All eyes on the Trump-Putin summit – but the US-Russia rift runs deep

Russia Today

a day ago

All eyes may be on the scheduled meeting between US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, set for August 15 in Alaska – which is likely to be critical for Ukraine. But fears are growing that tensions between Russia and the West are far from resolved.
Recently, with American 'mediation' – if not outright pressure – Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a preliminary peace agreement that went largely unnoticed in Greece. In reality, it marks Armenia's official capitulation after its defeats in recent wars with Azerbaijan. The consensus is that the big winner is Türkiye, which has been openly backing Azerbaijan – and still is.
The peace deal, signed in Washington on August 8 with the help of US President Donald Trump, is widely seen as a geopolitical win for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Ankara, which supported Baku in its 'blitzkrieg' in Karabakh, stands to gain the most – first and foremost by securing a direct land link to Azerbaijan via Nakhichevan. That said, the geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits for American interests are hardly smaller.
Following the US-Turkish-engineered deal in the Caucasus, observers expect Washington to push similar plans elsewhere in the post-Soviet space. Georgia and Moldova top the list of likely next targets.
Both countries have their own 'thorny' territories – self-declared autonomous regions, Kosovo-style, lacking international recognition and hosting Russian military bases. Kosovo itself, of course, is recognized by most of the West, though it technically still lacks full independent-state status. Notably, Greece, Romania, Cyprus, and Spain refuse to recognize it, while Serbia still considers it part of its territory.
The hottest flashpoint inside Europe – especially with elections in Moldova this September – is Chisinau's ambition to 'reintegrate' Transnistria.
In recent years, disputed elections have brought pro-Western governments and a pro-Western president to power in Moldova. Now, at least on paper, Chisinau could call on Kiev for help and attempt a military solution to the Transnistria question. No one can rule out such a move – especially with Russian forces largely tied down in the Ukraine conflict.
Parliamentary elections are adding to the tension. The country is split almost evenly for and against pro-Western President Maia Sandu and her PAS party. A new military adventure could serve as the perfect pretext to shift the domestic political climate – and to escalate the broader standoff between Europe and Russia.
If another European war were to break out – this time over Moldova – NATO member Romania would almost certainly side with Chisinau.
As Romania's ally, Greece would face a hard choice: back Bucharest (and by extension, Moldova) or keep its distance from another European conflict? In the case of Ukraine, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis's government took no such distance – instead, openly declaring that Greece was 'at war with Russia.'
Whatever Athens decides will depend in part on Türkiye's stance toward this – for now – hypothetical scenario. Ankara would likely get involved indirectly, if only to boost its geopolitical influence in the region and its standing within NATO. It has done so repeatedly in recent years – in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
Türkiye's and Azerbaijan's success in Karabakh – at the expense of Armenia and Russia – has emboldened Ankara in other arenas of foreign policy. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Türkiye will not give up 'a single inch of land once Turkish soldiers have set foot on it.' History suggests those are not idle words.
The United States is clearly playing a bigger game across the post-Soviet geopolitical chessboard. By closing the chapter on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in the Caucasus – a confrontation dating back to the collapse of the USSR – Washington has engineered a settlement tailored to its own strategic script. Next up are other 'frozen conflicts' in the former Soviet Union.
Georgia wants to peacefully 'reintegrate' Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway territories in the Caucasus that split from Tbilisi after bloody conflicts – the first in the early 1990s, the second in 2008. They are, in effect, the 'Kosovos' of the Caucasus.
In Moldova, the president and government have made deepening ties with the US and NATO a top priority. Like Kiev in years past, Chisinau sees this as its ticket to security guarantees against Moscow – and, more importantly, as its 'golden opportunity' to retake Transnistria.
A Karabakh-style 'blitzkrieg' would be hard to pull off against territories hosting Russian military bases. But Washington doesn't seem in a rush – even if events are moving at a dangerously fast pace.
It hasn't gone unnoticed that NATO military exercises have included scenarios simulating a crisis in these 'Kosovos' of Georgia and Moldova.
One telling example: Agile Spirit 2025, the 12th such exercise hosted jointly with Georgia, ran from July 25 to August 6 with participants from 13 countries – including the US, Türkiye, Poland, Germany, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine – not counting observer nations.
Adding fuel to the speculation, online rumors claim that during joint 'Fiery Shield-2025' drills with the US and Romania, which began August 4, Moldovan troops fired at targets depicting Russian soldiers.
Military ties between Greece and Romania – and between Greece and Moldova – have been strengthening. On June 26, 2025, Greece's chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, Dimitris Choupis, awarded Moldova's deputy chief of the General Staff, Brigadier General Sergiu Cirimpei, the Medal of Merit and Honor.
Diplomatic contacts are also on the rise. Deputy Foreign Minister Charis Theocharis recently visited Moldova, adding to a string of earlier meetings.
Finally, the former US ambassador to Athens and later Biden-era deputy secretary of state for energy, Geoffrey Pyatt, has repeatedly emphasized the 'Vertical Gas Corridor' – a network that would allow bidirectional flows from south to north, specifically from Greece through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and Ukraine, via both existing and new European natural gas and LNG infrastructure.