What's behind Beijing's decision on Japanese seafood
Shipments are to restart after a pause of about 2 years. NHK World's Nakamura Genta in Beijing says economic concerns and upcoming campaigns to promote patriotism drove the decision.
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NHK
3 hours ago
- NHK
North Korea state TV airs program honoring soldiers killed in Russia
North Korea's state television has aired footage of leader Kim Jong Un viewing, together with a delegation from Russia, an art performance honoring soldiers. A program broadcast on Monday by Korean Central Television featured Kim watching the performance together with Russian Minister of Culture Olga Lyubimova, who was visiting Pyongyang. Behind singers on stage singing a song honoring soldiers was a large screen displaying various images. They included photos of soldiers raising the national flags of both countries, as well as of Kim welcoming what appeared to be a flag-draped coffin and paying tribute. Some audience members from the two countries were spotted wiping away tears. Another image displayed on the screen showed what was believed to be a decree signed by Kim last year ordering the dispatch of troops to the western Russian region of Kursk. A South Korean media outlet quoted an expert as saying the TV program was an attempt by Pyongyang to convince the public of the legitimacy of sending troops to Russia.
The Diplomat
6 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Not Just Shock Absorbers: How ASEAN Is Shaping the China Trade Balance
Even as China turns to the region to manage overcapacity and geopolitical headwinds, Southeast Asia will continue to shape trade on its own terms. Leaders from China and Southeast Asian nations pose for a photo during the 27th ASEAN-China Summit in Vientiane, Laos, October 10, 2024. China's recent manufacturing resurgence – dubbed the 'Second China Shock' — has prompted fears of deindustrialization across Southeast Asia. Writing in The Straits Times last month, Ravi Velloor argued that China's dominance in sectors from textiles to EVs threatens ASEAN industries, reviving calls to revisit the assurances made by former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji upon the signing of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Yet framing Southeast Asia as a victim , as the term 'shock' implies , reflects both a misunderstanding of the region's historical autonomy and strategic agency and a misreading of China's intent. Complementarity, Not Exploitation China's trade with the region has historically been asymmetrical but stable, built on complementary strengths rather than competitive overlap. In 'The Nanhai Trade: The Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea,' the historian Wang Gungwu's traces this dynamic from the Han dynasty (211 BCE) to the founding of the Song dynasty in 960 CE, highlighting both the imperial attitudes towards the region and the economic foundations of maritime commerce. Then and after, Southeast Asian kingdoms such as Srivijaya and Ayutthaya exported spices, rice, metals, and timber to China in exchange for ceramics, textiles, and manufactured goods. The modern iteration of this relationship is governed by a more institutional framework. In 2009, China overtook Japan as ASEAN's largest trading partner. Today, annual China-ASEAN trade is projected to reach $1 trillion, surpassing the combined trade volumes of the United States and the European Union with China, and making ASEAN China's largest trading partner too. These new dynamics shed light on the nature of China's trade surplus with Southeast Asia, which extends beyond conventional narratives of high-tech dominance or state-induced overcapacity. Pop Mart's soft toy, Labubu, for instance, illustrates China's expanding strength in IP-driven consumer goods, where value is derived from design, branding, and emotional appeal. Southeast Asia has emerged as the company's largest and fastest-growing international market, with revenue in the region rising 619 percent year-on-year to $336 million, nearly half of Pop Mart's overseas earnings. ASEAN Shaping Engagement Clearly, in recent years the nature of China-ASEAN trade has evolved, driven by the rising value of China's intermediate and finished goods relative to Southeast Asia's commodity exports. This shift, combined with the region's growing middle class and purchasing power, has contributed to a widening trade imbalance. Yet governments across Southeast Asia have increasingly learned to use access to their fast-growing markets as strategic leverage, positioning themselves not simply as recipients of investment and exports but as active participants capable of demanding reciprocity and shaping the terms of engagement. The clearest example of this strategic posture can be seen in the defense sector, one of the most politically sensitive domains. In 2024, Thailand opted for Sweden's SAAB Gripen fighter jet over a U.S. bid, securing not just a fighter platform but full operational control of its Link-T datalink and a 144 percent return on investment via industrial offsets. Indonesia followed suit in 2025 with its commitment to purchase 48 KAAN fifth-generation fighter jets from Turkey, securing terms for local assembly and capability transfer. ASEAN states are replicating similar leverage in civilian sectors by using market access to drive industrial upgrading through local content mandates, technology transfer, and IP enforcement. Thailand now requires electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers benefiting from government tax incentives to produce core components – such as electric motors, reducers, and inverters – locally by 2026. This local content policy has prompted major Chinese automakers, including BYD and Changan, to commit to sourcing more of their EV components from Thai suppliers. The policy is expected to boost Thailand's national EV output by 40 percent in 2025. In parallel, Vietnam has revised its 2025 feed-in tariff system for solar power to favor projects that use locally produced battery storage and polysilicon. The new tariffs provide higher rates to solar projects that meet minimum local content requirements for batteries and polysilicon, aiming to reduce Vietnam's dependence on (mostly Chinese) imports and to advance the country's position in the solar value chain. Furthermore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other ASEAN governments have imposed a series of tariffs and trade barriers targeting Chinese goods to protect local industries from being overwhelmed by subsidized, low-priced imports. Malaysia has levied anti-dumping duties ranging from 4.48 to 20.42 percent on certain Chinese steel products and is considering broader measures to shield domestic manufacturers. Indonesia, facing a surge of cheap Chinese imports that threaten its small and medium-sized enterprises, has announced plans to impose tariffs of up to 200 percent on a range of Chinese products, including textiles, footwear, ceramics, and cosmetics. Both Vietnam and Indonesia have also launched anti-dumping investigations and duties on various Chinese goods to counteract unfair trade practices. Beyond tariffs, governments are also taking action against Chinese e-commerce platforms. Indonesia, for example, has blocked the Chinese online marketplace Temu, citing concerns over the impact on local micro, small, and medium enterprises and regulatory non-compliance. These moves reflect a broader trend across ASEAN to tighten enforcement, strengthen trade defense mechanisms, and safeguard domestic industries in the face of mounting Chinese overcapacity and aggressive export strategies. As global scrutiny of Chinese exports intensifies, ASEAN is increasingly strengthening its own trade defenses, demonstrating it is far from a passive absorber of the 'Second China Shock'; they are actively shaping the terms of engagement, an approach that in fact aligns with China's own strategic interests. China's Interest in ASEAN's Success Global trends are making reliance on single-source manufacturing untenable. According to McKinsey's 2025 survey of 400 Chinese export firms, 58 percent now use a 'China+1' strategy, with ASEAN as the leading secondary production base. Overcapacity is another driver: Factory utilization rates for China's EVs have fallen below 50 percent (a significant gap from the 80 percent breakeven point), and its solar panel industry faces declining margins due to global oversaturation. Exporting this surplus into politically neutral, fast-growing ASEAN markets is a growing strategic necessity. Finally, amid rising geopolitical pressure, China sees stable ties with ASEAN as a hedge against regional isolation. The 2024 CAFTA upgrade and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership underscore Beijing's commitment to trade frameworks that bolster ASEAN's role in global supply chains – and its value to China. What most threatens ASEAN-China interdependence today is not economic logic, but growing domestic political pressure. In both regions, public opinion is increasingly shaping the boundaries of foreign policy. As such, managing ASEAN-China ties requires mutual recognition of domestic political realities and the cultivation of political capital to sustain the relationship over the longer term. This is why narratives like the 'Second China Shock,' which suggest ASEAN passivity or acquiescence, should be reconsidered. The shock, if it exists, may be real – but so is ASEAN's capacity to respond on its own terms.
NHK
7 hours ago
- NHK
Hong Kong Security Law casts long shadow
Monday marked five years since Hong Kong's Security Law came into effect, chilling pro-democracy efforts. We talk to a former protester and our correspondent there about the mood on the ground.
