Analysis: For Algeria, Polisario is an Ally, MAK is a Threat
This glaring contradiction lays bare a regime built not on principles of self-determination, but on selective oppression, weaponized hypocrisy, and a desperate bid to maintain regional influence at any cost.
According to an analysis by Sahel Intelligence, 'this paradox is flagrant. Algeria, which qualifies the MAK as a 'terrorist group' without providing concrete evidence of violent acts, simultaneously offers official support to a movement like the Polisario, regularly associated with activities threatening the stability of the region.'
The report exposes how Algeria's military leadership has weaponized the concept of self-determination, deploying it selectively to advance regional destabilization while denying the same rights to its own citizens.
Algeria's handling of the two movements exposes a glaring double standard—sharp, deliberate, and impossible to miss. The Kabyle independence movement, represented by the Government of Kabylia in exile (GPK) in France, has consistently advocated for peaceful means to achieve self-determination.
'Under Ferhat Mehenni, the Movement for Self-determination of Kabylia (MAK) has always claimed a peaceful, secular and democratic struggle, rejecting any recourse to violence or terrorism,' notes the Sahel Intelligence analysis.
'The MAK denounces a policy of systemic marginalization of Kabylia by the Algerian state, on linguistic, economic, religious and identity levels,' adds the analysis.
Meanwhile, Algeria provides comprehensive support to the Polisario Front, which has become 'a hired regional gun that implements Iranian agendas in North Africa.'
This goes in line with Algerian objectives in the Western Mediterranean and the Sahel. Algeria's behavior exacerbates tensions and fuels risks of a major regional war that would set back decades of efforts to preserve peace, security, and prosperity in southern Europe and along Africa's Atlantic front.
'Alger furnishes refuge, financing and military as well as diplomatic assistance. Algeria hosts the movement in the Tindouf camps, presents it as a liberation movement, and advocates on its behalf in international forums,' the report states.
Polisario's terrorist ties are an open secret
The Polisario's terrorist ties are no longer whispers in the dark—they've stepped into the spotlight. Last April, Republican politician John Wilson stressed Washington's 'determination to support the North African kingdom in confronting the threats posed by Polisario Front terrorists' during a meeting with Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita.
Multiple intelligence reports have documented the Polisario's connections with terrorist organizations. The Sahel Intelligence analysis points to 'connections with Hamas and Iran, via weapons and training networks, complicity with AQMI (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and other jihadist groups operating in the Sahel, facilitating arms trafficking and kidnappings.'
These elements have led several observers and states to characterize 'the instrumentalization of the Tindouf camps by the chief of staff General Saïd Chengriha, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and his advisers, for opaque paramilitary activities, far from the standards of international conventions on refugees.'
The situation in the Tindouf camps has deteriorated significantly. Recent protests erupted following what the Sahrawi Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADEDH) described as a 'horrific massacre' committed by the Algerian army in the Arkoub district of the Dakhla camp. The incident resulted in two deaths and nine injuries, with three victims in critical condition.
NGOs strongly condemned the Algerian army's actions, pointing out that Polisario militias not only failed to denounce the attack but actively aided in suppressing protesters demanding justice for the victims.
The growing discontent within the Tindouf camps has ignited an unprecedented wave of dissent, with frustrated Sahrawis openly demanding an end to decades of exploitation and false promises.
According to local sources, chants once unthinkable in Polisario-controlled zones are now echoing through the camps. As they muster the courage to oppose the separatist group's illusive agenda, this emerging cohort of Sahrawi dissidents is calling not just for relief from their prolonged suffering, but for the immediate acceptance of Morocco's autonomy initiative as the only viable path forward.
The total collapse of Polisario's Algeria-sponsored separatism is increasingly within reach
The United Kingdom's recent alignment with Morocco on the Western Sahara marks a profound geopolitical shift. Not only does this shift consolidate the position of the world's major powers – including the US, France, and Spain – in favor of Morocco's territorial integrity, but also signals the collapse of the post-colonial ambivalence that long enabled Algerian-sponsored separatism to persist.
That even former colonial actors now endorse Morocco's autonomy initiative reflects a recalibration of global realpolitik: sovereignty, territorial integrity, and strategic partnership now outweigh outdated fantasies of Balkanizing North Africa.
If regional tensions continue to escalate and mounting intelligence confirms links between Polisario members and activities that undermine regional security, the path toward designating the group as a terrorist organization in the medium term will become significantly clearer—and more politically inevitable.
While the Polisario has not completely disappeared, it is weakened politically, diplomatically and militarily. The balance of power clearly favors Morocco, which is advancing its autonomy initiative, regional development plans, and garnering increasing international support.
If the current trend continues, particularly if the US administration designates the Polisario as a terrorist organization, Algeria may find itself forced to reconsider its support for the separatist group to avoid incurring the wrath of America and the Western world.
Read also: Hilale Slams Algeria's Regime Over Regional Destabilization, Hypocrisy, and Separatism
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Morocco World
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In early August, the Royal Armed Forces advanced to secure the territory, and on August 14, in an unmistakable rejection of the Algiers plan, the region's tribal leaders traveled to Rabat to renew their bay'a to the Moroccan monarch – a legal and political snub to both Mauritania's new rulers and Algeria's military establishment. Hassan II's position was unapologetically blunt: 'If Mauritania chooses a path, we shall stand beside her – on the condition it does not touch a single inch of Moroccan soil nor place a foreign frontier between Morocco and Mauritania.' 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