Algerian Military Aircraft Crashes, Killing Pilot
Rabat – The Algerian Defense Ministry said a military aircraft crashed today during a training maneuver near the Aoulef region in the Adrar province.
The ministry confirmed that the pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Bekkouche Nasr died during the crash, which was also documented by a viral video online.
'During a planned training flight, a military combat crashed on Wednesday,' the ministry said , extending Algeria's Army chief of staff Said Chengriha's condolences on behalf of all the personnel from the country's military.
Several reports said a second crew member managed to escape the accident safely.
Reports said this is the second Sukhoi Su-30 crash in Algeria, following a similar accident in Oum El Bouaghi province in 2020.
The previous jet crash claimed two lives. Tags: 12 Killed in Terrorist Attack on Military Parade in Iran's Ahvaz
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3 days ago
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Sahara: Peruvian Congress Exhorts Government to Support Morocco, Warns of Polisario Terrorist Threats
Doha – The Peruvian Congress has forcefully demanded its government to back Morocco's complete sovereignty over the Sahara, while exposing the dangerous terrorist connections and criminal operations of the Polisario Front – a puppet organization manipulated by the Algerian regime. In a motion adopted by an overwhelming majority on Monday, the Peruvian legislative body commanded the executive branch to 'adopt a position of support to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco over the Western Sahara,' as stated in the text presented by Congresswoman Carmen Patricia Juarez Gallegos, First Vice-President of the Congress. The motion hailed ties with Rabat since 1964 and declared Morocco's autonomy proposal as a 'serious solution in conformity with international law.' Peruvian lawmakers asserted that Morocco's 2007 initiative 'has received the support of numerous countries, among which the United States of America, the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of France, which have recognized said proposal as the most realistic and viable basis for a lasting solution to the conflict.' The Congress blasted the Polisario Front for its treacherous alliances with terrorist networks. The motion exposes to the international community 'the Polisario's links with terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, as well as with networks trafficking arms and persons, and the exploitation of minors in the Tindouf camps.' It demands international bodies to 'investigate these crimes and sanction them.' The motion slams the Polisario Front, which exists solely in the Tindouf camps on Algerian soil where it imprisons hostages under the watchful eye of its Algerian masters. The fraudulent 'SADR' remains nothing more than a phantom entity, a fictional creation sustained by the hostile Algerian regime in its desperate campaign against Morocco's territorial integrity. 'The Polisario is implicated in serious violations of human rights that constitute threats to regional and international security,' the motion thunders, adding that 'various reports from international think tanks have warned against attempts by the Tehran-Hezbollah-Polisario axis to destabilize North Africa and the Maghreb through ideological infiltration, financing of radical activities, and proliferation of weapons in the region.' Last March, Peru's Congress passed another motion urging the country's Foreign Ministry to express clear support for Morocco's Autonomy Plan. The document, introduced by legislators Maria Del Carmen Alva Prieto and Ernesto Bustamante Donayre, referenced the plan's widespread international backing from over 120 countries and cited UN Security Council Resolution 2756 from October 2024. In April, Keiko Fujimori, leader of Peru's Popular Force party, voiced her party's absolute support for Morocco's sovereignty during a visit to Rabat, where she met with Rachid Talbi El Alami, President of the Moroccan House of Representatives. This diplomatic pivot follows Peru's decision in September 2023 to sever ties with the self-proclaimed 'SADR,' a bogus entity fabricated by the deceptive Polisario Front and its Algerian sponsors. Peru had briefly reestablished these misguided ties under former leftist President Pedro Castillo – a political outsider who presided over a government in disarray, struggling to return stability to Lima after years of public discontent and large-scale riots – before rectifying this error. The Congress reaffirmed Peru's dedication to defending human rights, combating terrorism, and building diplomatic relations with countries that advance peace, security, and development, while rejecting the destabilizing schemes of the Algerian-backed separatist faction that threatens regional stability. Morocco maintains full control of its Sahara territories, implementing an ambitious development plan while the Algeria-financed Polisario languishes in isolated camps, holding people against their will and engaging in criminal activities under the protection of the Algerian military. Read also: US Congressman to Submit Legislation to Designate Polisario As Terrorist Group Tags: Morocco Peru relationsPolisario FrontWestern sahara
Morocco World
16-05-2025
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The Egg, the Chicken, and the Drunkard: a Lesson in Maghreb Geopolitics
Which of the chicken or the egg appeared first? This question, which amuses and intrigues at the same time, depicts incoherence, impotence, and indifference. Scientists say they have found the explanation. The same cannot be said for the bluffers who wear the armbands of official political planners. Besides, there is a joke that, in our youth, we liked to tell. It is the story of a drunkard who is used to rambling in a neighborhood bar. Still in debt, he leaves slates to the bartender, but he represents a good customer, so the latter forgives him his ill behavior. One night, the drunkard decides to despise everyone: customers, passers-by, and the taxi driver who is instructed by the family to take him home. That night, the drunkard refuses to pay the bill. No one says a word, and they let him go. The taxi driver, as an obliging duty, drops him off in front of his house. The drunkard lives in a two-bedroom apartment on the 2nd floor. His wife opens the door for him. He is already moaning and asking for food. Everything is ready. He kicks the tray that his wife serves him. No one deigns to contradict him. He couldn't bear it anymore. So, in desperation, the drunkard opens the window overlooking the main street. He noticed that a neighbor was walking his dog for its morning hike. The drunkard can't take it anymore. He picks up a small vase within reach and throws it in the direction of the dog. The animal is slightly scratched and moans as a result. The neighbor protests and asks the drunkard, 'What did the dog do to you?' And the drunkard, delighted that at last someone deigned to answer him, responded, 'What kind of question is that? Do you really expect me to wait until your damned dog bites me?' Context Misunderstood Means Case Poorly Sustained The story of the chicken and the egg and that of the drunkard currently apply to an important geopolitical equation in the Maghreb space. Indeed, a week ago, Ammar Bendjama, Algeria's permanent ambassador to the United Nations, was trapped in his argument on displaced persons debated in the United Nations Security Council. He took this opportunity to raise the issue of what he called 'Sahrawi refugees' held against their own will in the Tindouf camps. The Algerian diplomat has suffered yet another setback for his country, which is about to end the second year of its mandate as a non-permanent member without obtaining anything that meets its diplomatic ambitions. I will not mention the response of Omar Hilale, Permanent Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations, who, as usual lately, gave a hard time to his Algerian colleague. I will develop an argument based on a postulate that I would call, 'a misunderstood context means a case poorly sustained.' It aims to enumerate the contradictions of an Algerian diplomacy that does not learn from its past failure, mainly with respect to the legalism of which it boasts, only to end up besieged on all sides. The refugees' issue? This sort of tragedy, business, and aberration of which the Algerian political planners and military strategists are guilty has been invited on purpose into Ammar Bendjama's intervention. Why now and not yesterday? Why now, when the kidnapped in the Tindouf camps are denied the right to be registered by Algeria, despite the injunctions of the Security Council for almost two decades? Indeed, the populations of Tindouf have never been identified or recorded. They therefore do not benefit from the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Timing is the answer. But also Algerian decision-makers' fear that the Sahara issue is about to be resolved to their detriment. Algeria will inherit populations, most of whom are not from the Moroccan Sahara. The noose is tightening around a country that is losing its way. Algeria is now aware that the next Security Council resolution will sound the death knell for a diplomacy that has, since 2001, succeeded in failure. The insipidity of a diplomatic argument that makes seasoned diplomats smile more and more, if not feel annoyed. The fear of Algerian decision-makers can be explained by the psychological dimension, the financial burden, and the abyss towards which the country is heading. All this is the consequence of a blind perception of the geopolitics of the 1990s and 2000s. On the psychological side, Algeria refuses to accept that it has lost all its cards with respect to the so-called Western Sahara. The exaggerated self-confidence Algerian diplomats displayed during the 1970s and 1990s, while smoking a Davidoff cigar and sipping a glass of fine whisky in the lobbies of five-star hotels in New York or Geneva, has disappeared. And for good reason, the financial side weighs more and more heavily on the Algerian state's treasury. International assistance to the tenants of the Tindouf camps is dwindling. Realism took precedence over the political considerations of the 1970s and 1980s. And the reports of the diversion of humanitarian aid, concealed for three decades, are damning for the Algerian authorities and the Polisario separatists. Indeed, an investigation by the European Commission's anti-fraud unit (OLAF), begun in 2003, issued a gloomy report in 2007 on the fraudulent practices of the Polisario and the Algerian army. However, for unclear reasons, the report was not revealed to the general public until 2015. Since then, reports, including that of the World Food Programme (WFP) on the evaluation of its Algeria 2019-2022 country strategic program, confirm the existence of practices of diversion of food and human aid intended for the Tindouf camps' populations. Similarly, reports on economic growth put forward conclusions that do not bode well for the Algerian economy. Relying mainly on hydrocarbon revenues, the latter is likely to experience major difficulties for the next three decades. Indeed, studies are of the view that by 2050, Algeria's hydrocarbon wealth will be gone. The fall in oil prices already presents a great challenge for Algerian policy planners. Less than a barrel at more than 100 dollars, Algeria would not be able to achieve the expected growth objectives. Worse still, by 2030, there is a risk that it would no longer be able to meet domestic demand for gas for households. And the abyss opens wide in a move that depicts a like scene from 'Gone with the Wind.' The abyss is even more frightening because it recalls nightmares from the days when Algeria was just a testing ground skillfully managed by France. On the one hand, an attempt to implement the principle of the right to self-determination on a tailor-made basis, crowned by conditional independence in 1962. On the other hand, an attempt, quickly stifled, to create 'a Sahrawi state' in the Eastern Sahara in 1959. Indeed, French officers who are aware of the legal reality of this territory, which belongs to Morocco, and of the progress towards the creation of the Algerian state, propose to erect the Eastern Sahara into an independent entity. This is in line with the creation of Mauritania in 1960. The abyss becomes even greater insofar as one of the questions that will be asked by Algerian decision-makers (and the Polisario later) is how to manage a pitfall of a high magnitude with four dimensions. One, the nationality of the Tindouf camps' settlers. Because they are not registered by the UNHCR, they are registered in the Algerian general register of civil status as Algerians and acquire de facto Algerian nationality. They participate in the various elections, and some even participate in the management of Algerian municipalities. Two, only a small minority remaining would be of Moroccan origin, and few of them, arguably, can be included in the census Spain carried out in 1974. At the time, Spain was preparing to hold a controlled referendum on self-determination to circumvent Moroccan and Mauritanian pressure on the decolonization of the territory. Third, the same observation applies to those who bear Spanish nationality and who find themselves between the hammer of nationality acquired in Algeria and the anvil of the impossibility of registering their descendants born after 1974. Moreover, the bill that Spain had planned to adopt to give Spanish citizenship to natives of the southern provinces born under Spanish occupation could not have its epilogue, to the great displeasure of the people of the Tindouf camps and their supporters in Spain. Four, the weight of the attachment of people to Tindouf. Families have been founded in this area. They have lived there for two generations at least. Most of them hail from neighboring Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan, among others. Others really have no choice because of the psychological constraints and the mixed marriages they have contracted with Algerian nationals. In short, Algerian decision-makers are panicking. First, because the style of government they have made their spearhead can no longer bring results. One of the reasons is that it's based on a mythical revolutionary past that makes observers crass. Secondly, Algerian diplomacy, which used to adapt to this style to impress, resonates falsely. It has not been able to adapt to the changes taking place on the regional and international political, diplomatic, and security scenes. In desperation, the oligarchy in power in Algeria is turning into a firefighter on duty. One of the explanations for the behavior of Ambassador Ammar Bendjama, quoted above, is the fear of his government to see MINURSO leave the Sahara and thus sound the death knell for a lie that has lasted too long. To carry a lie for fifty years and realize at the end that it no longer fools anyone is difficult to swallow. Let's try to understand something in this charade, hopefully to allow Algerian decision-makers to make amends. I would refer, on the one hand, to the chicken and the egg dilemma, and on the other, to the joke of the drunkard. First question: which of the chicken or the egg appeared first? In the euphoria of Third Worldism, Algeria believes it is in a position to duplicate the precedent of its birth in 1962 everywhere. It made sure (with the complicity of Mauritania and Spain at the beginning) to create a phantom entity, the pseudo-Sadr. This is the first monumental mistake, because, in the process, it lets the separatist movement, the Polisario, act as a kind of 'national liberation movement' that it is not. At the time, it was feasible to the point that movements fighting for independence in other parts of the world could claim this status and receive the support of the non-aligned countries. Hence the second monumental mistake. Indeed, Algeria, with the wind in its sails, is already securing the support of the majority of African states for its thesis on the so-called Western Sahara, yet it must break down the wall of resistance of the Arab countries. So, the Algerian planners make, for the benefit of the pseudo-Sadr, a flag identical to that of Palestine, adding a star and a crescent. The idea, they say, is self-evident, as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is allowed to speak before the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Yasser Arafat gave an eloquent speech there in November 1974. Arafat earned a few stripes against his Syrian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Jordanian detractors. This perception leads to the third monumental mistake, that of playing the amalgam by juggling the membership of certain Arab countries in the Organization of African Unity (called the African Union since 2002), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the League of Arab States. The flag of the pseudo-Sadr is used as a lark's mirror. The certainty steeped in revolutionary dogmatism makes Algerian decision-makers believe that they have the endorsement of the Eastern Bloc and can capitalize on the indifference of Western countries, including the former colonizers. They then made the fourth monumental mistake, that of seeking to destabilize neighboring regimes, starting with Morocco and Tunisia. As far as Morocco is concerned, the signal is given by the alliance that Algeria and Spain conclude on the Saharan issue. They have an argument, especially since the internal political situation in Morocco is very tense after two coup attempts in 1971 and 1972 and an incursion of a commando dispatched from Algeria, which is neutralized in Khenifra in 1973. The first event took place a year before the signing of the border agreement between Morocco and Algeria (1972). And the second event happened one month after the signing of this agreement. The third event took place at the same time as the announcement of the creation of the Polisario (1973). As far as Tunisia is concerned, the chronicle recalls the attack on Gafsa in 1980 perpetrated by Gaddafi with the complicity of Algeria, through whose territory the commando transited. Algeria has trained in the Palestinian camps in Beirut the commando made up of former supporters of Salah ben Youssef (1907-1961), a former companion of Habib Bourguiba, who became his sworn enemy after Tunisia's independence. Salah ben Youssef was assassinated in Germany in 1961. He had been let go by Gamal Abdenasser, who had given him asylum a few years earlier. Tunisia brings me to mention the fifth monumental mistake Algeria made. It consists of imposing Brahim Ghali at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 8), which took place in Tunis in August 2022. None of the international partners recognizes the pseudo-Sadr, but Algeria put Tunisia in an uncomfortable situation. The latter sacrificed its relations with Morocco. Never mind, the sixth monumental mistake followed in the aftermath. It consists of a move to circumvent the decision of the Accra summit (2024), which adopted a decision whereby only member states of the United Nations are entitled to participate in summits between the African Union and its bilateral and multilateral international partners. Algeria recorded three failures in a row at TICAD 9 Tokyo in August 2024, at the South Korea-Africa summit in June 2024, and at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in September 2024. Shifting the Geopolitical Equation The story is ironic, as the Washington Post and Jeune Afrique evidenced last week. Both revealed that Hezbollah has trained Polisario elements in Syria and monitored their participation in the Syrian civil war. Algerian officers were part of the plot either as advisors or as operational officers. For the record, in the past, the political situation in Spain with the illness of General Franco made Houari Boumediene believe that no one could stop him to implement his hegemonic projects over the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. Too much self-confidence may end up bordering on arrogance. However, arrogance is the worst of vices. The seventh monumental mistake Algeria made can prove it. Indeed, the Algerian decision-makers resorted to bargaining against Mauritania and Spain to punish them for being parties in the Madrid Trilateral Agreement on the so-called Western Sahara in 1975. What could be more normal than the question 'Which of the chicken or the egg appeared first?' to invite itself into the debate? This time, the Algerian strategists find themselves prisoners of their own stratagems. How can one sort out the dilemma of the flag and the dichotomous status of a so-called 'national liberation' movement that was born outside the disputed territory and that never fired a single bullet against the Spanish army and an artificial entity, certainly recognized at the outset by a large number of countries, but which does not fulfill any of the attributes of sovereignty? The misperception is obviously to seek to duplicate the case of Palestine and to try to make it swallowed by the Arab countries. However, if Palestine gains new recognitions, the pseudo-Sadr loses them every year. There are only a handful of countries that still recognize this entity compared with the highest number of recognitions she recorded between 1976 and 1990, mainly in Africa and Latin America. 'Which of the chicken or the egg appeared first?' The dual role the separatist leaders play means that after fifty years, they find themselves in the same configuration as the post-Green March. This explains the catch-up session that Algeria tried to run by imposing the signing of the 1979 agreement between Mauritania and the Polisario, resulting in the withdrawal of the former from Teris algharbiya (Oued Eddahab nowadays). Morocco took its responsibilities and immediately recovered this part of the southern provinces. Resale right, acquired rights, rational choice, unavoidable act—name it as you like, taking over this territory was a masterstroke on the part of Morocco. So why are à la carte lawyers swallowing their languages these days? The time for exploiting the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and the time for national liberation movements to satisfy the need for domination on the regional diplomatic and strategic chessboard are long gone. Many movements that claim to belong to this category have either disappeared or integrated the governments against which they were fighting or seeking to separate. It was also a long time ago when independence aspirations in some European countries were used as a means of pressure to get them to side with the Algerian thesis on the Sahara issue. This is the case with the movement for the self-determination and independence of the Canary Islands (MPAIAC, 1964-1979), the Catalan independence movement (pan-Catalan 1978-1991), and the Basque Country Ta Askatasuna (ETA, 1959-2018) in Spain; the Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica (FLNC, 1976-still active) in France; or Sinn Fein, the political branch of the Irish Republican Army (IRA, 1969-1997), which was associated with the Ulster Agreement (1998). Recently, in the wake of the crisis between Algeria and France, Algerian official media praised Breton separatism. For example, the national channel made a report on the Front libération de la Bretagne (FLB, 1963), which criticized what it called the 'French colonial state' and called for the organization of a referendum on self-determination. The FLB is known for its violent actions, unlike the other movements, the Breton Party (2003) and ADSAV (2000). The floor is given to Erwan Pradier, president of the FLB, to report on independence demands. Ridicule does not kill. Recently, on the occasion of the visit of the Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq, to Algeria, some commentators, surfing on another planet, claim that this country would be tempted either to mediate between Algeria and Morocco or, against all odds, to express support for the Algerian potion in its various arm-wrestling matches with certain Arab countries. No doubt, these commentators would have suffered a temporary amnesia, because the Omanis will never forget Algeria's support for جبهة تحرير ظفار (Dhofar Liberation Front, FLD, 1963-1976), which was about to blow the national unity of their country. Moreover, the leaders of this movement had kept their main headquarters in Algeria for a long time after the failure of their secessionist project. The noose is tightening around Algeria and the Polisario. For four years now, the association between separatism and terrorism has been inscribed in the lexicon of many countries and regional organizations. These countries rely on solid arguments to sort out movements that defend so-called just causes and movements that have a separatist agenda that they implement on behalf of regional hegemonic actors who hide behind outdated legal jargon. These actors create or support non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that are as numerous as they are diverse. This is the case with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Al-Qaeda and its offshoots in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia; the Islamic State (IS); the Houthis in Yemen; Hezbollah in Lebanon; the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines; etc. Of course, some of these movements are only a shadow of their former selves, but their capacity to cause harm can manifest itself from time to time in the course of transnational bargaining processes. It is in this spirit of identifying separatism and terrorism as two faces of the same coin that the countries participating in the Ministerial Meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh held their conference in Marrakech on May 11, 2022 (Kamal F. Sadni, Séparatisme et Terrorisme: fin de l'ambivalence complice; Le Maroc Diplomatique, le 25/05/2022). Recently, the Washington Post and Jeune Afrique reported on the collusion between Algeria and Iran through Hezbollah, which led to elements of the separatist movement, the Polisario, to support the Bashar al-Assad regime against the opposition in Syria. This cooperation would have been done in exchange for financial and military support for the Polisario. Leading figures, including senators and representatives in the US House of Representatives and members of some European parliaments, are stepping up to the plate to demand that the Polisario be added to the list of terrorist movements. There is a fire in the house for the states that sponsor terrorism and those who support movements that are likely to be integrated into the category of terrorist movements in the near future. Algeria is one of them. So much so that Algerian decision-makers are caught up in the whirlwind of an existential question that gives them insomnia. It requires them to make a clear choice between saving the Polisario and saving their own regime. On this issue and on others alike, Algeria represents the case of the drunkard mentioned above. Here is a country that is in open or latent conflicts with all its neighbors. Against some, it uses the heavy weapon of subversion and destabilization. Against the others, she plays the scarecrow of containment. In both cases, the targeted countries are either unaware of it or barely respond to its mania for communiqués and decisions taken by its High Security Council (HCS), which meets more often than its mandate requests. The invention of enemies and la rente mémorielle are a stock in trade that makes Algerian politicians dangle the image according to which the intoxication of power is an eternal salvation. It reminds me of Tahar Djaout's excellent novel ' Les chercheurs d'os—The Bone Seekers,' published in 1984, which is a parody about the appropriation of myths to reinvent history. Djaout, an Algerian novelist, died during the Black Decade in 1993 following an attack in Algiers perpetrated, according to the official version, by Islamists. He could not be saved in time. Hence the virtual victory that the drunkard thinks he is solving his problems, like a shooting star. It is as if certain centers of power in Algeria were living in a parallel world. They still believe in the existence of an ideological solidarity that would mean unconditional military support, as in the time when Houari Boumediene, Muammar Gaddafi, and Hafez Assad considered themselves the guardians and promoters of the revolution of the masses, in which they really did not believe. The same exaggerated perception keeps alive the memory of solidarity between state entities that never existed before the wave of independence of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Solidarity understood in this sense gives rise, depending on the circumstances, to a series of waltzes in triple time: Algeria-Libya-Egypt; Algeria-Libya-Tunisia; Egypt-Syria-Algeria; and Libya-Syria-Algeria. The common denominator between these waltzes is the quest for a union in which asymmetrical relations would exist, regardless of the state of the balance of power. Algeria hovers in an orbit whose speed makes her lose the north. She does not realize the magnitude with which a geopolitical hurricane is being prepared. Although she prides herself on having excellent lawyers and political scientists, Algeria does not want to accept the obvious—which is that she has lost the battle of leadership to other neighboring countries. The obvious thing is that the law must follow the evolution of politics and geopolitics and adapt to them. Algerian decision-makers are entangled in a logic that makes people laugh more than it attracts sympathy. The following facts might give an insight into this argument. First, according to some information shared, on April 22, 2025, Algeria began secret negotiations with Ferhat Mehenni, president of the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK), founded in 2001. The objective would be to consider granting Kabylia a large autonomy within the framework of Algerian sovereignty. Two: If this was true, then why would Algeria reject the autonomy plan Morocco presented in 2007 to solve the artificial problem over the Sahara? The idea of autonomy was already considered in the mid-1960s by Spain, and it reiterated it in 1973-1974, during the standoff between Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria. Third, the referendum that Algeria defends loud and clear should not make seasoned observers forget that this principle was negotiated in an asymmetrical way (1954-1961) by France and the FLN. The objective was that its unfolding would only be a staging to prepare for the conditional independence of Algeria. However, when Morocco proposed the organization of a referendum on self-determination in 1981 in Nairobi to resolve the conflict, Algeria opposed it. Fourth, ironically, Morocco proposed the autonomy plan in 2007, and Algeria rejected it and demanded a return to the 1991 status quo situation. She ignored the conclusion of James A. Baker III, Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General (1997-2004), on the need for a realistic solution to the conflict. She protested against the conclusion of his successor, Peter Van Walsum (2005-2008), on the impossibility of establishing an artificial entity in the Sahara, describing this request as unrealistic and chimerical. The shift in the geopolitical equation in the Europe-Africa-America-Middle East space imposes supposedly adopting appropriate behaviors. Until recently, the Maghreb was not of much interest to the great powers. There is a kind of conceding a partial management of security and inter-Maghreb and sub-Saharan disputes to the intermediate powers, in particular France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. However, once Turkey, Iran, and China intervene more and more aggressively in the continent, things change. The geopolitics of hydrocarbons, the race for control of maritime and river routes, and the arrival of new generations of decision-makers in Africa are affecting the old perception of regional power balances. In the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, the certainties of yesteryear are beginning to be challenged, to which the beneficiary state actors respond with nonchalance. An error of judgment that pushes them to check the accuracy of their analytical compasses. The signal is given by certain non-state actors subservient to Middle Eastern intermediate powers who openly threaten to take the battle of the straits and sea lanes to Gibraltar. This is the case with the Houthis and Hezbollah. Hamas' adventure in 2023 has something to do with it. These threats are not serious, but you never know. The drunkard theory can come into play in this case. Hecatomb and Illusion The tug-of-war between the ambassador, Ammar Bendjama, and the response of the Moroccan ambassador, Omar Hilale, reflect a state of mind that is hovering over the legal debate on the respect of international legality. The first concerned is about to take a suicidal path. The second considered observes the scene, hesitating to reach out to him or to leave him to his fate. Because, on the Moroccan Sahara issue, the year 2025 is a decisive crossroads. It is especially a last call for Algeria if she wants to turn the page and live with it. The 2025-2028 period might end up with the establishment of a 'quasi-state' in Tindouf. After all, one has to decide who came first, the chicken or the egg? This is plausible since the president of the Council of the Nation, Salah Goudjil, recently declared that Algeria has borders with seven countries. Among these countries, at the height of derision, he mentioned the pseudo-Sadr, which is located in Tindouf. Curious is the number seven (7) cited in this case. If in some cultures, it is synonymous with good omen, in this case it is a harbinger of unpleasant surprises in the near future. In the auspicious chapter, the number 7 reminds us that out of seven dynasties that ruled Morocco, at least three of them (the Almoravids, 1060-1147; the Almohads, 1121-1269; and the Marinades, 1244-1465) extended their power beyond what is present-day Algeria. In the chapter of unpleasant surprises, the number 7 means that at least a seventh 'state' is in fact having its headquarters on Algerian territory, 'a Sahrawi entity' in Tindouf that one might include in the amazing acrobatics of the chicken and the egg. Goudjil's statement confirms the reading that some observers have of the quality of Algerian lawmakers and politicians. Proof of it is the signing of an agreement on the delimitation of borders by Ramtane Lamamra and his 'counterpart of Sadr' on August 20, 2021. The choice of this date was not innocent; it coincided with Morocco's celebration of the anniversary of the Revolution of the King and the People. Algeria adopted the same approach to announce the severance of relations with Morocco on August 24, 2021, two days after Morocco's celebration of Youth Day. This shows the martyrdom suffered by Algerian leaders when it comes to referring to historical landmarks. The Sahara being Moroccan, it is necessary to find a territory for 'Sadr.' The option of northern Mauritania, which Algerian strategists were considering in the wake of the El Guerguerat drama in 2020, is definitively buried. In addition, Polisario leaders who don't hail from the Southern Provinces will not be admitted to the process of implementing the Autonomy Plan. Moreover, it is worth remembering that since 1979, the separatist movement has been dominated by personalities who belong to the tribes of the Tindouf region—and therefore are Algerians. The few others taking care of small businesses are from the Moroccan regions and are not involved in the dispute. Furthermore, the shadow of the project of establishing a phantom state in Eastern Sahara that the French military nurtured in 1959 hangs over again in the sky of the contradictions of an Algerian decision-making system struck in its geopolitical myopia, strabismus, and syncope. Similarly, in order to have a more or less coherent reading of the evolution of relations between Morocco and Algeria and inter-Maghreb relations in general, the psychological dimension should be taken into account. It is common knowledge that the late King Hassan II and President Houari Boumediene did not have good feelings towards each other. The same observation is valid with respect to their relations with Muammar Gaddafi, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, and Maaouiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya. However, the most glaring feeling of aversion towards the Moroccan leaders is manifested, all day long, by President Abdelmajid Tebboune and by the chief of staff of the armed forces, Said Chengriha. The reading of the saga of the drunkard is still accurate in the way Algerian decision-makers deal with the issue of refugees and illegal migrants. As far as the refugee issue is concerned, there are two variants. The first variant is that of the leaders of former European, African, and Latin American separatist movements (or even terrorist groups) who continue to take up residence in Algiers. The second variant is that of the Saharawi populations held against their will by the Polisario militias, which are themselves under surveillance by the Algerian military security. As for illegal migrants, they are largely left at the mercy of human trafficking networks or abandoned in the Greater Sahara desert. Many complained that they had been treated badly by the Algerians when they returned to their countries. Speaking of the need to respect human rights in this case is a joke. Which of the chicken or the egg appeared first? One thing is certain: our drunken friend is now likely to see double. He could pay his debts to the bartender, but this doesn't matter. No one wants his money anymore. From now on, everyone is sober. However, he could imagine that the egg hatches and gives birth to one or two dinosaurs. And when it comes to dinosaurs, Algeria, since 1962, has carved out an unrivaled reputation for entertaining neophytes without really seducing paleontological policy planners. Tags: Algeria and the Western SaharaMorocco and Sahel
Ya Biladi
01-04-2025
- Ya Biladi
AI fuels Morocco-Algeria heritage debate
Is zellige Moroccan, or was it taken from Algeria? Was the caftan originally Algerian before being recognized as an integral part of Morocco's heritage? Did the recipe for chebakia originate in Algiers before making its way to Fez? In recent days, internet users from both countries have been fueling debates, presenting arguments and counterarguments on these cultural topics. Without citing researchers or verified historical sources, some users on X have turned to artificial intelligence for answers. The Grok tool has gained popularity, often leaning against the idea that everything is Algerian. As a series of tweets posed basic questions and received nuanced responses, those accusing Morocco of cultural appropriation found themselves entangled in contradictions. Challenged by AI-generated responses, they were told that «the caftan, zellige, and chebakia probably originate from Morocco». While acknowledging that the caftan has Persian origins, Grok emphasized that the Moroccan style is unique. It described zellige as a traditional Moroccan mosaic, particularly renowned in Fez and Marrakech, and identified chebakia as a sesame-fried pastry with honey, traditionally associated with Ramadan in Morocco. Another series of AI responses suggested that the University of Al-Qarawiyyin predates the Mutawwar school in Madauros (Algeria). When a pro-Algerian user contested this claim, Grok reiterated that the Fez-based institution is the «oldest university in Africa», founded in 859 AD. While noting that it officially became a university in 1963, it remains historically recognized as the world's oldest, despite debates over the definition of a «university» compared to institutions such as Al-Azhar in Egypt (970 AD, officially a university in 1961) or Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone (1827). Historical Narratives Are Not Binary A closer look at history reveals that cultural heritage is far from black and white. Many artisanal crafts, traditional garments, and culinary practices reflect shared influences, evolving differently across regions based on local adaptations. Take, for example, chebakia. While it draws from broader Arab, Eastern, and Andalusian traditions, the recipe has been refined over centuries in Morocco, incorporating distinctive touches that have made it a cherished national delicacy passed down through generations. Similarly, historical archives highlight the unique craftsmanship that has shaped the Moroccan caftan, setting it apart from other traditional garments found in different regions. Morocco's Efforts to Safeguard Its Heritage In 2023, the Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Communication announced legal measures against the appropriation of a specific caftan model attributed to Algeria in a UNESCO submission. The disputed image depicted the Fez caftan, a key element of Morocco's cultural heritage. The controversy surrounding zellige also prompted a response from Moroccan authorities in 2024. During a working session with the Director-General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the government reaffirmed its commitment to protecting Morocco's cultural and intangible heritage. WIPO acknowledged Morocco's registration of zellige in 2016, recognizing it as an internationally recognized element of Moroccan craftsmanship.
