The U.S. Message To Australia And Japan

Forbes

8 hours ago

The United States is, not surprisingly, concerned about alliance burden-sharing and security commitments, recently focusing on Australia and Japan and their respective views toward Taiwan. U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby has raised this issue in conversations with Australian and Japanese leadership, asking these two U.S. allies to clarify their security commitments to Taiwan in the event of a mainland Chinese attack. The U.S. itself has long maintained a posture of 'strategic ambiguity,' deliberately avoiding specifics about its potential response to such a scenario.
Colby's initiative aimed to signal regional unity in the U.S. effort to preserve the status quo between Taiwan and the mainland. It also carried a practical appeal: encouraging U.S. allies to strengthen their defense capabilities.
Burden-sharing remains a perennial challenge in alliances, driven by the natural temptation for partners to save on defense expenditures and, relatively speaking, benefit from the U.S. defense budget. Partners tend to underinvest in their own defense, relying on the U.S. security umbrella.
Here lies the paradox: neither Japan nor Australia can independently defend Taiwan. Only the United States possesses the military capacity—and therefore the credibility—to deter the People's Republic of China. Only the U.S. can impose long-term costs on China.
Whether Australia or Japan increases or decreases its defense spending, the sole indispensable component of deterrence remains U.S. credibility.
Japan knows this. Australia knows this. The U.S. knows this. Most importantly, China knows this.
So why would Japan or Australia seek to strengthen their security commitments to Taiwan when doing so offers no meaningful advantage to Taiwan but risks provoking China?
While Colby's outreach stirred debate in both countries, officials reiterated their positions of not formalizing any commitment to a hypothetical conflict. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stated that Australia would not commit troops in advance to any conflict. That ambiguity reflects a desire to maintain strategic flexibility and avoid premature entanglement in a potential war.
This conversation unfolds at a moment when the Trump administration is challenging or reshaping long-held positions and procedures in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. As Trump imposes higher tariffs on both Australia and Japan, the U.S. signals a shift away from its traditional role in alliance leadership and regional problem-solving—making itself a less attractive partner by reducing predictability and increasing the cost of engagement.
Much of what the U.S. is attempting in its trade relationship with Australia is viewed as unnecessary, counterproductive, or even in bad faith. The U.S. has a Free Trade Agreement with Australia that eliminates tariffs on nearly all bilateral trade. In fact, the U.S. currently enjoys a trade surplus with Australia—one of Trump's stated trade goals.
Rather than leading with a call for increased commitment to Taiwan, the U.S. could have pursued a less controversial approach: encouraging Japan and Australia to expand joint military exercises, enhance maritime surveillance, or simply boost defense spending without direct reference to China. By centering its request on Taiwan, the U.S. chose the approach least likely to elicit a positive response from its allies.
The Trump administration's outreach to Japan and Australia appears to have resulted in diminished confidence in the U.S. and reduced credibility regarding Taiwan. The paradox is that the U.S. may still see incremental increases in both countries' defense budgets in the coming years—but driven by concern about the U.S., not concern about China.