Palestinian territories: What makes a state a state?
Traditional allies of Israel are increasingly recognizing — or positioning themselves to acknowledge — the existence of Palestine as a state.
The Palestinian territories are the focal point of the current conflict between Israel and Hamas.
The moves by nations like Australia, France, Canada and potentially the United Kingdom to recognize a Palestinian state, joining around 150 others, will not necessarily bring an end to the war or secure territorial borders.
That, as with many other statehood disputes, is because recognized statehood is not a straightforward process.
What makes a state?
There are states of all shapes, sizes and structures; 193 are currently full members of the United Nations.
But not having full UN membership does not preclude those states from participating in the functions of the organization, joining other international bodies and even having diplomatic missions.
Nor is UN membership even required to be a state.
One of the simplest guides for statehood is outlined in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States — the Montevideo Convention — signed in 1933. It lists four criteria for statehood: defined territorial boundaries, a permanent population, a government representing those people and the ability to enter into international agreements
It is sometimes said that a state exists when it's recognized by enough people outside its own territory.
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While recognition isn't a literal part of international conventions, Gezim Visoka, a peace and conflict studies scholar and statehood expert at Dublin City University, Ireland, said it effectively exists through other measures.
"Recognition is crucial for a state to function, to exist internationally, to enter international agreements, to benefit from international treaties, protection from annexation, occupations and other forms of arbitrary intervention from abroad," said Visoka.
"You're in a better place than if you're not recognized."
How to become a UN member state
Recognition of statehood or fulfilling the Montevideo criteria does not automatically lead to UN admission. The process of becoming a member requires a candidate state to follow several steps: a letter to the UN secretary-general, a formal declaration accepting the UN Charter's membership obligations and the support of the secretary-general.
And then, the candidate state must gain the support of members of the UN Security Council.
That includes nine of the 15 council members voting in favor of the candidate, and all five of the permanent members: China, France, Russia, the UK and US. Historically, this has been a difficult barrier for candidate states to pass, even for those that have a high level of recognition.
Palestine, Kosovo and Western Sahara are among states with extensive recognition but that aren't full UN members.
"When Montenegro joined the UN, or Croatia [joined], they had less than 70 recognitions," said Visoka. "Whereas Palestine has almost 150, Kosovo has around 118-119 recognitions, Western Sahara has over 50."
However, if this barrier is passed, a candidate need only receive a two-thirds majority vote of all other UN members at the General Assembly.
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