Ukraine can survive without Donbas, it can't without Black Sea access

Telegraph

9 hours ago

As is often the way, the Black Sea slips under the radar. Not to everyone: earlier today, an OSINT account reported a Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 Fulcrum providing top cover for a cargo ship heading into Odesa. Our own Air Force is flying a C-17 heavy-lift aircraft there as I type this. The military have not forgotten the strategic importance of this sea.
And they are right not to do so – the ability to navigate freely on it is hugely important and is not a foregone conclusion.
Right at the start of the 2022 invasion, the interaction at Snake Island set the tone for subsequent Ukrainian doggedness. In the face of the Black Sea flagship, the Moskva, off Snake Island, the Ukrainian forces there used some extremely naval language to suggest they go away. It didn't work, and the island was lost, but two months later, the Moskva was sent to the bottom in what was a simple but devastating counter-attack.
Symbolic as this sinking was as a single military action, and despite getting Snake Island back shortly afterwards, it was part of a wider maritime tapestry which Ukraine were not winning. Russia was now denying them freedom of navigation – blockading them, to use the wartime term – and it worked, initially halting up to 90 per cent of all sea exports.
July 2022 to July 2023 saw the implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by the UN and Turkey. This partially alleviated the pressure with exports increasing up to 50 per cent – 33 million tons of grain over 1,000 voyages. Putin ended this initiative in July 2023 – for obvious reasons – recommenced attacks and mining, and numbers dipped again.
But by this point, Ukraine's long-range counter-strategy was in full flight. Rapid development and use of uncrewed surface vessels, combined with more conventional missile and special forces strikes, worked to drive the Black Sea Fleet out of Sevastopol and virtually into hiding.
It's risky in warfare to say anyone has lost until the surrender is signed, but in terms of what the Black Sea Fleet set out to achieve, against how it was forced to operate for most of 2024 it is not far off. They certainly lost their fighting cohesion at sea. By July 2024, pre-war export levels were restored, and there they have largely remained.
This is not by chance and has taken considerable effort to maintain, and it is a balance that could be upset quickly if the importance of the Black Sea is overlooked.
A Black Sea Fleet out of hiding and able to restock and rearm could upset this balance almost immediately causing war risk insurance to climb again and shipping companies to no longer take the risk. At least Russia won't be able to sail more warships in there, the Montreux Convention prevents it, but rearmament takes many forms. And besides, that convention works both ways.
Most estimates are that if Ukraine lost freedom of navigation by up to 80 per cent, it would damage their overall economy by 10-12 per cent of GDP. Indirect losses could be as much as 30 per cent. They simply can't afford for this to happen again.
Add in loss of influence, access and the effect on other countries who need those exports, then layer how much this all inversely helps Russia, and you can start building a case for maintaining freedom of navigation in the Black Sea being more important than the division of land being contested and now discussed.
In war, most people naturally focus on the land. In peace, no one focuses on the sea until it stops working, at which point it can wreck your security and prosperity. This isn't a competition, just a plea not to ignore the sea as this conflict progresses to a conclusion, whatever form that takes, over land.