Jamming could be key to dodging China's PL-15 missiles

Asia Times

12 hours ago

A month ago, I wrote about India's loss of three Rafale fighter jets. I pointed out that the information was very preliminary until more was learned. At the time I wrote, we did not have information on Pakistani losses. We are still missing reliable accounts from either side.
However, the most important question, assuming the initial report's validity, is the performance of China's relatively new air-to-air missile, known as the PL-15.
PL-15 is a beyond visual range missile that is somewhat similar to US BVR missiles such as the AIM-120. It appears as a fast and powerful missile, flying to its target at Mach 5, which is the low end of hypersonic speed.
The missile has a dual-pulse engine. The first pulse, initiated at launch, drives the missile toward its target. As the missile runs out of energy near the target, a second engine pulse helps to re-accelerate the missile.
This significantly contributes to the PL-15's lethality, as speed makes evasion difficult for the target. The Russians and the Chinese have emphasized maneuverability as US warplanes, especially the F-35, mostly have not. The exception is the F-22, which is a stealth aircraft.
One reason for this is that the aerodynamic design of a stealth aircraft is primarily intended to evade radar (typically X-band). Additionally, Russia's fighters feature thrust-vectoring engines, enabling the aircraft to make rapid maneuvers.
The AL-41F1 in the Su-57 features thrust vectoring nozzles and integrated flight and propulsion-control systems, a technology not employed in the F-35.
According to various trade press reports, the Indian Air Force (IAF), which flies both Rafale jets and Russian Su-30s, appears to have avoided the PL-15s as many as eight times.
Parts of nearly complete PL-15 missiles have been recovered in India. Several countries are eager to get involved in the exploitation of the failed missiles, at least one of which never exploded. Meanwhile, questions have arisen as to why the missiles missed their targets and landed without exploding.
The PL-15 is guided either by the launch aircraft's radar or by some sort of AWACS aircraft. It only uses its internal AESA radar (with a restricted field of view) for the final segment of its flight path. Alleged remains of a PL-15E AAM found on Indian soil. If the export model is equipped with a Ku-band AESA seeker, then even though the range may be reduced, there should be no loss in guidance or anti-ECM capabilities. Production date: July 2015.
India has good radar-jamming equipment. The Rafale comes with its own electronic warfare system called SPECTRA.
The Indian Su-30MKI features a Russian Tarang radar warning receiver and an Israel jammer pod, EL/M 8222. This jammer, made by ELTA, a division of Israel Aviation Industries, uses active phased array technology to detect threats and precisely jam them.
Some history of jamming technology can be found here.
No one can say how effective the jammers were during this brief clash between India and Pakistan, but it may be that Chinese air-to-air missiles, even extreme-range BVR missiles, are vulnerable to jamming.
It is likely that the AESA radars and other guidance components of China's BVR air-to-air weapons, even newer ones like the PL-15, use almost identical technology.
More will be learned as the grounded PL-15s are exploited and even more as the IAF back-briefs the French and the Russians. Obviously, the Russians won't tell, but France may be willing to share with the US and other NATO partners.
If BVR threats can be compromised, then the future for these weapons is uncertain.
For example, the Pentagon has placed its bets on BVR technology for the F-35 and other conventional fourth-plus generation jets in the US inventory. Are the same vulnerabilities possibly found in the PL-15 likely to occur in US BVR weapons?
One presumes that the Pentagon should want to know this as soon as possible. Attention to jammers, and more of them, also makes good sense.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.