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Why have clashes erupted at the Lebanon-Syria border?

Why have clashes erupted at the Lebanon-Syria border?

The National10-02-2025
Violence at the Lebanon-Syria border between Lebanese clans and Syrian security forces escalated last week as the government in Damascus intensified efforts to disrupt smuggling routes in the area where militant group Hezbollah wields influence. Syria announced a large-scale security operation aimed at shutting down smuggling routes along the border, with a focus on the village of Haweek and surrounding areas in western Homs province, triggering clashes with Lebanese clan members. Haweek is a border village in Syria, inhabited mainly by members of the Lebanese Zaaiter and Jaafar tribes. 'The situation at the border is very bad,' Col Bassil Idriss, brigade commander for southern rural Homs province, told The National. 'There have been continuing issues, including drug and weapons smuggling, due to the chaos on the Lebanese side. That's why we have deployed forces at the border. 'For 50 years, this mountainous region has been lawless – a hub for smuggling, hashish trade and weapons storage, including Hezbollah arms depots near the border … there are also tunnels running from Syria into Lebanon.' Since taking power in December, Syria's new government, led by the Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) group – which had links to al Qaeda and Al Nusra Front – has made cracking down on Hezbollah-linked smugglers a key priority in efforts to secure the border with Lebanon. The move has significantly disrupted smuggling routes used by the Lebanese group, which was a key ally of the Assad regime. At least three people were killed and 10 injured on the Lebanese side in the clashes, while Syria's state news agency Sana reported that one member of forces in the newly formed government in Damascus, comprising mostly former HTS fighters, was also killed. The violence has involved an exchange of missile fire from either side, with Lebanese clans claiming they are battling fighters attempting to infiltrate the border. On Saturday, the Lebanese army, which has sent military reinforcements to the northern and eastern borders, said it had responded to incoming fire from Syria. Both sides have carried out kidnappings. On Friday, the Syrian government and Lebanese tribes agreed to a prisoner exchange, resulting in the release of two HTS fighters captured in Haweek, as reported by Sana, and 16 women and children taken from the neighbouring town of Al Aqrabiyah, Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen said. That same day, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and interim Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara agreed to 'co-ordinate efforts to control the situation on the Lebanese-Syrian border and prevent attacks on civilians', during a phone call, Mr Aoun's office said on X. While Syria's new government insists the operation aims to crack down on smuggling routes, two Lebanese security sources claimed this was a 'pretext'. 'What happened is that HTS fighters, under the pretext of targeting arms and drug smugglers, raided several Syrian villages near the border using armed drones,' one source said. 'However, most of the homes in these areas belonged to Lebanese families. They detained several people, prompting clans on the Lebanese side to demand their release and an end to the operation, which escalated into clashes.' Another security source suggested the operation could be an attempt to pressure the government into negotiating the release of Islamists being held in Lebanese prisons. Despite the tension, the situation is steadily improving, Col Idriss said. 'We knew the border situation was unstable but now, hamdella [praise be to God], it is safer. We have set up four to five official checkpoints.' On Sunday, the Lebanese Jaafar tribe released a video announcing the withdrawal of its fighters and calling on the Lebanese army and state to take the matter into their own hands. A western diplomatic source told The National that the situation remained concerning despite the recent lull. 'The situation at the border is worrying. We are talking about drug trafficking, kidnappings, weapons smuggling,' the source said. They also highlighted the risk of the conflict taking on a sectarian dimension. 'The Lebanese villages along the border are exclusively Shiite. Some have framed the conflict as Sunni groups, perceived as linked to Daesh, oppressing a minority,' the diplomat said, using the Arabic term for extremist group ISIS. Hezbollah is not officially involved in the clashes, despite reports suggesting its fighters are present in the area. However, for the diplomatic source, this is not necessarily a sign of Hezbollah's weakening. 'It signals a shift in their operational approach,' they said. 'Previously, they would have intervened directly but now they are acting through local tribes in the region, orchestrating events from behind the scenes. 'This is a new trend, which we have also observed in the south. It marks a return to the idea of 'popular resistance' – a strategy Hezbollah used in the 1970s before developing its military force. It's a reconfiguration, which should be monitored.'
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