistani delegation announced on Monday.
Pakistan delegation head Syed Jawad Hussain Kazmi told The Express Tribune that the Afghan side also agreed to halt illegal construction, and both parties decided that any future construction at the disputed border point would only proceed with mutual consensus.
The Torkham border was closed on February 21 following rising tensions between the border forces of the two neighbouring countries due to unauthorized construction by Afghan authorities near the border, violating a prior agreement.
The situation escalated on March 4 when talks for reopening the crossing failed, leading to an exchange of fire between Pakistani security forces and the Afghan Taliban fighters. The clash resulted in the death of one Afghan border guard and injuries to two others.
The 24-day closure of the border had resulted in the suspension of all movements, affecting trade and travel. However, with the latest agreement, both sides appeared committed to resolving their differences and reopening the border for mutual benefit.
The latest round of talks was held at the Commissionery building on the Afghan side of the border. At the talks, the Pakistan side was led by Kazmi. "The two sides have agreed to the resumption of trade and people's crossing," Kazmi said.
"The Afghan side also agreed that illegal construction would also be halted on Afghan side, and the message of Islamabad would also be delivered to the authorities. The [Pak-Afghan] Joint Chamber of Commerce [JCC] has also agreed that the two sides would also stick to the ceasefire," he added.
The Afghan media also confirmed the reopening of the border from Tuesday (today). TOLO news reported on its website that the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment (ACCI) had announced the agreement on the reopening of the Torkham crossing.
"A meeting was held today in Torkham between both sides. The decisions made were positive, and it is likely that the crossing will reopen today or tomorrow," TOLOnews quotd a trader, Zalmai Azimi, as saying. "Torkham will reopen tomorrow [today] for all types of movement under this agreement."
Khaamapress, another Afghan media outlet, quoted officials from the Chamber of Commerce and Investment in Nangarhar as saying that traders and tribal elders from both countries had reached an agreement to reopen the Torkham border crossing on Tuesday (today).
"Following today's meeting, the Torkham border will officially reopen for transit tomorrow. This will allow free movement of goods and people across the border, bringing much-needed relief to the people who rely on this crossing for trade and travel," the report stated.
The Pakistani officials told The Express Tribune that all sorts of trade, including the transit trade, remained halted during the 24-day closure of the border. The cumulative losses to the national kitty because of the closure amounted to $72 million, an official said speaking on condition of anonymity.
The reopening of the border would be welcome news for approximately 2 million people on both sides who wanted to cross over ahead of the Eidul Fitr. According to the officials, 10,000 people cross the Torkham border point every day.
(WITH INPUT FROM NEWS DESK)
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Express Tribune
44 minutes ago
- Express Tribune
Auto sector divided on new budget
Listen to article Auto sector experts and consultants expressed serious reservations about the finance minister's budget speech and called for reviewing the federal budget before seeking approval from the National Assembly (NA). Talking to The Express Tribune, Auto Sector Expert Mashood Khan said the finance minister's budget speech closely mirrors the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) recommendations. The downward trend in additional customs duty, regulatory duty and customs duty will likely hit local manufacturing instead of exports in the future. Severe consequences for the local manufacturing industry may be predicted and witnessed. Without a thriving domestic industry, the import bill will surge, and foreign reserves will take a hit. The auto parts and other manufacturing sectors will face major challenges. It is unclear how exports will increase without a robust local industry. "I urge the federal finance minister to revisit the budget before seeking approval from the National Assembly. Without a supportive industrialisation policy, local manufacturing will struggle, and exports will suffer," he said. Moreover, Economic Strategist and Regional Expert Dr Mehmoodul Hassan Khan said the pledges for the creation of effective incentives and essential tax exemptions for the adoption and use of electric vehicles (EVs), contributing to the national goal of 30% penetration for new passenger EV sales and 50% for two- and three-wheelers by 2030, represent a paradigm shift towards a massive green transformation. Additionally, reducing taxes on five-year-old vehicles is a step in the right direction, making imports more affordable, which would provide some much-needed financial relief to common consumers in the country. The introduction of a holistic and comprehensive reform package, mainly gradually phasing out additional customs duty on vehicles and reducing regulatory duties, will also be beneficial for the local auto industry, creating a strategic balance between local and imported automobiles. The government's recommendation that no new regulatory duties be imposed on the auto sector and its proposal for an annual 10% reduction in tariffs on used vehicles is a constructive step having multiplier effects. The easy and smooth mechanism of issuance of licenses to 57 EV manufacturers for the production of two- and three-wheeler electric vehicles vividly reflects the strategic priority of the government in reducing carbon footprints and inching towards carbon neutrality. Meanwhile, contrary to the above-cited views, another leading automobile consultant and expert, Shafiq Ahmed Shaikh, said: "In my opinion, the federal budget is good and balanced. With reference to the auto sector, the recommended National Tariff Programme with the plan is good for Pakistan and a requirement of today. As I foresee, by gradually lowering import duties, in the future it will not only stabilise the local and international markets but also have to be competitive with the global industry." He said under the proposed tariff, the duties would come down to 15% from the current 20% over five years, whereas additional customs duty and regulatory duty will also be phased out. The government also plans to eliminate the Fifth Schedule and lower the maximum slab rate to 15%. This is a good overhauling of the trade regime and will definitely foster export-led growth. This was also the requirement of the IMF, which seeks to bring Pakistan's tariff structures in line with global norms. Now, through revolutionary changes, not only will policy stabilisation come, but easy access to international supply chains will also be opened. "At present, this sector contributes around 4% of total tax revenue. I foresee that by taking the tariff rationalisation route, more revenue will be generated," he said.
Express Tribune
3 hours ago
- Express Tribune
India, ISKP and BLA: Pakistan's multi-front security challenge
The writer is a public policy analyst based in Lahore. She can be reached at durdananajam1@ Listen to article In recent years, Pakistan has grappled with an evolving security landscape marked by a resurgence of terrorism and foreign interference. From the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) to the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), and with India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) allegedly backing these elements, the threats are no longer isolated. They form part of a broader, transnational effort to undermine Pakistan's internal cohesion, divert its strategic focus and erode its sovereignty. At the heart of these challenges lies a sophisticated matrix of proxy warfare, disinformation campaigns and ideological subversion, designed to weaken Pakistan's state apparatus and inflame ethnic and sectarian divisions. Pakistan's commitment to countering terrorism has been evident in recent counter-intelligence successes. The arrest of an ISKP recruiter in coordination with Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) signals a proactive approach to dismantling terror networks. However, gains like these are frequently offset by persistent external interference. RAW's support to insurgent groups such as the BLA and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) reportedly extends beyond financial and logistical assistance. It includes strategic disinformation campaigns aimed at fostering mistrust within Pakistani society and delegitimising state institutions. By exploiting regional grievances — particularly in Balochistan and former tribal areas — these actors seek to provoke unrest and delegitimise constitutional authority. Such asymmetric tactics are not unique, but the scale and precision of their execution suggest a long-term strategy to destabilise Pakistan from within. The manipulation of nationalist sentiments and radical religious narratives is central to this objective, positioning Pakistan as a battleground for ideological and geopolitical contests. While ideological differences exist between groups like ISKP and BLA, they converge on one objective: undermining the Pakistani state. Rivalries between such factions may occasionally result in infighting, but their collective impact remains deeply destabilising. These groups exploit porous borders, weak governance in remote regions and access to digital platforms to sustain their operations. The fragmentation of these networks does not reduce the threat; instead, it signals a dangerous adaptability. Their volatility, combined with the external backing they receive, fuels a cycle of violence with repercussions far beyond Pakistan's borders. The result is not only domestic insecurity but also a regional spillover — disrupted trade routes, refugee inflows and diminished prospects for regional cooperation. The persistence of such conditions limits Pakistan's ability to assert itself diplomatically and economically within South Asia. Pakistan faces an existential threat, not merely through armed incursions or terrorist attacks but through strategic hybrid warfare. The tools of this conflict are disinformation, cyber subversion and proxy militancy — each aimed at fragmenting Pakistan's national identity and weakening its institutions. This multi-pronged approach serves broader geopolitical aims: to contain Pakistan's strategic outreach, curtail its role in regional diplomacy and deter foreign investment. The cost is not only economic — it is societal, institutional and psychological. A state that must perpetually defend its legitimacy at home finds it difficult to project influence abroad. Addressing these complex challenges requires more than tactical responses. While intelligence coordination and counter-terrorism operations remain crucial, the broader strategy must be structural, long-term and rooted in resilience. First, Pakistan must continue to modernise its security and intelligence infrastructure. This includes enhanced cyber surveillance, predictive analytics and robust counter-disinformation architecture. Investment in these capabilities would strengthen the state's ability to detect, deter and disrupt both internal threats and foreign interference. Second, a sustained policy of regional engagement is essential. While strategic competition with India may persist, Pakistan must continue building alliances with regional actors — particularly those with shared concerns about terrorism and cyber threats. Intelligence sharing, joint operations and diplomatic convergence, such as seen with Turkey and China, offer a pathway to collective security. Third, internal consolidation is paramount. Socio-economic disparities, especially in regions like Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, continue to serve as recruitment grounds for extremist groups. Development, however, must be matched with political inclusion, institutional reform and restoration of state legitimacy through accountable governance. Lastly, the narrative domain must not be ceded. Pakistan must invest in strategic communication — amplifying voices of national unity, countering propaganda and promoting critical media literacy. Civil society, academic institutions and religious leaders all have roles to play in rebuilding a national consensus rooted in pluralism and constitutionalism. Pakistan's security dilemma is no longer confined to its borders. The instability it faces is both a consequence and a driver of wider regional volatility. If left unaddressed, the current trajectory could precipitate broader strategic disorder across South Asia. By consolidating internal strength, refining external partnerships and investing in long-term social resilience, Pakistan can reposition itself not merely as a state under siege but as a proactive agent of regional stability — one that places sovereignty at the centre, balances coercive capability with socio-political outreach and embeds national security within a framework of regional cooperation.
Express Tribune
3 hours ago
- Express Tribune
Military notes of Indo-Pak conflict — the rundown
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@ and tweets @20_Inam During the last two weeks, in this series, we discussed the perceptual aspects of the recent Indo-Pak standoff, India's doctrinal collapse, the redefined deterrence and the 'Exterior' and 'Interior Maneuvers' by both sides, before and during the hostilities. We continue the debate… This was the first time that India under its supposed 'new normal' used 'cruise' missiles, both the BrahMos version (PJ-10 co-developed with Russia) as well as the European SCALP-EG targeting Pakistan proper. Pakistan also retaliated for the first time, employing its conventionally armed short-range Fatah-I and Fatah-II series of 'ballistic' missiles and other types. This was also the first time that RPVs (drones) were used with the intent of causing damage to the other side, in addition to reconnaissance and intelligence-collection roles. This was also the first time that strategic instability in South Asia was linked internationally to the unresolved Jammu and Kashmir dispute and not terrorism per se. Let us quickly recapture the timelines from April 22 to May 22, 2025. In run up to the crisis, on April 22, five militants killed 26 civilian tourists in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir, including one Nepali national, leading to Indian finger pointing towards Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) groups. On April 23, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, closed Attari–Wagah border crossing, expelled Pakistan's military diplomats, reduced Pakistan's diplomatic staff and cancelled SAARC visas for Pakistani nationals. From April 23–30 border skirmishes took place. On April 24, Pakistan condemned the Pahalgam attack and termed India's response as 'unilateral'; and retaliated by cancelling Indian visas, evacuating Indian nationals, closing its airspace to Indian aircraft, halting all trade and warning India against diverting Indus water, calling it an act of war. On April 25, India initiated ceasefire violations across the LoC. National Security Committee (NSC) met in Pakistan on April 26. Iran stepped forward with an offer to mediate. And on April 30, India banned its airspace to Pakistan, and IAF intruded into Pakistani airspace. Escalation and military preparations took place during May 1–6. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, after some initial ambivalence, 'expected' to speak with both foreign ministers on May 1. On May 3, Pakistan successfully test-fired its short-range Abdali ballistic missile. India escalated by cutting off all mail and trade links with Pakistan, banning Pakistani vessels from its ports and warned Pakistani ships against entering the Indian waters. On May 4, India stopped downflow from Baglihar dam on River Chenab. On May 6, Pakistan shot down 29 Indian drones near the LoC and in Punjab. And Iran's FM visited Pakistan proposing mediation. In the military operations (May 7–10), India launched 'Operation Sindoor', on May 7, conducting missile strikes on nine sites in Pakistan (Bahawalpur, Muridke, Gulpur, Bhimber, Chak Amru, Bagh, Kotli, Sialkot and Muzaffarabad). On May 10, IAF attacked eight major Pakistani air bases, including Nur Khan base in Rawalpindi. Pakistan, early on May 10, retaliated with Operation 'Bunyan-un-Marsoos', launching missile and drone combo on 26 military targets across India, and in the Indian-occupied Kashmir. It also launched another wave of swarm drones, loitering munitions and Fatah missiles targeting 26 locations along India's western border. On the same day (May 10), the Saudi FM called for de-escalation, Secretary of State Rubio spoke with both PMs and NSAs, urging restraint. Pakistan's DGMO reached out to the Indian side for direct military-level communications. President Trump mediated the ceasefire and announced it on X. On May 11, Pakistan claimed victory against India. Both sides subsequently conducted propaganda offensive through aggressive diplomacy by sending delegations to global capitals. In between the above compressed timeline, a lot went through. The Indian attacks, as per information available through open sources, were 'supposedly calibrated' during May 8 and early on May 9, whereas the wider attacks during May 9-10, still 'presumably' calibrated, were dangerously escalatory, as these were aimed at Pakistan's SEAD (suppression of enemy air defences) systems, after IAF having lost aircraft on May 7. It was sometimes on the morning of May 9 (the US time and evening in India/Pakistan), that the US received unspecified, new but 'alarming intelligence' about dangerous escalation between both sides, as reported by CNN and corroborated by The New York Times. The US worries emerged before the dramatic escalation during the night of May 9-10, but no source has actually 'identified' those worries. The 'speculation' is that Washington observing Pakistan's launch of short-range Fatah-I and -II ballistic missiles and others for the first time during May 9-10 night got aggressively involved. Islamabad's stockpile of tactical nuclear arsenal and Indian thinking of continuing a conventional war of punitive retribution provided a background to it. Some analysts also attribute it to Pakistan's deft diplomacy, signalling to and drawing on the US interlocution, spurred by 'readiness changes in Pakistan's stockpiles', besides the announced meeting of Pakistan's National Command Authority, that oversees the non-conventional means of war i.e. the nuclear weapons. The DG ISPR had, on May 9, declined calls for de-escalation due to the planned riposte under Pakistan's 'quid-pro-quo plus' strategy, to equalise losses caused by the Indian attacks. India later struck Nur Khan airbase around 2:30 am on May 10. This attack was meant to 'strike where it would hurt', to quote the Indian Director-General Air Operations, Air Marshal Bharti. However, that was an escalatory message. The Indian attacks also targeted Rafiqui, Rahim Yar Khan and Sukkur bases during the first wave of strikes, followed by the IAF strikes at Sargodha, Bholari and Jacobabad airbases and some military infrastructure at Murid, Chunian, Arifwala and Pasrur. This was India 'knocking on the nuclear door', and it presumably provided more muscle and lethality to Pakistan's riposte, that was dubbed equally if alarmingly escalatory by Washington. In de-escalation, the predominant view is that the Saudis, the Americans, the Turks and the Qataris rushed to quell India 'not because Pakistan asked, but because Delhi could not stabilize the board…Pakistan had not flinched; it had not folded. It escalated, absorbed and redrew the board'. More on ceasefire exclusively later. Continues…
