Is Regime Change Possible in Iran?

Newsweek

5 hours ago

Israel's campaign to set back Iran's nuclear program reflects a shared, if mostly unspoken, ambition among Western and Arab allies: to end Iran's clerical regime. The terrible record of regime change efforts by the West has long muted such hopes—but Israel's early successes in the war are giving them interesting new life.
The assessment of whether the regime might actually collapse is certainly a factor in America's calculations of how much deeper to involve itself. Washington's stated position of non-involvement is, of course, implausible. Israel would never have acted against U.S. wishes—it depends on America for the spare parts that keep its air force running, a diplomatic shield at the United Nations, legal cover against international tribunals, and critical support in intercepting Iranian missile and drone retaliation.
That Israel also struck right around the 60-day deadline President Donald Trump had given Iran for engaging in useful talks—which Iran brazenly flouted—also points in the direction of coordination. But on the other hand, Trump is averse to military action and the United States has vulnerable military personnel, assets, and bases scattered across the region.
That said, only the United States has the bunker-busting capability to fully take out the most fortified elements of Iran's nuclear program: the underground facilities at Natanz and Fordow. There is a scenario, after Israel does everything else, in which such an option may look attractive.
It is reasonable to expect the Trump administration to first try a return to diplomacy, but of a more muscular variety than it had telegraphed in recent months. The U.S. previously seemed to be headed towards a renewed version of the Obama-era nuclear deal that Trump walked away from (unwisely, in my view) in 2018.
But that was before the humiliation the regime has endured since Israel began its strikes Friday. Israeli jets have controlled Iran's skies, having wiped out air defenses; a host of senior figures, including the heads of the military and Revolutionary Guards as well as the top nuclear scientists, have been killed; many missile launchers have been disabled and a host of nuclear sites badly damaged. Most missiles sent from Iran have been intercepted, though some did get through, killing more than 20 people in Israel.
With the regime thus exposed, perhaps Trump will finally issue a long-overdue ultimatum to Iran's clerical regime—not only to hand over its enriched uranium but also to end its outrageous efforts to undermine its neighbors with proxy militias and discontinue production of long-range ballistic missiles.
If this happens and Iran stuck to its old positions, a U.S. military strike becomes more plausible. And from there, it is easy to envision escalation, especially if Iran hits at American targets like the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar.
At that point, undermining the regime itself—through attacks on energy infrastructure, cyberattacks, information campaigns, and more—might be openly on the table.
Would any of that be defensible? Do countries not retain the right to govern themselves? Such questions are never clear—but the case for regime change in Iran is good.
By nearly every standard, the Islamic Republic has lost its legitimacy. It governs without meaningful consent, relying on violent repression, censorship, and an unaccountable clerical elite. It is anti-democratic by design, structurally incapable of reform, and fundamentally at odds with the aspirations of Iran's overwhelmingly young, urban, and globally aware population. It remains standing not through popular support but because of its efficiency in suppressing dissent, its control over the economy, and the fear it instills.
Internationally, Iran's legitimacy is further eroded by its rather obvious pursuit of nuclear weapons, sponsorship of terrorism, and serial violations of human rights.
Smoke from an explosion in southwest Tehran billows on June 16, 2025.
Smoke from an explosion in southwest Tehran billows on June 16, 2025.
ATTA KENARE / AFP/Getty Images
The Iranian proxy militia project has devastated the region: Hezbollah has turned Lebanon into a failed state; Hamas and Islamic Jihad have perpetuated cycles of war in Gaza and the West Bank; the Houthis have destabilized Yemen; Shiite militias in Iraq have terrorized civilians. Uncoiling these tentacles would not just restore regional balance—it would free Arab states from the permanent hostage situation engineered in Tehran.
Given all this, one could certainly argue that the Iranian regime has lost its right to demand noninterference by being a menace to its region. But that still leaves the question of practicality. After all, history is littered with failed regime change efforts from outsiders.
The U.S.-backed invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein, but unleashed chaos, insurgency, and years of sectarian war. In Afghanistan, 20 years of Western nation-building collapsed in 11 days, ending with the odious Taliban back in power in Kabul. The Bay of Pigs invasion was a debacle that only strengthened Cuba's Fidel Castro. The CIA-backed overthrow of Chilean socialist Salvador Allende led to decades of dictatorship and considerable regret. More recently, Libya collapsed into anarchy after the fall of Moammar Gaddafi, and U.S. attempts to influence regime change in Venezuela have gone nowhere.
What these cases teach is not that regime change is always doomed, but that external actors cannot impose internal legitimacy, decency, and stability. You cannot liberate a people who aren't prepared to act—or who might see you as the greater threat.
Iran is a deeply nationalistic society, even if the people despise the Islamist regime. Any intervention that appears externally driven risks strengthening the regime's narrative and provoking backlash. The Revolutionary Guards thrive on the image of Iran as a besieged fortress. A misstep could entrench them further.
So while regime change is not impossible, it must ultimately be homemade. The challenge is that the clerics have constructed a dense architecture of fear, dependency, surveillance, and economic patronage that enriched the men with guns. Civil society is fragmented, the opposition in exile is divided, and many are economically tied to the state.
The most plausible scenario is a palace coup: a rupture within the military, perhaps even inside the Revolutionary Guards themselves. Both organizations have suffered humiliating setbacks in recent days, and it is not inconceivable that to protect their corrupt financial interests they might dump the aging clerical leadership, beginning with 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, compelling top clerics to flee Tehran.
Might Trump authorize the carefully calibrated steps that could lead to such a scenario?
For all his hawkish rhetoric, America's problematic president has shown a consistent aversion to prolonged military engagements—on top of an odd disdain for his own military and even for the Western alliance. He criticized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, avoided conflict with North Korea, and even declined to retaliate militarily after Iran shot down a U.S. drone in 2019. Yet he is also deeply drawn to dramatic successes and personal credit. Israel's successful strike campaign may prove tempting.
A scenario where Trump issues a sweeping ultimatum to Iran, demands the dismantling of its missile and proxy projects, and positions himself as the architect of Iran's "freedom moment" might fit this brand. What follows could be very interesting indeed.
At a moment of grave uncertainty, one thing is not in doubt: Even though a period of chaos may follow a collapse of the regime, the 90 million people of Iran deserve better than the theocratic prison they've been consigned to since 1979.
Dan Perry is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor (also leading coverage from Iran) and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books. Follow him at danperry.substack.com.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.