Great power rivalry and security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: Quest for Southeast Asia's strategic autonomy

Yahoo

11-08-2025

Eminent naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) recognised more than a century ago that sea power determines global politics. According to him, the Indian Ocean – being part of the Indo-Pacific (IP) – functions as the gateway to all 'seven seas', with global powers asserting their national destinies through maritime activity on these waters.
The IP has become the epicentre of global strategic competition, mostly driven by the intensifying rivalry between the United States (US) and China. This geopolitical contest has significant implications for Southeast Asia (SEA), a region strategically located at the intersection of key sea lanes, global trade routes, and interlinked security frameworks.
As the US and China deepen their economic and security footprints in the region, SEA countries face increasing pressure to balance conflicting interests without compromising their autonomy or sovereignty.
In the early 20th century, German geopolitical thinker Karl Haushofer first coined the term Indopazifischen Raum (the Indo-Pacific space) to highlight the strategic relevance of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Contemporary scholars such as Rory Medcalf view the Indo-Pacific as an interconnected space stretching from Africa's east coast, across the Indian Ocean and SEA, to the Pacific Islands.
A significant shift in this concept occurred in 2007 when Japan launched its 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) vision, promoting freedom of navigation and trade as a means to counter China's growing assertiveness.
By 2016, countries including the US, Australia, and India had formally adopted the FOIP concept in their national security and regional strategies.
A host of regional and international actors contribute to the volatility, complexity, and unpredictability of the IP.
Internal crises, structural limitations, and both traditional and non-traditional security threats challenge the strategies currently pursued by SEA nations.
In this context, strategic autonomy – the capacity to make independent decisions on foreign policy and security – has become a vital priority for the region.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) brings together the US, Australia, India, and Japan to address common concerns about regional stability and authoritarian expansion.
China advances its strategic objectives through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at building infrastructure networks to widen its economic and political influence.
On the military front, the US has bolstered its IP presence through expanded naval operations, joint exercises, and rotational deployments in Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
Meanwhile, China has accelerated its military development, expanding its blue-water navy, missile systems, and constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea.
This military buildup reflects a growing power struggle. Table 1 presents recent figures on military expenditure by major regional powers.
Military expenditure in the Indo-Pacific (2023) Country Military spending (US$ billion) Annual growth (%)
United States 877 3.2
China 292 7.2
India 81.4 13.0
Australia 38.3 8.3
Japan 50.2 5.6
Source: SIPRI, 2024
The IP also faces numerous non-traditional security threats that transcend national boundaries and require coordinated responses.
Climate change poses a severe threat to coastal populations in Indonesia and the Philippines. Cybersecurity is a growing area of concern, with increasing state-sponsored and non-state cyberattacks, digital espionage, and disinformation campaigns.
Southern Thailand and Mindanao continue to experience terrorism and extremism. The South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca are plagued by maritime piracy, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
While Asean remains committed to neutrality, inclusivity, and regional centrality, its effectiveness is increasingly constrained by divergent national interests among its member states.
To strengthen strategic autonomy, SEA must adopt a multi-layered approach, focusing on internal resilience through economic diversification, defence capability development, and regional cooperation.
Asean should undertake pragmatic institutional reforms to enhance its strategic relevance.
The organisation could introduce flexible mechanisms such as issue-based coalitions, empowered special envoys, and rapid response task forces for managing emerging crises.
Establishing a permanent Asean headquarters with expanded authority and longer-term mandates would improve operational efficiency and policy coherence. Strategic autonomy does not imply isolation.
SEA should engage in selective partnerships with emerging powers such as India, Japan, Türkiye, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and selected BRICS members.
These alliances could provide diplomatic alternatives, security cooperation, and development financing. For example, SEA could tap into Türkiye's defence industry and the BRICS New Development Bank for capability-building and infrastructure support.
To enhance strategic independence, SEA must also build its own regional defence capacity.
Adopting Türkiye's defence model – which emphasises local industry development, joint procurement, and technology transfers – could be instructive.
Shared training, logistics, and research initiatives among SEA countries would strengthen the region's collective security.
Greater trust and cooperation can also be fostered through collaboration on non-traditional security issues such as climate resilience, pandemic response, maritime governance, counter-terrorism, and cybersecurity.
Expanded cooperation with Türkiye, Gulf states, and BRICS members could support disaster management, public health, and digital security efforts.
SEA should remain committed to strategic autonomy by preserving freedom of choice and avoiding entanglement in great power rivalries.
To do so, the region must modernise its institutions, restore Asean's centrality, strengthen defence capabilities, and diversify its international partnerships.
Strategic autonomy for SEA in a contested IP depends on member states working collectively, demonstrating diplomatic flexibility, and adhering to both regional and international norms.
Brigadier General Faruque Ahmed is with the Bangladesh Army and is currently attending National Resilience College, PUSPAHANAS.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of Twentytwo13.