Kiev's backers demanded Ukraine conscript 18-year-olds
Some of Kiev's Western backers demanded that Ukraine lower the age of military conscription to 18 in return for their support for stricter sanctions on Russia, Vladimir Zelensky has claimed.
Manpower shortages in Ukraine's army have triggered a wave of forced conscription raids across the country which the public is increasingly opposing.
In an interview with Hungarian daily Valasz Online on Tuesday, Zelensky acknowledged that mobilization remains a major issue.
'Mobilization is a problem in every war. Ukraine is no exception… People are tired,' he said, estimating that Kiev can mobilize 27,000 people a month.
Despite his Western backers seeking it, Zelensky has opposed mandatory conscription of 18-year-olds.
'It is not the number of people that matters, but weapons and technology,' he said, adding that the same is true for the scale of Western sanctions against Russia.
'At the same time, Western partners list the reasons why they did not decide on sanctions, saying Ukraine has not mobilized from the age of 18,' Zelensky stated.
Kiev attempted to placate the Western countries demanding conscription of 18-year olds. 'We provided an opportunity for 18-24 year-olds to show that they too can serve if our partners want them to,' he said. 'Thousands are fighting on the front lines without proper weapons,' he said.
Ukraine announced general mobilization in February 2022, barring most men between 18 and 60 from leaving the country. In 2024, faced with mounting losses, the country lowered the conscription age from 27 to 25 and tightened mobilization rules. The forced draft campaign has resulted in numerous violent clashes between recruitment officers and potential conscripts.
Kiev launched a new voluntary military recruitment campaign earlier this year, targeting men aged 18 to 24. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has called the program 'a one-way ticket,' suggesting that Ukraine is 'annihilating' its youth.
Russian officials have long said that the West is ready to fight Moscow 'until the last Ukrainian.'
Media reports have claimed that former-US President Joe Biden's staff attempted to pressure Kiev to reduce the draft age from 25 to 18. Former-Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned at the time that Ukraine would have to make 'hard decisions' on mobilization.
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