CuriosityStream to Report First Quarter 2025 Financial Results on May 6, 2025
SILVER SPRING, Md.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- CuriosityStream Inc. (NASDAQ: CURI), a global factual entertainment media company, today announced that it will release financial results for the first quarter of 2025 on Tuesday, May 6, 2025, after market close. The company will host a Q&A conference call to discuss these results at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time (2:00 p.m. Pacific Time) on the same day. Reporters are invited to join the call on a listen-only basis.
A live audio webcast of the call will be available on the CuriosityStream Investor Relations website at https://investors.curiositystream.com. Participants may also dial in, toll-free at (888) 510-2008 or International at (646) 960-0306 and reference conference ID 3957505.
An audio replay of the conference call will be available for two weeks following the call on the CuriosityStream Investor Relations website at https://investors.curiositystream.com.
About CuriosityStream Inc.
CuriosityStream Inc. is the entertainment brand for people who want to know more. The global media company is home to award-winning original and curated factual films, shows, and series covering science, nature, history, technology, society, and lifestyle. With millions of subscribers worldwide and thousands of titles, the company operates the flagship Curiosity Stream SVOD service, available in more than 175 countries worldwide; Curiosity Channel, the linear television channel available via global distribution partners; Curiosity University, featuring talks from the best professors at the world's most renowned universities as well as courses, short and long-form videos, and podcasts; Curiosity Now, Curiosity Explora, and other free, ad-supported channels; Curiosity Audio Network, with original content and podcasts; and Curiosity Studios, which oversees original programming. For more information, visit CuriosityStream.com.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Forbes
2 hours ago
- Forbes
Have Reporting Burdens Led To More Firms Staying Private?
The best evidence for this hypothesis comes from micro-caps. Confounding trends and offsetting benefits of being public are often ignored by advocates for reducing reporting rules. The number of US public firms has fallen in recent times. Prof. Jay Ritter, who tracks these numbers, documents that we had 3,804 US listed firms at the end of 2024 relative to the peak of around 8000 in 1996. Remarkably we had 1,384 foreign firms listed at the end of 2024. Many blame higher costs reporting and auditing for the smaller number of US listed firms. They point to the cumulative onslaught of Sarbanes Oxley 2022, the 2003 Global Settlement that alleged made it harder for analysts to cover small firms, Dodd-Frank 2010, and the supposedly relentless pace of accounting and auditing regulation pushed by Congress, the SEC and the FASB. The question I want to address is whether there is any evidence for that claim. Trend depends on benchmark period In a research note, Vanguard points out that if we go back to 1972, the decline shrinks to a third. On top of that, 1972 was the year NASDAQ was set up and 3,000 odd new companies entered the public arena. Why the fall? Doidge, Karolyi, Shen and Stulz (2025) list two potential underlying reasons: (i) it is easier to stay private because restrictions on staying private have softened and it has become easier to raise funds for private firms, perhaps due to the low interest rate environment; and (ii) antitrust enforcement over the last decade has been relatively lax and product market competition has heated up leading to a greater number of mergers. They don't seem to devote much space to reporting cost burden. Acquisitions drive most of the decline A McKinsey piece shows that 95% of the exits from our markets are driven by acquisitions. Thus, the so-called missing companies have not left the investible universe for the US investor as the investor gets indirect exposure to the target via the acquirer's stock. Espen Eckbo makes the acquisition point more rigorously. However, the rate of entry and exit into public markets is not uniform across industries. We had more IPOs, relative to exits, in pharmaceutical and biotech industries. The number of IPOs, relative to exits, are more or less the same in retail, materials, consumer apparel and durables. Exits far exceed IPOs in banking, software, technology hardware, media and telecom. Any theory that argues reporting burdens are a first order problem needs to explain why such burden has massively increased for banking, software, tech hardware, media and telecom relative to pharma. Smaller IPOs, mostly micro-caps, gone The McKinsey piece also makes the interesting point that we have far fewer smaller IPOs now relative to the past. This suggests that more of the earlier value is captured by private investors, as private equity firms seem to take longer to exit their positions now relative to before (3 years in 2007 relative to 6 years in 2015). One could argue that the costs of reporting, auditing and compliance have become too large for smaller IPOs to even think about going public. Vanguard points out that the missing IPOs are micro-caps. Is the loss of micro-caps a policy concern? Moreover, Mauboussin, Callahan, and Majd (2017) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) note that half of what can be referred to as the 'listing gap' (exits more than IPOs) occurred before Sarbanes Oxley became law. Start-ups have declined too Somewhat intriguing, the number of start-ups appears to display mixed patterns since 1996. The Kaufmann index of startup activity falls from 1996 to its nadir in 2013, after which it picks up till 2017, when the index was last published but the 2017 number was still lower than the 1996 number. This suggests that there may be fewer businesses even available to go public. International exchanges I am in the UK as I write this and an institutional investor I know here suggested that the London stock exchange has suffered a similar decline in IPOs. In fact, there is some angst in the UK that they are losing listings to the US. The loss in listings applies to other advanced economies as well, as Espen Eckbo points out. The theory pushing for reporting burdens as the primary explanation will have to explain why UK reporting and reporting in other advanced economies has also become onerously burdensome. Burgeoning private equity (PE) A senior executive tells me,' the payouts achieved by management and their VCs by arranging acquisitions to PE firms, as well as PE to PE sales have been, in recent times, just as compelling as anything other than a truly dramatic IPO. Smaller companies, companies with significant internal ownership, companies without strong growth or high investment opportunities (that is to say not pharma or biotech who absolutely need risk capital), companies where management would like to stay involved but are not keen on public company visibility. These are all great reasons to be acquired by PE rather than either IPO or even getting acquired by a public company rapidly, with certainty, without much publicity. PE is incredibly well equipped at maximizing ongoing cashflows, and growth, while still maintaining: (i) particularly attractive incentives for management in the transaction, (ii) management that stays post transaction with significant incentive retentions and milestones -- all without pesky proxy announcements about executive compensation; and (iii) objectively great returns to those equity holders that are just selling.' The role of reporting for intangibles Rene Stulz (2018) has suggested that new firms heavily invest in intangibles and forced disclosure of intangibles by securities laws, all else constant, encourage firms to stay private. I am not sure of this argument as US public firms barely tell us anything about their intangible investments, especially home grown ones. Papers suggesting that SOX increased regulatory burdens Zhang (2007) finds negative returns of around -15% to -13% around the events surrounding the passage of SOX. I find these returns too large to be credible. Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) observed an increase in decisions to go private after SOX. But this evidence is mixed. Bartlett (2008) of the Stanford Law School re-examines this question and concludes, 'non-SOX factors were the primary impetus for the "name brand" buyouts commonly evoked as evidence that SOX has harmed the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets.' Iliev (2010) is perhaps the best cited paper in the area. Using careful research designs, Iliev documents that section 404 of the SOX, which mandates that the auditor attest the internal controls of the firm for the absence of a material weakness, led to conservative reported earnings but also imposed real costs. Iliev compares audit fees and earnings quality for firms with float of $50-75 million to those just above at $75 million-$100 million. The idea is that firms in these two partitions are mostly similar except that Section 404 applies only to firms with float greater than $75 million. He concludes, 'on net, SOX compliance reduced the market value of small firms' and increases audit fees by 167%. Atanasov and Black (2020) replicate Iliev (2010) and conclude that not controlling for firm growth led Iliev (2010) to overestimate SOX compliance costs in his analysis. However, the increase in audit fees suffered by the small firms is real, by about 80%. The dollar numbers underlying these estimates are worth reiterating. The average firm in Iliev's affected firm sample pays more than $0.7 million in greater audit fees. The mean and median earnings of sample firms is -$4.8 million and -$1.4 million respectively. Iliev uses this comparison to argue that the compliance costs of section 404 were substantial. Were they? Would these firms have survived had section 404 not been enacted? Is it obvious that investors would have wanted to invest in such firms? And, how much of the audit fee hike is temporary for a year or two. Even more noteworthy, this evidence relates to micro caps (defined as stocks with market capitalizations of between $50 million and $250 million in 2024). These numbers would be smaller if we went back in time as stock markets have gone up quite a bit in the last 20 years or so. The bigger question is how can we possibly generalize evidence reliant on a sample of microcaps to the entire corporate ecosystem? Ewens, Xiao and Xu (2024), in a new paper, move this literature forward and consider three such natural breakpoints to estimate costs of mandatory reporting: (i) firms below $25 million in float in 1992 were designated as 'small businesses' and escaped a few disclosure requirements; (ii) the $75 million float threshold that Iliev looked for section 404 of SOX; and (iii) the $700 million float threshold used in the 2012 JOBS Act. The 2012 JOBS Act is interesting because the point of that legislation was to exempt smaller firms from a few reporting requirements. So, the JOBS Act presents a bit of a counterfactual to the usual setting whereby regulation increased. Based on these events, they claim that the median firm spends 4.3% of its market capitalization on compliance costs. I find the 4.3% number somewhat big. Moreover, even with the clever econometrics used in the paper, can one really generalize estimates from SOX and JOBS Act to the universe of firms? I don't know. Interestingly, Ewens et al. themselves seem to conclude, 'heightened regulatory costs only explain a small fraction of the decline in the number of public firms over the last two decades. Our results suggest that non-regulatory factors likely played a more important role in explaining the decline in the number of U.S. public firms.' Evidence around the 2012 JOBS Act Researchers are generally good at coming up with unintended consequences of regulations that public firms are required to follow. But we don't often see studies that document the offsetting benefits of going or staying public. The 2012 JOBS Act presents a rare opportunity to consider whether relaxing reporting regulations encourages more IPOs. Dambra et al. (2015) conclude that the 2012 JOBS Act led to an increase of 21 IPOs a year, on average. Ewens et al. (2024) find a slightly higher estimate: roughly 28 additional IPOs. One must wonder whether 20 odd IPOs per year are worth the potential collateral damage to the credibility of US reporting and compliance systems, if the PCAOB were to be dismantled or SOX were to be repealed. Incidentally, many other advanced economies passed regulation, modeled on SOX, in their own countries. Did they not conduct a careful assessment of costs of such regulation on their IPO activity? Or did they recognize the need to tighten up reporting and audit rules after the tech bubble burst in 2001? IPO Tax Robert Jackson's, the ex-SEC commissioner, analysis highlights the 7% tax that middle market IPOs must pay even before they go public, to investment bankers, lawyers and the like. Surely, the IPO tax, which has little to do per se with the reporting and compliance costs of 4.3% highlighted by Ewens et al, deserves more attention. The advocates of cutting reporting burdens are somewhat silent about reducing the 7% middle market IPO tax. And I am aware of startups that are working on software that can write an S1 in minutes with AI. Shouldn't the 4.3% reporting costs, estimated by Ewens et al., fall? Benefits of staying public are often ignored Owners, VCs, and capital providers get liquidity. Public firms can potentially pay labor mostly via stock and hence attract higher quality talent. Stock can be used as a means of payment to buy another company and hence take out a rival or to buy a complementary firm. If you get acquired, the acquirer is usually expected to pay a 25% control premium over the prevailing stock price. In sum, the case for reporting burdens forcing companies to stay private is far from clear. The best evidence relates to micro-caps and generalizing from that set to other companies is not straightforward. Partisan debate about the evidence often tends to ignore the vast number of confounding factors such as low interest rates, falling number of start-ups, special time periods chosen for the analysis and large number of acquisitions of public firms and the 7% IPO tax. If anything, US reporting rules need to be strengthened, not weakened. I have pointed out, time and again, the deficiencies in our financial reporting system and how auditors could potentially do a better job. Regulators may want to proceed with caution the next time someone brings up the hypothesis that reporting burdens are a significant barrier to US firms going public.
Associated Press
2 hours ago
- Associated Press
NWTN Investors Have Opportunity to Join NWTN Inc. Fraud Investigation with the Schall Law Firm
LOS ANGELES--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Jun 7, 2025-- The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm, announces that it is investigating claims on behalf of investors of NWTN Inc. ('NWTN' or 'the Company') (NASDAQ: NWTN ) for violations of the securities laws. The investigation focuses on whether the Company issued false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose information pertinent to investors. NWTN disclosed on May 28, 2025, that it had received a determination notice from Nasdaq indicated that the Company's securities will be delisted for failing to comply with listing rules. If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to participate. We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law Firm, 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2460, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at 310-301-3335, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at or by email at [email protected]. The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder rights litigation. This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some jurisdictions under the applicable law and rules of ethics. View source version on CONTACT: The Schall Law Firm Brian Schall, Esq. 310-301-3335 [email protected] KEYWORD: UNITED STATES NORTH AMERICA CALIFORNIA INDUSTRY KEYWORD: CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PROFESSIONAL SERVICES LEGAL SOURCE: The Schall Law Firm Copyright Business Wire 2025. PUB: 06/07/2025 03:56 PM/DISC: 06/07/2025 03:55 PM
Yahoo
2 hours ago
- Yahoo
2 High-Growth Stocks to Buy and Hold for Great Long-Term Potential
CoreWeave is a promising stock to use to profit from the growing investment in AI infrastructure services. Axon stock recently hit new highs as it continues to report growing demand for its public safety solutions. 10 stocks we like better than CoreWeave › Investing in fast-growing companies that still have a large opportunity ahead for their products can help you build wealth. Artificial intelligence (AI) and public safety are promising industries to look for investments in 2025. Here are two stocks to ride these megatrends. AI is expected to add trillions in value to the economy over the long term, but this first requires substantial investment in data centers specially designed to handle AI computing workloads. CoreWeave (NASDAQ: CRWV) is a leader in offering AI infrastructure through the cloud for training models and other advanced workloads at scale. CoreWeave's revenue has exploded over the last year, growing from $189 million in Q1 2024 to $982 million in Q1 2025. Management expects 2025 revenue to be between $4.9 billion to $5.1 billion. For a long-term investor, CoreWeave is a unique stock with which to ride the growth of AI. It earns revenue through multiyear contracts or on-demand services, but most of its revenue is through committed contracts. This business model instills steady revenue and growing cash flows over time. The business is in the process of investing in technology to meet growing demand for its services. It reported a loss of $314 million last quarter. This mostly reflects the high upfront investment it's making in infrastructure, such as Nvidia's graphics processing units (GPUs), to offer its AI cloud platform to customers. However, CoreWeave is already showing the potential to be a very profitable business down the road. In Q1, its adjusted operating income increased 17% year over year to $163 million. But until it achieves higher margins, investors should expect the stock to be volatile. This is a world-class AI infrastructure provider that is trading at a price-to-sales multiple of 13 based on management's 2025 guidance. This is based on the company's current market cap (share price times shares outstanding) of $64 billion. Investors buying around this valuation can still expect to earn excellent returns over the next several years. Axon Enterprise (NASDAQ: AXON) (formerly Taser International) started over 30 years ago selling its Taser energy devices for law enforcement and self-defense. In recent years, the company has transformed into a services company with software solutions. This has grown its addressable market to an estimated $129 billion. Axon offers cloud-based evidence gathering software and body cameras, which has transformed the business from a device seller to a comprehensive solutions provider for public safety. Revenue from software and services grew 39% year over year to $263 million last quarter. Taser devices remain a key growth driver for the company. Since launching a few years ago, Taser 10 orders are growing twice as fast as the adoption of Taser 7. This indicates an expanding market for its products, which is a great sign for investors buying shares today. Axon's total revenue grew 31% year over year last quarter to $604 million. Axon is also benefiting from strong demand for Draft One, a service that uses AI to automatically fill out data entries and police reports. It saves hours of time from manual work, which has made it the fastest-growing software offering in Axon's history. Taser is potentially vulnerable to risks that investors should be aware of. It generates some revenue from government contracts, making it susceptible to spending cuts and higher compliance costs that could pressure its profit margin. It could also face public backlash and resistance from privacy concerns over its body camera products. But Axon's history shows that the need for enhanced public safety tools continues to grow. The stock surged to new highs following its first-quarter earnings report, which can be taken as a bullish signal on the company's future. Before you buy stock in CoreWeave, consider this: The Motley Fool Stock Advisor analyst team just identified what they believe are the for investors to buy now… and CoreWeave wasn't one of them. The 10 stocks that made the cut could produce monster returns in the coming years. Consider when Netflix made this list on December 17, 2004... if you invested $1,000 at the time of our recommendation, you'd have $669,517!* Or when Nvidia made this list on April 15, 2005... if you invested $1,000 at the time of our recommendation, you'd have $868,615!* Now, it's worth noting Stock Advisor's total average return is 792% — a market-crushing outperformance compared to 171% for the S&P 500. Don't miss out on the latest top 10 list, available when you join . See the 10 stocks » *Stock Advisor returns as of June 2, 2025 John Ballard has positions in CoreWeave and Nvidia. The Motley Fool has positions in and recommends Axon Enterprise and Nvidia. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy. 2 High-Growth Stocks to Buy and Hold for Great Long-Term Potential was originally published by The Motley Fool
