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ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Archbishop Bashar Warda of the Chaldean Archdiocese of Erbil described the participation of Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani in the farewell ceremony for Pope Francis in Rome as a source of pride that places the Kurdistan Region on the global map.
Speaking to Rudaw on Saturday, Archbishop Warda stated, 'As of today, a nine-day mourning period begins, during which a mass will be held each day.' He added that 'the names of the cardinals and the locations of the masses held for the intention of the Pope have already been set.'
Warda further explained that during this mourning period, the College of Cardinals would convene regularly to deliberate on the Church's current status and its responsibilities moving forward. 'These discussions are crucial for defining the character of the next phase in the Church's journey,' he noted.
On President Nechirvan Barzani's participation in the farewell ceremony, Archbishop Warda remarked that it 'is a source of pride for us as Christians in Kurdistan and Iraq. To see the President of the Region present at a global event where humanity bids farewell to the Pope - a spiritual leader for over 1.4 billion Catholics - is deeply significant.'
He also highlighted the special relationship between the Vatican and the leadership of the Kurdistan Region. 'Let us not forget the unique and friendly ties between Pope Francis and the Barzani leadership - President Nechirvan Barzani, President Masoud Barzani, and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani,' he said.
Warda recalled the exceptional protocol extended to the Kurdistan Region during the Pope's historic visit to Iraq. 'Typically, the Pope meets all political leaders together in one place, as he did in Baghdad. However, in recognition of the Kurdistan Region's role - especially in hosting and protecting over a million displaced people, including many Christians, in 2014 - the Vatican arranged a special meeting in Erbil.'
He stressed that this gesture reflected the Vatican's deep appreciation and the warmth of its relationship with the Kurdistan Region. 'Such protocols demonstrate the depth of this friendship,' he added.
'President Nechirvan Barzani's participation in this international event shows that the Kurdistan Region is not isolated, but is actively engaged on the world stage - with strength and a meaningful message,' the Archbishop concluded.
President Barzani arrived in Rome on Friday evening to attend the funeral, which began on Saturday.
On the selection of the next pope, Archbishop Warda clarified that the process is not influenced by campaigns or speculation. 'What is being circulated in the media is just that - speculation. Historically, the elected pope is rarely among the widely expected names,' he said.
On May 9, the cardinals will enter what is known as the conclave, and other procedures will follow that are characterized more by ecclesiastical privacy than secrecy.
According to Archbishop Warda, 'The privacy is due to the nature of the election which is more of a mission than a calling and is primarily aimed at serving the Church.'
He elaborated that a new pontiff would be elected within less than two weeks and that 'the mourning period, which lasts nine days, is an established tradition derived from the Bible.'
Pope Francis passed away in Rome on Monday at the age of 88, following complications from severe pneumonia that had persisted for over two months.
On Saturday, the Vatican hosted the funeral service in St. Peter's Square, presided over by Italian Cardinal Giovanni Battista Re. Authorities anticipated the attendance of over 200,000 people, including world leaders, religious figures, and faithful from around the globe. The Pope had selected his final resting place in his favorite church in Rome.
According to the Vatican, 162 official delegations, including dozens of heads of state, government officials, and monarchs, confirmed their attendance at the funeral.
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By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad . Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News. Turkey Ends ITPA- Submission to Blackmail or Preservation of Iraqi Sovereign Rights and National Interests The Turkish government officially ended, on 21 July 2025, the Iraqi Turkish Oil Pipeline Agreement-ITOPA, effective on 27 July 2026.[1] A couple of days later, the Turkish Minister of Energy proposed amending and expanding- ITOPA.[2] Obviously, the Turkish formal position is inconsistent with ITOPA' "2010 Amendment". So far, no formal position was announced by the Iraqi government on the Turkish move. [3] The Turkish act was the topic of a debating event, in Arabic, that was convened by "Al-Mushtarac Platform" on 1 August 2025.* Below is a brief of my presentation, with minor updating. My intervention at the debating event covers the following themes: 1. A brief background on ITOPA, focusing on its latest amendment in 2010, which expires in 2026. An analysis of the Turkish position in light of the agreement's legal frameworks on the one hand, and the very complex set of economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic considerations on the other. 3. The impact of the Turkish decision on Iraq: A critical analysis of what Iraq should have done since 2023, what Iraq have done, and the alternatives currently available for Iraq. First: A brief background on ITOPA and its latest amendment ITOPA was signed on August 27, 1973. The pipeline on the Turkish side consists of two parallel lines: a 40-inch line, which is the first expansion of the system that was completed in 1984, and a 46-inch line, which is the second expansion, completed in 1987. This brought total design pumping capacity to 1.6 Mbpd. ITOPA latest amendment was signed in 2010 and became effective in July 2011. In November 2013, KRG completed the laying of an oil pipeline from Khormala to the metering station at Fishkhabur for the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, then connected it to the 40-inch pipeline on the Turkish side. In the same month, KRG and Turkey signed 50-year agreements regarding KRG oil export. On 21 May 2014, the first shipment of KRG oil was loaded for export from the port of Ceyhan. That loading prompted the Ministry of Oil-MoO to invoking arbitration clause of ITOPA amendment before the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce-ICC on 23 May 2014, and ICC award was delivered on 23 March 2023. A formal document entitled, "Amendment to the Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement signed on August 27, 1973, and the following related agreements, protocols, minutes of meetings, and annexes between the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the Government of the Republic of Turkey," signed on September 19, 2010. The amendment entered into force in July 2011 and expires in July 2026.[4] The "Amendment" document consists of 16 pages and includes 11 articles: 1- Definitions. 2- General Provisions. 3- Pumping Capacity and Minimum Obligated Pumping Capacity. 4- Transit Tariffs and Payments. 5- Recovered and Wasted Crude Oil. 6- Ownership of Crude Oil Filling Pipelines and Tank Flors. 7- Iraq Office in Ceyhan Port. 8- Other Issues. 9- Force Majeure. 10- Dispute Settlement. 11- Duration of the Amendment and Date of Entry Into Force. According to Article 11, the duration/term of "Amendment" is 15 years effective from July 2011, with time-framed four options: 1- amendment, 2- new agreement, 3- automatic extension for five years and 4- end of the amendment term. Second: Analysing Turkish' action and position The following analysis is premised on the legal frameworks of ITOPA amendment on the one hand, and the very complex economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic considerations on the other. From a legal perspective related to international bilateral agreements, Turkey's move does not violate Article 11 of the Amendment, Turkey chose the fourth option. But why? Theoretically and analytically, Turkey could have waited another five years for ITOPA amendment to expire, and during that period, it could use the pipeline, which has become ready to be operational. However, Turkey may have found that the current overall circumstances-domestic and regional economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic- are conducive to making the decision to terminate the agreement. So, what are they? The Turkish energy balance indicates the country is oil and gas import dependent. Petroleum consumption-production gap was 800 kbd, and 56% of its gas imports was from Russia and Iran (in 2022). [5] This is a geopolitical vulnerability if the situation continues in 2025, considering Trump's threatening to energy imports from these two countries. However, Turkey worked for years to becoming an important transit country and oil and gas pipelines hub from central Asia to Europe, in addition to pipelines from Iraq (including KRG). Also, Turkey succeeded to making important discoveries offshore (in the Mediterranean and Black Sea) and onshore, especially Gabar oilfield in eastern mountainous area of the country, which was connected to the ITP. [6] The Iraqi oil through the pipeline have been either very low or was outage for years. This makes Turkey accustomed to the absence of the Iraqi oil. But, on the other hand, Turkey benefits twice; by gaining the minimum-throughput transit fee, i.e., pump-or-pay (PoP) and by charging a much higher transit fee on KRG oil that is pumped through the 40 Inch pipeline of (ITP). The political reconciliation and agreement with the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan/PKK, have reduced the tremendous security burdens on the Turkish government, and thus discounts or minimise the Kurdish related political and security risk. The political and geopolitical consequences of the military situation in the Middle East and the USA/Isreal attack on Iran have weakened Russia and Iran geopolitical standing and, consequently, enhanced Turkish regional strategic importance and positioning. The Turkish President Erdogan is known for his pragmatism and real politic , and such political attitude is probably enhanced by the US President Trump views, policies and actions. Turkey might find some encouragement by the recently expressed US views regarding the end of "Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916" Middle East boarders. Also, there seems to be an echoing sentiment in Turkey hinting to end 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. In addition to the agreements signed between Turkey and KRG, the latter had offered, in 2016, the sale of many oilfield and exploration blocks to Turkey.[7] Finally, ICC award might have been triggering the timing of the Turkish action. The award comprises many decisions, some in Iraq's favour while others in Turkish favour and others of operative nature relating to interest rates that both countries are directed to apply and calculate. Decisions 2, 3 and 5 compel Turkey to pay ca. $1.998billion to Iraq. Decisions 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 award Turkey a total of ca. $5.266billion, mostly related to PoP provisions. Thus, Turkey should pay Iraq a net of $1.471billion. Decisions 16, 17, 18 and 19 are related to the calculation of accrued interest rates that the countries should follow and apply, without stating the timeframe, how and who to finalise this matter. While the award was a financial victory for Iraq, many in Turkey interpret it as only related to unauthorised KRG oil pumping to and loading in Ceyhan terminal; this could be avoided by different means in the future. Third topic: How Could Iraq React to Turkish Decision Upon the ICC award, I proposed for the MoO to: 1. Implement the award, especially what relates to interest rate issue. 2. Carefully examine the award and learn from its deliberations and consequences. 3. Evaluate Turkish potential future options and how to confront them to preserve Iraq's interests.[8] I have not received feedback or seen any action from the government, the ministry or any information regarding these recommendations. [9] In my view and as mentioned above, the possibility of the pipeline agreement expiring in July 2026 is included in the amendment document, and therefore Iraq should have been planning since 2014 to confront such eventuality in 2026 or, in the best-case scenario, in 2031. From my perspective, regarding the strategic importance and geopolitical risks of all Iraqi export outlets, the best alternative is to modernize and expand export capacities at the southern outlets, while simultaneously modernizing and expanding the "strategic pipeline" for transporting northern oil, including KRG oil, to the south. The matter becomes even more urgent after the signing of the Kirkuk field development agreement with BP and the Hamrin field development agreement with the US' HKN. I am fully aware of the MoO's efforts on these two directions, but the actual facts and statistical data do not indicate at all that sufficient work has been done to complete these two strategic export essential projects. This failure has been the responsibility of the MoO since 2014. Moreover, the North Oil Company-NOC announced, for a while, that the restoration of the Kirkuk-Feshkhabur pipeline has been completed and that three tests have been conducted, indicating that the pipeline is ready for pumping oil. If this is the case, why hasn't it been operational before July 21, 2025? And why hasn't Turkey taken this into consideration? What's even more surprising is that in recent months MoO has been busy contracting numerous mini projects it classifies as "strategic", in a manner that lacks proper planning and implementation priorities. The worst and most damaging action Turkey could take and do after July 2026 includes any or all of the following alternatives/possibilities: Activating the secret agreements with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), including those reported by Allocating a portion of the capacity of the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to exporting KRG oil or laying a new pipeline exclusively for KRG oil, parallel to the existing two pipelines. Proposing and negotiating a new agreement with the Iraqi government aimed at achieving a range of Turkish interests at the expense of Iraqi national interests. What can the Iraqi government do regarding these three possibilities above? Iraq has two alternatives: submitting to the blackmail or preserving sovereign rights and national interests. I believe the Iraqi government should adopt the second option, and take the following actions: Regarding the two Turkish possibilities (1) and (2) above, it is preferable to resort to activating the tools of international law related to relations between states, the Vienna Convention, the bilateral agreements between Iraq and Turkey, especially the 1946 bilateral friendship treaty between the two countries, and numerous international law instruments. There should be a concerted move towards the relevant international bodies for this purpose. The responsibility for such move is entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with ongoing, serious follow-up by the Council of Ministers. I see no point in talking about or negotiating any new agreement, as discussed below, if the Turkish side insists on the two possibilities (1) and (2) mentioned above. Turkey's latest proposals and comments The Turkish Energy Minister reportedly said, on 29 July 2025, that his country is proposing: (1) A framework for ongoing negotiations to expand the bilateral agreement in the energy sector. (2) A "mechanism to ensure full utilization" of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. (3) Expanding the amendment to the pipeline agreement to include cooperation in the fields of gas, electricity, and petrochemicals, in addition to oil. (4) The possibility of extending the pipeline to southern Iraq, as the path to full capacity necessarily begins from the south. (5) Linking all this to the "Development Highway" project from Basra to the Turkish border and then to Europe. My preliminary remarks on the reported proposals. First: Turkey should have submitted these proposals in July 2024, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of ITOPA Amendment of 2010 referred to earlier, instead of giving note, in July 2025, ending the validity of the ITOPA. Article 11 stipulates that either party has the right to propose amendment or a new agreement two years prior to the end of Amendment term/duration. Therefore, by choosing one option while violating other options of Article 11, this actually reflects inconsistency, by intention or omission, of the Turkish authorities. Second: Such proposals, whether general or multi-purpose, should be presented within the "Iraqi-Turkish Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation", which has been in operation for more than 50 years. This Turkish proposal could be a base for a "Frame Agreement," resulting from it, if needs be, a series of "specific agreements" for the topics mentioned in the Turkish minister proposal. It is worth mentioning that this Joint Committee has been one of the most active bilateral committees Iraq has with other countries. Third: Regarding the crude oil pipeline, I suggest there should be a specific agreement for oil pipeline consisting of two parts: the first is relating to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (i.e., the agreement that Turkey have suspended recently-ITOPA), and the second is relating to the proposed new Basra-Ceyhan pipeline, in the event of an agreement have been reached on the implementation, timing and funding of this pipeline and its integration with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.[10] Fourth: The integration of the Kurdistan Region's oil pipeline with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan/Basra-Ceyhan pipeline, with pumping, transporting, and loading of oil falling under SOMO mandate exclusively. Final remarks Until recently, the Oil Minister's statements indicated Turkish side's readiness to operate the pipeline. Furthermore, in her recent meeting with parliamentarians, the Minister of Finance did not mention anything related to the Turkish side as a reason for the delay in submitting the budget schedules thus far. Furthermore, the Director General of SOMO recently confirmed the current readiness to export oil through the pipeline, if KRG deliver the oil. Have the Iraqi authorities, the government, and the Ministry of Oil fallen into what can be described as a "trap of deceptive statements" by Turkey and their naive trust in these statements?? While the Turkish decision had actually prompted numerous reactions inside and outside Iraq, including my initiative to convene this event, the matter was not mentioned in the Cabinet meeting on July 29, and not in the regular meeting of the Council' follow-up on oil projects on July 31[11], and not in the seventh session of the Opinion Board held on Wednesday, July 30, at the Ministry of Oil.[12] Nothing relating to the Turkish decision was published on the websites of the Ministry of Oil, SOMO, and the North Oil Company (all of which are executing parties specifically mentioned in the Amendment document of 2010.( Do these Iraqi authorities have no official position on the Turkish move?? I believe that official bodies must stop adopting the policy and practice of "ignoring and turning a deaf ear." A closing call or cry is due now: To strengthen Iraq's negotiating position, ensure economic security, and protect the national interest, I emphasize the need for the Iraqi government to give immediate and absolute priority to modernizing and expanding oil export capacities at the southern ports and expediting the implementation of the Basra-Haditha pipeline within the concept of a "strategic pipeline" to transport northern oil, including regional oil, to the south. A dim light at the end of a tunnel still there; recent statements by the Iraqi side, namely by the Minister of Oil[13] and the DG of SOMO[14] indicating eminent resumption of ITP operation, conditional though, upon KRG and its contracted IOCs making enough oil for pumping!! * The virtual event uses Zoom facility, and its full recording is accessible through the following link: The Platform uses AI to transfer "sounds into text". Hence, the text of the recording is accessible through the following link: The Arabic text can be translated into English and other languages by clicking the Translate icon therein. The presentation comprises map, charts, tables and images; they are not included in this brief article. The PowerPoint slides are available upon request in MS or Pdf. Norway 10 August 2025 Endnotes [1] [2] [3] Except a brief statement by unnamed official from the Ministry of Oil to (INA), which was removed later, but till accessible through this link. [4] I do possess scanned copies of the Agreement and related formal Iraqi documents, and they are the base of analyses. [5] Based on data from, [6] My articles, "Once Again, Turkey Violates the Pipeline Agreement" and in Arabic, [7] The secret documents were published by but they are not available now. Luckily, I saved them in my database. [8] My articles, ICC Awards, FSC Decisions and The Three-Years State Budget, May 2023 [9] However, an IOR article dated 30 September 2023, "Iraq presses claim to enforce arbitration award against Turkey", provides information on an Iraqi filed case before a US court. [10] Actually, such a pipeline was proposed in 2012, but the idea did not materialize since then, and I have referred to it in my previous writings many times. [11] [12] [13] Tareek Al-Shaab, 7 August 2025 and Click here to read the full article in pdf format. Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at) Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.
