Trump faces internal Republican rift over possible Iran intervention
The prospect of United States military involvement in Iran has exposed growing divisions within the Republican coalition, particularly among members of former President Donald Trump's political base, some of whom are urging caution against further entanglement in the Middle East.
Several prominent figures associated with the so-called 'America First' movement — a key component of Trump's electoral support in 2016 and 2024 — have voiced concern over reports that the US could join Israeli efforts to target Iran's nuclear infrastructure in the absence of a diplomatic solution.
Steve Bannon, Trump's former chief strategist and a longstanding advocate of non-interventionist policies, said the US should not repeat past military engagements without broad national support. 'We can't do this again,' Bannon said at a press briefing in Washington on Wednesday. 'We can't have another Iraq.'
Bannon reiterated his position on his War Room podcast, where he was joined by Jack Posobiec, another prominent conservative commentator. Posobiec argued that involving the US in regime change efforts could lead to unintended consequences. Bannon responded that such political change, if it occurs, 'has to come from the people, not from a foreign power.'
The comments reflect wider concerns among certain Republican factions that military action could mark a departure from Trump's traditionally cautious approach to foreign conflicts. Critics have pointed to the potential deployment of advanced US munitions, including bunker-busting bombs, as a sign of possible escalation.
Iran has issued warnings about any direct American involvement, suggesting it would have significant consequences, though it has not specified what form those might take.
Trump downplays internal dissent
Asked about opposition within his support base, Trump appeared dismissive of the idea that the issue could cause lasting political damage. 'My supporters are more in love with me today than they were even at election time,' he said at the White House on Wednesday. 'I only want one thing: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.'
While acknowledging that 'some are a little bit unhappy now,' Trump insisted that others agree with his assessment that preventing Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal is a priority.
'I'm not looking to fight,' he said. 'But if it's a choice between them fighting or having a nuclear weapon, you have to do what you have to do.'
Trump has not formally announced any military plans, stating only that he has 'some ideas' on the path forward.
Intraparty tensions
The debate has highlighted a divide within the Republican Party over how the US should respond to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Marc Short, a former senior adviser to Trump and an ally of ex-Vice President Mike Pence, described the disagreement as 'a pretty large rift.' However, he suggested that Trump's political base was likely to remain loyal.
'Most of the president's followers are loyal to him more so than to any worldview,' Short said.
Others argue that supporting Israel could strengthen Trump's standing among more traditional conservative voters. A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted in March found that 48% of Republicans supported using US military force to defend Israel, compared with 28% who disagreed. Among Democrats, only 25% agreed, while 52% expressed opposition.
Iran has consistently denied seeking nuclear weapons, but US and Israeli officials believe Tehran's programme could lead to regional instability. Analysts have warned that an Iranian nuclear capability could trigger a wider arms race in the Middle East.
MAGA figures call for restraint
Bannon urged the administration to provide greater clarity on its intentions. 'This is one of the oldest civilisations in the world, with over 90 million people,' he said. 'This is not something you play around with. You have to think this through, and the American people have to be on board.'
Other high-profile Republicans have echoed those concerns. Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene wrote on social media: 'Anyone calling for the US to become fully involved in the Israel–Iran war is not America First. We are tired of foreign wars.'
Former Fox News presenter Tucker Carlson has also criticised interventionist rhetoric, including in a recent exchange with Senator Ted Cruz, in which Carlson challenged Cruz's stance on regime change in Iran.
Senator Lindsey Graham, a long-time Republican figure on foreign affairs, took a different view, telling Fox News he hoped Trump would support Israel's campaign. 'Iran is an existential threat to our friends in Israel,' Graham said.
Vice President JD Vance attempted to address the debate by expressing confidence in the president's judgment. 'People are right to be worried about foreign entanglement after the last 25 years of foreign policy. But I believe the president has earned some trust on this issue,' he wrote online.
As of Wednesday evening, no decision had been announced. Trump said discussions were ongoing and that a final determination had yet to be made.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
EVN Report
9 hours ago
- EVN Report
Advocating for Justice After the Peace Agreement
On August 11, 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan jointly released the full text of their negotiated peace agreement, called the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Though the agreement was reached in principle on March 13 , it wasn't published until recently following the Washington Summit hosted by President Trump. While the agreement after decades of failed negotiations is newsworthy, the text itself isn't particularly surprising. In the words of conflict expert Olesya Vartanyan, ' why did it take so long to develop and agree on something so basic? ' Most of the agreement reiterates fundamental principles that have been long established in international law, such as respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity and refraining from intervening in the internal affairs of each other. However, some articles of the peace agreement go beyond the norm, with one requiring both countries to end their international lawsuits against each other. Article XV of the peace agreement states that [T]he Parties shall withdraw, dismiss, or otherwise settle any and all interstate claims … related to the issues existed between the Parties before the signing of this Agreement in any legal forum … and shall not initiate such claims … [nor] be involved in any manner into such claims … initiated against the other Party by any third-party. Put simply, this article requires both parties to terminate all ongoing international cases against each other and to refrain from initiating new ones. This would affect the high-profile cases before the International Court of Justice, for which preliminary measures were issued in December 2021, as well as the less-publicized proceedings between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the European Court of Human Rights and the Permanent Court of Arbitration . All of these cases must be terminated, without any judicial conclusion, within the first month of the peace agreement coming into effect. What the peace agreement does is prioritize peace over justice. The question of what should come first, peace or justice, is an old question in the field of transitional justice. The prevailing view is to find a balanced, context-specific approach where peace and justice mechanisms complement one another. However, that often means one is at least partially sacrificed to preserve the other. The peace agreement limits the pursuit of justice, but perhaps less significantly than many might assume. Lawyers prize court rulings because they establish legal certainty and create authoritative judgments that others (including other courts) can rely on. For victims though, a successful judgment might not result in any meaningful justice for them. Justice is bottom-up, not top-down. From decades of experience, we've learned that achieving a sense of closure after a period of grave injustice requires a response that is inclusive, victim-centered and supports community ownership . A top-down imposed sense of justice achieves none of that. Examples of successful bottom-up approaches to achieve a sense of justice among the broader populace are South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, created after apartheid, and Rwanda's Gacaca trials established after the genocide. Both mechanisms gave victims an opportunity to share their experiences publicly, while incorporating processes aimed at holding offenders responsible. Even with almost unlimited resources, top-down approaches can fail at producing social reconciliation. The most prominent example is the former Yugoslav states. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was created by the United Nations to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity occurring during the Yugoslav wars. It operated for 24 years and was successful in indicting 161 alleged perpetrators and holding 111 trials. From the perspective of legal administration, the Tribunal was a success. From the perspective of social healing, it was an abject failure. Slobodan Milošević was charged with sixty-six counts (he died before his trial ended) yet is still praised as a great leader, denial of the Srebrenica genocide still exists, and distrust and prejudice between the peoples in the area remains strong. For all the good the Tribunal made in establishing a historical record and putting perpetrators in jail, many people on the ground were dissatisfied with it, denied its findings, and felt that justice was not done . This peace agreement cements what we already knew: justice and closure won't come from above but must come from the people. The pressing question, then, is how. From a legal standpoint, the peace agreement does not restrict cases brought by individuals. This means that cases brought by individuals to the European Court of Human Rights, national ombudsmen, or to UN bodies are unaffected. These methods can still establish a record of rights violations and potentially ensure compensation for the victims. However, beyond these individual pathways there is the possibility of something grander: a truth commission involving both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. A truth commission is an official, nonjudicial body tasked with establishing the facts after a period of mass human rights abuses. It's a tool used in the field of transitional justice after a systemic change has, such as a peace agreement, allowed for an investigation into past abuses, abuses too expansive for a traditional judicial system to manage effectively or fairly. Notable examples include South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, developed after the fall of apartheid regime, and Colombia's Comisión de la Verdad, established through the peace accord between the government and the FARC-EP rebels. The scale of extrajudicial killings, mob violence, declarations of hate, and episodes of ethnic cleansing that have occurred between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the break-up of the Soviet Union is more than any judicial body, be it the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights, can thoroughly address. For any sort of comprehensive justice to occur, there needs to be broad engagement of both populations. This is something only a truth commission can provide. The alternative is to end the frozen conflict but remain in a cold peace. One precedent exists for a truth commission between two states: the joint effort of Indonesia and Timor Leste. It was created to investigate the atrocities committed during Indonesia's brutal response to Timor Leste's independence referendum, where the Indonesian military killed 100,000–180,000 people. Despite being the clear perpetrator, Indonesia agreed to participate, and when the commission released its final report condemning abuses by the Indonesian military, the president fully endorsed the report. Indonesia was willing to do this because the truth commission provided an opportunity to turn the page, avoid lengthy individual prosecutions, and normalize bilateral relations. To be clear, a bilateral truth commission between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn't going to materialize any time soon. Expecting one now is as unrealistic as thinking the two governments could sign a single document that resolves all the problems between them. The point is simpler, but essential: anyone who advocates for justice should know that the work doesn't end with a signature. A peace agreement can set the terms for interstate relations, but on its own it cannot resolve injustices, deliver accountability, or heal relations between people.
EVN Report
2 days ago
- EVN Report
Iran's Strategic Uncertainty and Armenia's Security Challenges
Following the Second Karabakh War, and particularly after Azerbaijan's assault on Armenia's sovereign territory in September 2022, many observers began describing Iran's regional policy as increasingly pro-Armenian. While Tehran continues to pursue a broadly balanced approach in the South Caucasus , this perception has been reinforced by frequent high-level visits with Armenian officials, regular statements affirming Armenia's territorial integrity, and a sustained ' war of words ' with Baku. Tensions deepened amid reports of Azerbaijani involvement in Israel's strike on Iran. Both the recent 12-day Israeli-American-Iranian war and shifting Iran-Azerbaijan dynamics carry direct implications for Armenia's security. As the risk of renewed escalation lingers, this article assesses those risks from the perspective of Armenia's security. Iran-U.S.-Israeli War and Its Outcome After Donald Trump returned to the White House and declared his strategic goal of becoming a ' peacemaker president ', mediated talks resumed between Washington and Tehran on Iran's nuclear program. Following five Oman-mediated meetings described as ' successful ', the parties appeared close to reaching an agreement. However, shortly before the sixth round of negotiations, Israel attacked Iran, killing key nuclear scientists and senior military officials. Israel subsequently convinced the U.S. to join in the military action against Iran, using ' bunker buster' bombs to strike Iran's Fordow nuclear facility. Though a ceasefire was established after 12 days of conflict, uncertainties about Iran's nuclear program and the future of negotiations persist. All sides declared ' victory ,' yet paradoxically, each fell short of its strategic objectives. This phase of the conflict left relations between the parties no clearer than before. Uncertainty over Iran's nuclear program persists, as U.S. military strikes provided no conclusive evidence that it has been fully disrupted. Iran has acknowledged significant damage to its nuclear infrastructure, likely delaying any potential nuclear weapon development by months or years (whether Iran intends to create such a weapon is a separate discussion). Reports suggest Iran preemptively safeguarded some of its enriched uranium, suggesting Tehran may have had advance knowledge of the U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, according to American sources , informal U.S.-Iran negotiations continued even during the strikes. The war also exposed the vulnerability of Iran's military and strategic infrastructure, which can be attributed to several objective realities: The once-united ' Axis of Resistance '—the main pillar of Iran's regional policy and security—is now fragmented. Syria no longer operates under pro-Iranian rule, Hezbollah has suffered significant losses, and Houthis forces face more direct threats and targeted U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, Iran's strategic allies, Russia and China , offered nothing beyond condemnatory statements during the war. Not all of Israel's strategic goals materialized. Its expectation of regime change in Iran proved overly ambitious. While some Iranian ethnic minority movements receive external backing, foreign actors have used separatist rhetoric more as leverage than as a genuine push for Iran's partition. Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example, have encouraged Turkic separatism among Iran's Azeris, yet both understand that Iran's fragmentation could also embolden Kurdish separatism—an outcome Turkey opposes. Likewise, Pakistan condemned the Israeli strikes, likely wary of unrest among its own Baluchi population. Despite public discontent with the regime, Iranian society carries the traumatic memory of the Iran-Iraq War and the painful experience of a foreign-backed coup (the overthrow of Mossadegh ). These historical wounds make expectations of a mass internal uprising against the backdrop of missile strikes unrealistic. While some social media voices portrayed the conflict as a war against the regime rather than the people of Iran, these perspectives were largely perceived as disconnected from actual Iranian sentiment. Nevertheless, despite the regime maintaining its formal integrity, recent developments suggest the possibility of internal change. President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi took on key decision-making roles during the war, emphasizing continued diplomacy and distinguishing between U.S. and Israeli approaches. Following the war, both officials gave interviews to American media highlighting their willingness to resume negotiations on Iran's peaceful nuclear program. In an interview with Tucker Carlson, Pezeshkian stated that Iran would welcome American investors if sanctions were lifted, clarifying that 'the slogan 'Death to America,' by no means refers to the American people, or even officials .' While Iranian conservatives have severely criticized these positions, they will continue to shape Iran's foreign policy as long as distrust in the president remains incomplete. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was absent from the public sphere during the military strikes and did not attend the funerals of military and political figures. The vulnerability of Iran's airspace calls into question both the viability of holding mass public events and the regime's ideological slogans of 'Death to America' and 'Death to Israel.' These slogans are not just rhetoric but form the ideological backbone of the regime. The succession process of the Supreme Leader and the role of a weakened Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may determine whether Iran pursues ideological reorientation or further escalation with the United States. Rather than complete regime change, Iran may undergo a transformation of its political identity, shifting from the Shiite Islamic concept of ' Velayate Faghih ' toward a more national political strategy. This trend is already visible in Khamenei's commissioning of a patriotic song during Ashura ceremonies, Pezeshkian's emphasis on the need to start dialogue with the political opposition, and even in calls from conservative actors, saying ' we need change .' Thus, Iran's policy in the near future faces strategic uncertainty due to both external conflict threats (with Israel and the U.S.) and internal leadership instability. Three possible scenarios emerge: New military escalation Diplomatic reintegration (perhaps with or without a new nuclear agreement) Or the continuation of the current status quo of strategic uncertainty Iran's Political Uncertainty and Its Impact on the South Caucasus and Armenia Developments around Iran could directly affect the security of the South Caucasus, particularly Armenia's. Recent threats to Armenia included potential breakdown of negotiations with Azerbaijan, political conditions favoring military escalation, ongoing disagreements over the Syunik transit route, and the continuing blockade of Armenia. An Israeli attack on Iran, especially with U.S. participation, could intensify these threats for several reasons: First, conducting negotiations while simultaneously planning what could be termed a ' preemptive attack ', undermines established norms in international relations and encourages other actors to consider military options even during peace talks. Engaging Iran in a protracted war would shift the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Military operations near the region could embolden Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, particularly since a conflict with Iran would jeopardize the security of connections between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Israel's plans for a protracted war include activating separatist forces inside Iran. This scenario would require using the Azeri-speaking population in northern Iran, with Azerbaijan playing a significant role. Such involvement would enhance Azerbaijan's political importance to the West, especially Israel, potentially creating an additional threat for Armenia. If these plans were viable, the transit route through Syunik might become less urgent since Azerbaijan would already have a land border with Nakhichevan. However, there's no guarantee that northern Iran would seek independence or unification with Azerbaijan, even during internal chaos. Consequently, in the medium term, Azerbaijan would likely still have additional political justifications for demanding a transit route through Syunik, similar to the situation described earlier. On the very first day of the war, news spread in Iranian media that one of Iran's neighbors had supported Israel's attack on Iran. Azerbaijani officials denied these rumors. Nevertheless, the issue became a topic of discussion during a later telephone conversation between the presidents of Iran and Azerbaijan. During his subsequent visit to Azerbaijan, Iranian President Pezeshkian expressed satisfaction with the ' responsible position ' taken by member states of the Economic Cooperation Organization during the war. While some Iranian circles still advocate for a cautious approach toward Azerbaijan, officials are working to ease tensions through diplomatic engagements. The declaration adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul—which referenced the right of return for 'Western Azerbaijanis'—represents one such diplomatic effort. Despite the Iranian ambassador to Armenia stating , 'The use of such wording should be avoided. The name 'Western Azerbaijan' is the name of one of the provinces of the Republic of Iran. It cannot be used to name any other geographical area, especially if it implies any form of territorial claims,' Iran maintained its signature on the document. Similarly, Pezeshkian did not cancel his visit to Karabakh and engaged in cordial discussions with Aliyev regarding destruction attributed to Armenians. The U.S.-backed Syunik Transit Route and Iran's Response Following the war, developments emerged regarding the proposed transit route through Syunik and the U.S. proposal for this route. While official details of the proposal, (or possibly multiple proposals) remained undisclosed, discussions about this possibility spread through both Armenian and international media after the Carnegie Endowment published an article and the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey issued a statement . Iran remained silent for several days. Eventually, during a telephone conversation between the security council secretaries of Iran and Armenia, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity in any project implementation. In a subsequent interview with Iranian Public Television, Iran's ambassador emphasized that Tehran would accept any project that aligned with Armenia's security interests. Ali Khamenei's foreign affairs advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, also reaffirmed Iran's opposition to the 'Zangezur corridor' though notably did not address potential American involvement in the transit road. Despite Armenian officials' announcement that Armenia would not 'lease land' to America, it seemed unlikely that American proposals would end there. Indeed, the peace declaration initialed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 at the White House—in the presence of and witnessed by the U.S. President— included an important provision about the transit road through Meghri, to be named the 'Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity' (TRIPP). Iran's reaction to this event was twofold: First, even before the signing, an article by Ali Akbar Velayati published on August 8 described in harsh terms the path 'to be given to a third party.' Second, Tehran's official response came through a press release from the Foreign Ministry which welcomed peace efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan while expressing concerns about potential American presence in the region. In the days following the declaration, after telephone conversations between Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Pezeshkian , and between Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Abbas Araghchi , and particularly after Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan's visit to Tehran, Pezeshkian and Araghchi issued several statements . They affirmed that Iran's red lines were respected in the declaration, noting there was no mention of a third-party presence, especially armed forces, and that Armenia had assured them the declaration would not negatively impact the shared Iran-Armenia border. Both officials also highlighted the widespread disinformation circulating in the country about this issue. This dualism in Iran's responses should be analyzed primarily through the lens of Iran's domestic politics. President Pezeshkian's government faces criticism for emphasizing the importance of U.S. negotiations after the war. Conservative circles are characterizing recent developments in the South Caucasus as consequences of Pezeshkian's policy that work against Iran's interests. However, these circles lack decision-making authority. When analyzing Iran's response, one should rely exclusively on statements from those with foreign policy authority—namely, members of the government. I believe that President Pezeshkian's August 18 visit to Armenia will provide an important opportunity to clear up existing misconceptions. Iran's balanced response to the fundamental shift that occurred on August 8 in the South Caucasus serves as an important indicator of Iran's potential future role and the evolving Iran-U.S. relations in the broader region. While Iran continues to navigate its ties with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, its fraught relations with Israel and the U.S.—and the prospect of further clashes—pose potential security risks for Armenia. At the same time, the war exposed the vulnerability of Iran's strategic infrastructure, and the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran engagement could trigger a broader regional realignment. Much will depend on whether the current ceasefire evolves into a lasting settlement through negotiations, rather than serving merely as a pause before renewed conflict.
Libyan Express
6 days ago
- Libyan Express
Trump says ‘no deal until there's a deal'
BY Libyan Express Aug 16, 2025 - 01:33 Trump says 'no deal until there's a deal' after Putin summit U.S. President Donald Trump said on Friday that his long-awaited meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska ended without any formal agreement, after nearly three hours of talks centered on the war in Ukraine. 'There's no deal until there's a deal,' Trump told reporters, acknowledging that no ceasefire or binding commitments were reached. The U.S. president described the discussions as 'very productive' and claimed 'some great progress' had been made, but offered no specifics. 'We didn't get there,' he added, before leaving without taking questions from the gathered press. The summit, held at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage, was part of Trump's effort to encourage direct negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. While stressing that he was not negotiating on Ukraine's behalf, Trump said he planned to arrange direct talks between Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin expressed hope that all sides would respect what had been discussed and hinted at the possibility of meeting again, but no follow-up summit has been scheduled. For Washington's allies in Europe and the Middle East — many of whom have a direct stake in regional stability and energy markets — the meeting's failure to produce a breakthrough underscores the difficulty of reaching a negotiated end to the conflict. The views expressed in Op-Ed pieces are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of Libyan Express. How to submit an Op-Ed: Libyan Express accepts opinion articles on a wide range of topics. Submissions may be sent to oped@ Please include 'Op-Ed' in the subject line.
