The politics of insurgency, the decline of Naxalism
A case of contrasts
A concern across the world is that a quarter of century after the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York, the threat of terrorism, far from receding or abating, still remains alive. Many instances of 'copycat killings' continue to take place. There has also been a spurt in Islamic State (IS)- inspired vehicle rammings of late, the most publicised case being the one which took place in New Orleans, U.S. on January 1 this year. Well before the New Orleans attack, the IS had orchestrated and inspired several other attacks of a similar nature across Europe. Counter-terrorism experts believe that Jihadist groups were only beginning to intensify their terror attacks in several countries. Online campaigns were, meanwhile, inciting more 'lone wolf' attacks. Alongside this, anti-Israel protests in many parts of the world, seemed to provide more grist to IS and al -Qaeda-sponsored terror campaigns.
Doomsday predictions that tomorrow's terrorists will be even involved in more sanguinary campaigns than earlier ones are emerging. This is thanks to the advent of AI. The warnings are that AI-enabled terrorists, together with terrorists, are gaining access to 'bio weapons', which could lead to the killing of thousands. Another given prediction is that misaligned AI could break free of all human control to unleash unthinkable harm on society and the world at large.
The scenario above is, however, very different from what is being seen in India of late, which features a declining curve in militancy, at least of ideologically-oriented terrorism. The accepted wisdom is that the current declining curve of Naxalite or Maoist violence heralds an end to ideological terrorism in the country. A normally taciturn Union Home Minister himself indicated that the end of Naxalism is near, and that mid-2026 would mark the final demise of Naxalite violence. If so, it would spell the end of what was once perceived to be a vibrant, ideologically-driven, militant movement which, in its heyday, had captured the imagination of youth and intellectuals, and also energised what philosopher Frantz Fanon had referred to as the 'wretched of the earth', viz., tribals in the deepest forests and the 'urban poor' in the cities. Till now, however, what had been witnessed were several 'false dawns' (as for instance towards the end of 1970s and at least twice thereafter prior to the end of 20th century). The elimination of Naxalite violence had, however, never been officially pronounced till date.
The revolutionary fervour seemed to evaporate all too soon. Even while revolutionary leaders such as Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Satyanarayan Singh, and Kondapalli Seetharamaiah were being extolled, the movement had slowly started losing much of its sheen, degenerating into mindless violence — initially in the urban areas, but soon thereafter even in the interior jungles of the country. A once integrated revolutionary movement soon split into separate regional entities, though the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) remained for quite some time, the leading light of the movement. An all-India fervour was markedly absent, and the movement became centered around the hilly and forested regions of central India, especially in States such as Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh.
The promise of a 'Spring Thunder Over India' in the early 1960s, had, no doubt, attracted some of the best and the brightest of the generation at the time, who were fired by a revolutionary zeal (following the successful revolutions in China and other parts of the world, including South America). The heroes of the time were revolutionaries such as China's Chairman Mao, Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh, and South America's Che Guevara and the like. Even as Charu Mazumdar of Bengal was being hailed as 'the new Messiah', the resounding slogan was 'China's Chairman is our Chairman'. Yet, the early promise has begun to be dispelled.
The campaign against Naxalism
Beginning in 2024, and under directions from the Union Home Minister, a sustained offensive was launched against militant Naxalite groups in different States. The data on Naxalites killed in encounters vary, but it is generally accepted that a few thousands were eliminated. Police chiefs in the worst Naxalite-affected areas have provided their own counts of the numbers of Naxalites eliminated or killed. But perhaps, the most authentic figure on the numbers could be found in a booklet released by the once banned CPI (Maoist), which admitted that during the past year alone, 357 Naxalites had been killed in encounters with security forces across the country. Among the killed, according to this report, more than a third belonged to the women's cadre.
The epicentre of violence was the Dandakaranya region which spans parts of Bastar district in Chhattisgarh, Gadchiroli in Maharashtra and several areas of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh. The shrinkage of territory was compounded by internal bickerings and a series of leadership crises since the removal of M. Lakshman Rao alias Ganapathi in 2018.
On the surface, the war on Naxalism might seem to parallel United States President Donald Trump's 'war on terror', launched soon after he took over as President for a second term. Yet, there are marked differences. The U.S. President's offensive was launched not so much against ideologically inspired militants or terrorists, but against those elements who did not believe in any ideology other than that of attacking the 'great Satan'. The offensive launched by the U.S. was, hence, markedly different from that employed in India, where Naxalites lived and identified closely with villagers and their ilk. The use of brute force was not seen till recently as the answer, except in exceptional circumstances. To compare the U.S. President's attacks against Jihadists in Somalia and Yemen — based on the logic that Jihadist groups were plotting against the U.S. — with the tactics employed by the Indian security forces against Naxalites would, hence, be an error. There were, and still exist, many checks and balances in the Indian context on the use of deadly force, even against adversaries who believe in overthrowing the established order through violence.
The campaign against Naxalites and Naxalite violence, has, by and large, been conducted along certain well-defined lines. Preventing revolutionary groups, however high-minded they may proclaim to be, and irrespective of the grievances they have, from disturbing the established order has, however, been the set objective of whichever government has/governments have been in power in Delhi or in the States. Admittedly, the original Naxalites were filled with revolutionary fervour and were intent on putting in place a more democratic order. However, having failed to achieve their objective, they soon began to resort to indiscriminate violence. Having said this, it is also true that even while they resorted to indiscriminate violence, most groups retained a veneer of ideology.
A new term
The distinction is important and vital. Currently, the misuse of the term 'urban naxals' has given a distorted view of the original Naxalite movement. The origin of the 'Spring Thunder Over India' initiated in the late 1960s, was based on certain principles, however misdirected these might have been. The Marxist-Leninist Movement also had a well-defined structure and a robust philosophy. While not denigrating today's 'urban naxals', the latter seem, at least for the present, to be a loose-knit group of intellectuals who are opposed to the actions of the administration and the government on several policy aspects. Today's 'urban naxals' have little in common with the original Naxalites.
Wrong classification could and would have unintended consequences. Inability to identify, comprehend and implement policies to address such matters can again magnify the risk they pose. Better understanding of the factors involved is needed to avoid incurring high latent costs. It is vital to avoid blind spots that arise due to cognitive bias or short-sightedness.
M.K. Narayanan is a former Director, Intelligence Bureau, a former National Security Adviser, and a former Governor of West Bengal
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