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A courtesy call or more? Pakistan Army's top general holds defence, security talks with Sri Lanka officials
The Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army Lieutenant General Syed Aamer Raza paid a courtesy call on Sri Lanka's Deputy Minister of Defence Aruna Jayasekara and discussed strengthening bilateral defence cooperation.
Raza is currently on an official visit to Sri Lanka. The visiting delegation received a warm welcome and engaged in a cordial and constructive dialogue.
His discussions with Jayasekara on Tuesday centred on strengthening bilateral defence cooperation, with a particular focus on capacity building and the exchange of best practices, the Ministry of Defence here said.
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'Both parties emphasised the significance of enhancing preparedness and resilience, especially in the context of natural disaster response,' the ministry said in a statement.
He also paid courtesy calls on Defence Ministry Secretary Sampath Thuyacontha.
Sri Lankan officials acknowledged Pakistan's long-standing support in the form of military training opportunities extended to Sri Lankan personnel, which have played a pivotal role in professional development and fostering regional collaboration.
The talks referred to the recent Sri Lanka–Pakistan Bilateral Defence Dialogue held in Islamabad in April, highlighting its importance in reinforcing defence sector partnerships across multiple domains.
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Indian Express
11 minutes ago
- Indian Express
Kargil War: Why did Pakistan embark on such a reckless gamble?
In the summer of 1999, India and Pakistan fought a short but intense war in the Kargil mountains. The conflict broke out just a few months after both sides had agreed to resume peace talks after signing the Lahore Declaration. Pakistan's infiltration across the LoC was bold, secretive, and ultimately disastrous. The operation was spearheaded by units from Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry, who crossed into Indian territory during winter and occupied strategic heights that were usually left unmanned during the harsh cold months. The intrusion was kept secret from the world, and even from many within Pakistan. It was passed off as an act by Kashmiri militants, though it was a military operation planned and executed by the Pakistan Army. When the snow melted and the Indian army discovered the intrusion, a two-month-long military operation ensued to repel the infiltrators. The world watched with bated breath, aware that both countries had tested nuclear weapons the year before. But a basic question has remained unanswered: Why did Pakistan embark on such a reckless gamble? The answer lies not just in what happened in the mountains, but in the larger political and military thinking in Pakistan at the time. When viewed through the lens of realism, this thinking becomes more comprehensible. One of the main ideas used to explain war is realism, which views international politics as a game of power among self-interested states. In this worldview, survival comes first, and power is the means to secure it. States must rely on themselves. When one state becomes stronger, others feel threatened and seek ways to protect themselves. This logic has shaped how Pakistan's military sees its security. The 1971 war, which split the country and led to the loss of East Pakistan, left a lasting impact. Since then, Pakistan has watched India expand its conventional strength. The gap widened after India opened its economy in the 1990s. The 1998 nuclear tests changed the equation. With both sides now armed, Pakistan assumed nuclear deterrence would prevent full-scale war, allowing for small-scale military action without provoking a major retaliation. This thinking follows what scholars call the 'stability-instability paradox' – the idea that nuclear balance at the top makes lower-level conflict seem more manageable. Kargil was shaped by this logic. In early 1999, when Indian troops left some high-altitude posts due to the harsh weather, Pakistan saw this as an opportunity. Its army quietly moved in, hoping to create military and diplomatic pressure, push India to negotiate, and draw international attention to Kashmir. The belief was that the conflict would remain localised and not escalate. It was a risky attempt to change the status quo on the ground. But it rested on a miscalculation. Pakistan assumed India would avoid escalation, fearing that pushing too far might trigger a nuclear response. That turned out to be wrong. India responded forcefully. Most countries backed India, including the United States, which was already wary of Pakistan's ties to armed groups. What Pakistan thought was a bold strategy ended up as a major diplomatic disaster. To understand why Pakistan undertook such a risky operation, it is necessary to examine the dynamics within Pakistan. While realism explains the external logic, the deeper reasons lie in Pakistan's internal power structure. The military, not elected leaders, controls national security decisions. General Pervez Musharraf, then army chief, planned and carried out the Kargil operation without involving the civilian government. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was reportedly unaware of the full plan until it was already in motion. This reflects a long-standing pattern. The military has long considered itself the guardian of national ideology. Its institutional culture is steeped in the belief that it alone can safeguard Pakistan's interests, especially against India. Over time, this self-image has fostered a command system that acts independently, often at odds with the country's elected leadership. A successful military operation in Kargil could have achieved multiple objectives for the army. It could have derailed peace talks, weakened civilian authority, and reinforced the military's control over foreign policy. This also aligns with the idea of a diversionary war, where external conflict is used to distract from internal instability or consolidate power. Whether Kargil was intended as such is debatable, but the outcome certainly shifted the domestic balance in favour of the military. Within months, Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif in a coup and took control. Power balances and military planning explain much of Pakistan's actions, but they don't tell the full story. Kargil was not just a tactical operation. It was also shaped by how Pakistan sees itself, how it views India, and how it interprets its own history. In international politics, constructivist thinkers argue that ideas and identity shape state behaviour, sometimes more than calculations of power. In Pakistan's case, this is clear. Its military has long viewed India as a permanent threat and Kashmir as a mission left unfinished since Partition. This belief runs deep. For many in the military, Kargil was part of a larger struggle that includes the wars of 1947, 1965, and 1971. The idea that Kashmir is Pakistan's 'jugular vein' has been repeated across generations, from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to General Asim Munir. It is a belief woven into textbooks, media narratives and political rhetoric. For Pakistan's political elite, especially the military establishment, Kashmir is not just a territory. It is a symbol of Pakistan's ideological foundation as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The Kargil operation was framed as a 'freedom struggle' led by Kashmiri mujahideen – an effort to shape an international narrative using the language of resistance and self-determination and justify its actions. However, this narrative collapsed under scrutiny. Satellite images, captured prisoners, and mounting casualties revealed that the intruders were not local militants but regular soldiers. The global community was not deceived. Instead of garnering sympathy, Pakistan faced sharp criticism even from its friends and allies. In the end, the Kargil operation failed on all fronts. It did not bring India to the negotiating table. Pakistan's claim that it was a freedom struggle found few takers. Most countries saw it for what it was – an act of aggression. Even close allies like China and Saudi Arabia did not support the move. The biggest setback came from the United States. In July, Nawaz Sharif met President Bill Clinton in Washington, who made it clear that Pakistan had to withdraw unconditionally from Kargil. Soon after, Pakistani forces began to pull back. By the end of July, the conflict was over. From a realist perspective, the operation made little strategic sense. The costs were high. Pakistan didn't just lose soldiers and equipment. It also faced diplomatic isolation and severe reputational damage. India reclaimed most of the lost territory. Politically, Pakistan was left vulnerable. At home, the civilian leadership lost control, and the military's credibility suffered a significant blow when details of the operation became public. The bigger failure was in planning. Tactical advances on the ground were not backed by a long-term political strategy. There was no clear idea of what to do after occupying the heights. This exposed serious flaws in Pakistan's strategic thinking. The central miscalculation was nuclear deterrence. Pakistan assumed that its nuclear weapons would prevent India from responding forcefully. That belief was tested and proved wrong. India pushed back without crossing the nuclear threshold. Kargil ultimately demonstrated that even between nuclear powers, limited wars are possible when one side misreads the risks. Kargil remains a sharp reminder of what can go wrong when military ambition, weak civilian oversight, and national identity mix without restraint. For Pakistan, it exposed the dangers of planning a war in secret, without broader political or institutional checks. It showed that short-term gains on the battlefield can lead to long-term setbacks. It also proved that having nuclear weapons does not give a free hand to take reckless action. What initially appeared to be a bold move ultimately ended in failure and isolation. For India, the conflict revealed serious gaps in intelligence and early warning systems. But it also showed India's ability to respond quickly, with both force and diplomacy, once the crisis began. Twenty-six years later, the scars of Kargil have not faded. Not just in the bunkers and memorials, but in the questions that were never fully answered. Questions about who decides when to go to war, how countries read power, and why they sometimes walk into traps of their own making. How does the idea of realism, which views international politics as a game of power among self-interested states, explain Pakistan's Kargil operation? How does Pakistan's internal power structure explain the decision to carry out the Kargil operation? In international politics, constructivist thinkers argue that ideas and identity shape state behaviour, sometimes more than calculations of power. Evaluate Pakistan's Kargil operation through the constructivist lens. Pakistan assumed that its nuclear weapons would prevent India from responding forcefully. But how did India's response challenge the assumptions about the nuclear threshold? Kargil remains a sharp reminder of what can go wrong when military ambition, weak civilian oversight, and national identity mix without restraint. Comment. (The author is a Professor at MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.) Share your thoughts and ideas on UPSC Special articles with Subscribe to our UPSC newsletter and stay updated with the news cues from the past week. Stay updated with the latest UPSC articles by joining our Telegram channel – IndianExpress UPSC Hub, and follow us on Instagram and X.
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First Post
41 minutes ago
- First Post
Pahalgam attack mastermind Hashim Musa reportedly killed in Operation Mahadev. Who was he?
Main: Indian forces have reportedly killed three terrorists, including Hashim Musa aka Suleman Shah, the mastermind of the Pahalgam terror attack. Security forces had launched Operation Mahadev, a combined effort of the Indian Army, Jammu and Kashmir Police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), after a device authorities had been tracking since the Pahalgam terror attack made a suspicious call. Here's what we know about Musa and how it all went down read more Jammu and Kashmir Police had released sketches of Pahalgam attackers. X/@AnantnagPolice Indian forces have reportedly killed Hashim Musa, the mastermind of the Pahalgam terror attack. Musa, aka Suleman Shah, is said to be one of three terrorists killed in a gunbattle on Monday in Operation Mahadev. The encounter is said to have occurred near Srinagar. While the identities of the terrorist are yet to be confirmed, sources said they could be Musa, Yasir aka Harris and Abu Hamza. But who was Musa? How did security forces reportedly kill him? STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Who was Musa? Musa was previously a para-commando of the Pakistan Army's Special Service Group (SSG). He is believed to be in his late 20s. He joined the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) after being dismissed from his army post. The Pakistan Army is said to have recruited Musa to bolster the LeT's Kashmir operations. Musa is said to have been a top LeT commander. He is rumoured to have been proficient in unconventional warfare and covert operations. He is also believed to be able to use complex weapons, excel in hand-to-hand combat, as well as have navigation and survival skills. He was sent to target civilians and security forces. 'It is possible that he was loaned by Pakistan special forces, like Special Service Group (SSG), to LeT,' an officer was quoted as saying by Times of India. His use of advanced weapons, including M4 carbines, is another indicator of his special training. The officer said Musa's background shows that the ISI was involved in the Pahalgam terror attack. Indian security officers inspect the site in Pahalgam where militants indiscriminately opened fired at tourists at Pahalgam. AP He is said to have been involved in several other terror attacks in Kashmir including the incidents in Gagangir and Baramulla. The first incident, which occurred in October 2024, left seven dead including a doctor. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The second claimed the lives of two army personnel and two army porters. Musa is said to have lost weight in an attempt to change his appearance and stay ahead of the authorities. He is believed to have entered India sometime in the past two years. 'We believe he [Musa] entered from the Samba and Kathua side and then moved towards Kishtwar. There is no local support for these terrorists so they mostly live in tents in the dense forests and caves and keep moving, which is also why Musa hasn't been arrested earlier,' a source earlier told ThePrint. Musa is said to have operated mainly in Kashmir's Budgam district, which is near Srinagar. He is said to have been coordinating with other Pakistan-backed terror outfits in the Valley. His background is believed to have been revealed by one of the LeT's Over Ground Workers in Kashmir. Indian authorities had arrested more than a dozen of these OGWs in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD These individuals played a critical link in organising the supplies that the Pakistani terrorists needed. They are also have said to have scouted the site of the terror attack. How did security forces reportedly kill Musa? Now, let's take a look at Operation Mahadev. It was a combined effort from the Indian Army, Jammu and Kashmir Police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). It was named after Mahadev Peak in Srinagar. The firefight occurred in the upper reaches of Dachigam Forest, which is in Srinagar's Harwan area. The army is said to have been keeping a watchful eye on that area. (File) Indian Army personnel during a counterterror operation following a terrorist attack on an army convoy, in Kathua district, on July 9, 2024. PTI File The army in early July received a communication it deemed suspicious. The security forces are said to have been trying to tracking the movements of the terrorists. The 24 Rashtriya Rifles, 4 Para, J&K Police, and CRPF had been sweeping Dachegam for the past two weeks. Then, two days ago, a device security forces had been tracking since the Pahalgam terror attack made a suspicious call. The LeT often uses Chinese-made equipment to send encrypted messages. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The device is believed to be a Huawei satellite phone. This development set off alarm bells in the security establishment. Security forces quickly narrowed the location of the device to the Dachigam forests, where it suspected the terrorists were hiding. A full-scale operation was quickly launched on Monday in Harwan's Mulnar area. Information from the nomads also helped security forces track down the terrorists. A joint team of 24 Rashtriya Rifles and 4 PARA found the terrorists. Sources said the terrorists were caught off guard as they were napping inside the tent – a common tactic they use to keep their energy up. The elite unit opened fire immediately. Musa and the others were gunned down during the operation. Visuals of the hideout of the terrorists deep in the forests shows a large green sheet between trees. Clothes, blankets, plastic bags, food, and plates can scattered underneath this. 'There is a high probability that the militants killed in this encounter may have been involved in the brutal Pahalgam terror attack that took place on April 22, 2025, in the Baisaran Valley area of Jammu and Kashmir, which claimed the lives of 26 innocent civilians', a high-level source told India Today. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The operation to find other possible terrorists continues. 'Three terrorists have been neutralised in an intense firefight. Operation continues," Chinar Corps wrote on X. At least 26 people, mostly tourists, were killed and several others were injured after terrorists opened fire on a popular meadow near Pahalgam in Kashmir on April 22. The terror attack was the deadliest incident in the region since the 2019 Pulwama strike. With inputs from agencies
Hans India
41 minutes ago
- Hans India
Operation Mahadev exposes ISI backed Lashkar-e-Taiba plot behind Pahalgam massacre
The role of the Pakistan Army in the Pahalgam terror attack that claimed 26 lives became clearer when the Indian security forces gunned down Sulaiman, considered to be the mastermind. Suleman, who is part of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which carried out the April 22 attack, also goes by the name Hashim Moosa. He was an ex-Pakistani army official who was killed during Operation Mahadev, carried out by the CRPF and Jammu and Kashmir Police. During the operation, two other terrorists, Abu Hamza and Yasir, too, were eliminated by the security forces. "Three terrorists have been neutralised in an intense firefight. Operation Continues," the official X handle of the Indian Army's Chinar Corps said. The killing of Sulaiman further cements the fact that the ISI had played a major role in the Pahalgam attack. Suleman was a highly trained terrorist and an asset of the ISI. He was roped in to oversee the attack due to his expertise and the time he had spent in the Pakistan Army. The probe into the Pahalgam attack showed that it was the ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba that carried out this attack. It was a guarded conspiracy, and the planners decided to hire only Pakistani terrorists as they wanted it to be a top secret. While at first the role of some locals did come up, the probe found that while some had offered shelter and food, they had no clue about the attack. In the run-up to the planning, the ISI had roped in Sajid Jutt to deploy only Pakistani fighters to carry out the attack. Only a handful of people were involved in this attack. Jutt was told to identify Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists who were fighting in the Valley to carry out the attack, and at any cost, not involve any locals, as they did not want the details to come out. The attack squad was led by Sulaiman, who was part of the Pakistan army's special forces commando squad. He has been in the Valley since 2022 after having trained at the Muridke camp of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It may be recalled that in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, India had carried out Operation Sindoor during which Muridke, the primary training facility of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, had been hit. Investigations showed that Sulaiman was at the Tral forest on April 15. This means that he was close to the attack site at Baisaran nearly seven days before the strike. Sulaiman, according to the investigating agencies, was also involved in the April 2023 attack on an army truck in Poonch in which five soldiers were killed. The role of the locals had cropped up after the arrest of Parvaiz Ahmad Jothar from Batkote, Pahalgam, and Bashir Ahmad Jothar from Hill Park, Pahalgam. However, the probe learnt that they had a limited role. They only provided shelter, food, and some logistics for a few thousand rupees. During their questioning, they said that they had no clue about the attack and where it was taking place. They also said that they were not told about the plan by the terrorists. This suggests that the ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba wanted to maintain utmost secrecy and planned the entire strike on a need-to-know basis. The Pahalgam attack was clearly aimed at creating a huge communal divide and also to stop the thriving tourism industry in Jammu and Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370.
