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Why India still remains in a state of confusion when it comes to GM crops
Sanjeeb Mukherjee New Delhi
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A lesser-known chapter in the life of MS Swaminathan, the chief architect of India's Green Revolution, is his role in nudging the Vatican towards supporting genetically modified (GM) crops as a tool to fight global hunger.
As narrated in a recent biography by his niece Priyambada Jayakumar (MS Swaminathan: The Man Who Fed India), Swaminathan, while serving with the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), met Pope John Paul II privately in 1982. The pontiff, deeply troubled by drought-induced hunger in Africa, backed FAO's efforts to tackle the crisis.
His successor, Pope Benedict XVI, invited Swaminathan to the Vatican to
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Time of India
3 hours ago
- Time of India
Pakistan's Ayub Khan sought US help to annexe Kashmir after Indus Treaty in 1960
A new book reveals Ayub Khan's attempt to gain US support for capturing Kashmir after the Indus Waters Treaty. Khan linked water rights to territorial claims. He warned that US aid to India would be wasted without resolving the Kashmir issue. Kennedy offered a compromise, but Khan insisted on securing water resources. Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Following the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960, the then Pakistani President Ayub Khan sought US President John F Kennedy 's support to capture Kashmir from India, a new book on the treaty has 'Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India-Pakistan Relations ', author Uttam Sinha, an expert on international water issues and IDSA senior fellow, recounts how, in July 1961-months after signing the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)-Khan arrived in Washington, already bristling over America's generous aid to a reception in his honour at Mount Vernon, tastefully arranged by First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, Ayub's displeasure was clear. In protest, he had suspended CIA's covert flights from airbases in East Pakistan, which supported Tibetan rebels, as well as U-2 flights over China from West Pakistan.A private garden walk with Kennedy thawed the frost. Ayub agreed to reopen the airbases; Kennedy, in turn, promised that the US will not supply any military equipment to India, according to the later in the Oval Office, Ayub, like a campaign general, spread out maps to press Pakistan's security concerns. The first showed Indian troop deployment-of the 1.5 million soldiers, only 15% faced China, while 85% were positioned against Pakistan. The second detailed 80,000-90,000 Afghan troops on the western border, armed with Soviet-supplied equipment. The third mapped Pakistan's thin defences against both neighbours. Throughout, Ayub insisted that without Kashmir, "Pakistan would be up the gum tree" if attacked from India or Afghanistan, Sinha pointed out in his and his advisers doubted the alarmism but recognised Kashmir as the litmus test of Indo-Pak peace. Kennedy proposed a compromise that the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru might accept. Ayub's answer was calculated. India could keep Jammu, but Pakistan needed "some miles" across the Chenab to secure water resources . His logic was simple-if the Indus Treaty gave Pakistan rights to the western rivers, and those rivers flowed from Kashmir, adjoining territories should belong to suggested Nehru, politically spent and out of touch with Kashmiris, was now ready for settlement. Without resolving Kashmir, he warned, US aid to India was wasted. Kennedy countered that US assistance was aimed at keeping India free from communist influence, not to buy loyalty, Sinha pointed out in his the meeting closed, Ayub made one final ask-if Kennedy's effort to sway Nehru during the latter's planned November 1961 Washington visit failed, and Pakistan returned to the UN over Kashmir, would the US back it?"Yes," Kennedy replied - an episode that, as the book makes clear, showed how deeply water and territory were entwined during the Cold War era's South Asian book also recalls how Nehru faced internal criticism over the IWT. He was described as an umpire in a cricket match-was how one MP described the PM during a fiery Lok Sabha debate on the treaty in November and December 1960. The charge, recorded in the book, captured the frustration of parliamentarians who believed India was giving away too much, too the treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, and debated in the House on November 30, the mood was anything but celebratory. Criticism came from across the political spectrum, including even the Congress benches. Ashok Mehta of the Praja Socialist Party famously called it a "second partition."


Economic Times
3 hours ago
- Economic Times
Pakistan's Ayub Khan sought US help to annexe Kashmir after Indus Treaty in 1960
A new book reveals Ayub Khan's attempt to gain US support for capturing Kashmir after the Indus Waters Treaty. Khan linked water rights to territorial claims. He warned that US aid to India would be wasted without resolving the Kashmir issue. Kennedy offered a compromise, but Khan insisted on securing water resources. Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Following the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960, the then Pakistani President Ayub Khan sought US President John F Kennedy 's support to capture Kashmir from India, a new book on the treaty has 'Trial by Water: Indus Basin and India-Pakistan Relations ', author Uttam Sinha, an expert on international water issues and IDSA senior fellow, recounts how, in July 1961-months after signing the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)-Khan arrived in Washington, already bristling over America's generous aid to a reception in his honour at Mount Vernon, tastefully arranged by First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, Ayub's displeasure was clear. In protest, he had suspended CIA's covert flights from airbases in East Pakistan, which supported Tibetan rebels, as well as U-2 flights over China from West Pakistan.A private garden walk with Kennedy thawed the frost. Ayub agreed to reopen the airbases; Kennedy, in turn, promised that the US will not supply any military equipment to India, according to the later in the Oval Office, Ayub, like a campaign general, spread out maps to press Pakistan's security concerns. The first showed Indian troop deployment-of the 1.5 million soldiers, only 15% faced China, while 85% were positioned against Pakistan. The second detailed 80,000-90,000 Afghan troops on the western border, armed with Soviet-supplied equipment. The third mapped Pakistan's thin defences against both neighbours. Throughout, Ayub insisted that without Kashmir, "Pakistan would be up the gum tree" if attacked from India or Afghanistan, Sinha pointed out in his and his advisers doubted the alarmism but recognised Kashmir as the litmus test of Indo-Pak peace. Kennedy proposed a compromise that the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru might accept. Ayub's answer was calculated. India could keep Jammu, but Pakistan needed "some miles" across the Chenab to secure water resources . His logic was simple-if the Indus Treaty gave Pakistan rights to the western rivers, and those rivers flowed from Kashmir, adjoining territories should belong to suggested Nehru, politically spent and out of touch with Kashmiris, was now ready for settlement. Without resolving Kashmir, he warned, US aid to India was wasted. Kennedy countered that US assistance was aimed at keeping India free from communist influence, not to buy loyalty, Sinha pointed out in his the meeting closed, Ayub made one final ask-if Kennedy's effort to sway Nehru during the latter's planned November 1961 Washington visit failed, and Pakistan returned to the UN over Kashmir, would the US back it?"Yes," Kennedy replied - an episode that, as the book makes clear, showed how deeply water and territory were entwined during the Cold War era's South Asian book also recalls how Nehru faced internal criticism over the IWT. He was described as an umpire in a cricket match-was how one MP described the PM during a fiery Lok Sabha debate on the treaty in November and December 1960. The charge, recorded in the book, captured the frustration of parliamentarians who believed India was giving away too much, too the treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, and debated in the House on November 30, the mood was anything but celebratory. Criticism came from across the political spectrum, including even the Congress benches. Ashok Mehta of the Praja Socialist Party famously called it a "second partition."


Time of India
3 hours ago
- Time of India
Beijing files WTO suit against Canada, opposes EU sanctions on Iran
China deepened a trade spat with Canada, filing a lawsuit at the World Trade Organization over import restrictions on steel just days after slapping fresh duties on Canadian canola. The WTO case targets tariffs and quotas on steel. Those measures were "typical trade protectionism" that disregarded China's legitimate rights and interests and flouted WTO rules, China's ministry of commerce said in a statement on Friday. Helping Iran China said on Friday that it opposed invoking sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme after three Western nations told the UN they would reimpose them if no diplomatic solution was found by the end of August.